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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction and Frame of Reference 
 
 
 CONTENT: 1. Introduction to the topic. – 2. Hypotheses and goals. – 3. The principle of freedom in 
implementation of international law and its limits: implications for the role of national political authorities. – 
Fundamental policy factors influencing the way international law is implemented in domestic legal systems. – 
4.1. Safeguard of democratic legitimacy. – 4.2. Separation of powers. – 4.3. National sovereignty. – 5. Structure 
of the work. 
 
 
1. Introduction to the topic. 
 
The role of domestic political actors in the application of international law has undergone a 
steady and momentous transformation. 
Under the Westphalian conception of sovereignty, the separation line between international 
law and matters of purely domestic concern was clear-cut: virtually all relations between 
national governments and their subjects were deemed to fall under the exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction of states.1 As late as in 1950, the International Law Commission could observe 
that “many of the provisions of international law serve little purpose in national law”.2 Across 
the vast expanse of domaine réservé, the regulatory powers of domestic political authorities 
were left unaffected by international law.3 
These circumstances, however, are long gone. The expansion in subject-matter experienced 
by international law has caused its domain to overlap to a great extent with the areas regulated 
by national law.4 Contemporary international law increasingly claims to influence, regulate 
and control political decisions internal to municipal legal systems.5 It seems, therefore, that 
ensuring that domestic political actors obey international law is more vital to the effectiveness 
of the international legal order than it ever was. 
                                                
1 R.A. FALK, “The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of the International Legal Order”, in 
R.A. FALK, C.E. BLACK (eds.), The Future of the International Legal Order, Volume 1, Princeton, 1969, p. 32 ff. 
2 Report of the International Law Commission covering its second session, 5 June – 25 July 1950, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1950, Vol. II, p. 364 ff., p. 370, para. 53. 
3 On the classical understanding of sovereignty, see generally J. MATTERN, Concepts of State, Sovereignty 
and International Law, Baltimore-Oxford, 1928. See also S.D. KRASNER, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 
Princeton, 1999, p. 20 (criticizing the Westphalian conception of the state as a territory where “political 
authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate behavior”). 
4 R. JENNINGS, A. WATTS, Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, London-New York, 1992, p. 54; C. 
TOMUSCHAT, “International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century”, Recueil des 
cours 1999, Vol. 281, p. 9 ff., p. 63 (describing international law as a “comprehensive blueprint for social life”); 
R. PISILLO MAZZESCHI, “Human Rights and the Modernization of International Law”, in F. LENZERINI, A.F. 
VRDOLJAK (eds.), International Law for Common Goods: Normative Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture 
and Nature, Oxford-Portland, 2014, p. 89 ff., p. 90; J. CRAWFORD, “International Law and the Rule of Law”, 
Adelaide Law Review 2003, p. 3 ff., p. 6-8 (noting that “[i]nternational law is concerned increasingly with 
matters internal to the state – human rights, the environment, investment protection, criminal law, intellectual 
property, the conditions of free trade in terms of the WTO, the control of civil conflict and so on”). 
5 A.M. SLAUGHTER, W. BURKE-WHITE, “The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The European 
Way of Law)”, Harvard International Law Journal 2006, p. 327 ff., p. 338 (international law puts increasing 
emphasis on “shaping or influencing political outcomes within sovereign states”). 
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And yet, despite its tendency to regulate matters of domestic concern, international law 
remains – somewhat paradoxically – entirely dependent for its domestic implementation on 
the very subjects whose actions it aims to constrain. Indeed, national governments retain 
exclusive control of coercive authority within the state.6 Heinrich Triepel, who famously 
likened international law to a field marshal who can reach his goals only if the generals (i.e. 
national legal systems) issue orders to their subordinates, would probably be pleased to see 
how accurate his metaphor remains.7 
What has changed, though, is that the generals have become much more assertive in ensuring 
that subordinates do not break ranks with international law. National legal systems, indeed, 
commonly establish a number of legal devices aimed at ensuring that their own governments 
comply with international obligations. Such devices can be classed in two categories. Firstly, 
domestic law may curb the lawmaking, i.e. political authorities may be deprived of the 
capacity to determine whether and how international law should be imported in the domestic 
legal system. This may happen, for example, by means of constitutional provisions 
establishing the automatic incorporation of international sources within domestic law, or their 
primacy over domestic sources of law. Secondly, domestic law may also constrain the 
domestic enforcement of international law. Compliance of governmental action with 
international law may be subject to external review and, most notably, to judicial control. In 
certain legal systems, judicial review may extend to the conformity of legislation with 
international law. Because of their capacity to be entrusted with powers of review of 
governmental action which are unknown to any international institution, national courts are 
increasingly regarded as a backbone of the effectiveness of international law as a whole.8 
The choice to submit the latitude of the political branches to the authority of international law, 
however, is at the crossroads of competing considerations in domestic law. While it can 
greatly facilitate state compliance with international obligations, it can also entail a tension 
with principles and values embodied by the prerogatives of the political authorities. A notable 
example is the protection of domestic democracy. Limitations on the acts of the political 
branches may be perceived to impinge on the democratic process, to the extent that such acts 
are regarded as expressions of the democratic will. Furthermore, the division of competence 
between state organs in the application of international norms may raise concerns with regard 
to the separation of powers. The automatic incorporation of international agreements, for 
example, may seem to empower the executive to the detriment of the legislature. Judicial 
                                                
6 Ibid., p. 343. See also M. KANETAKE, A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The International Rule of Law in the Cycle of 
Contestations and Deference”, in M. KANETAKE, A. NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), The Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels: Contestations and Deference, Oxford-Portland, 2016, p. 445 ff., p. 455 (“national and 
international law are dependent on each other in order to achieve certain purposes”). 
7 H. TRIEPEL, “Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international”, Recueil des cours 1923, vol. 1, p. 
73 ff., p. 106 (international law “est semblable à un maréchal qui ne donne ses ordres qu’aux chefs des troupes et 
ne peut atteindre son but que s’il est sûr que les généraux, se conformant à ses instructions, donneront de 
nouveaux ordres à ceux qui leur sont soumis”). For a more recent restatement of the same concept, see B. 
CONFORTI, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal Systems, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993, p. 9 
(contending that “[o]nly a State’s internal system can act effectively to prevent the State from violating 
international law”). 
8 On this point, see generally A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts and the International Rule of Law, 
Oxford, 2011. For a more thorough analysis of the role of national courts in the enforcement of international law, 
see Chapters 3 and 4. 
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checks on the acts of the political branches, for their part, may seem to increase the power of 
the judiciary vis-à-vis the political authorities. 
The influence of these concerns potentially impacts on all aspects of the domestic 
implementation of international law, from the choices of constitutional drafters to the 
everyday activities of national courts. Such principles of domestic law may be perceived to 
offset the desirability and the legitimacy of a purely internationalist approach to international 
law implementation. This, in turn, might induce domestic organs to dodge international 
obligations. 
The tension between compliance with international obligations and domestic concerns 
relating to democracy and separation of powers stirs a number of complex questions. To 
begin with, it seems inevitable to wonder if this tension constitutes a structural feature of the 
relationship between international law and domestic law or, to the contrary, if it can be 
reconciled. But either of the two possible answers begs further questions. On the one hand, 
assuming that ways to reconcile this tension do exist, the question is whether they should be 
devised at the level of international law or, instead, a balance can only be pursued within 
national legal systems. If, on the other hand, this tension is to some extent unavoidable, the 
most crucial question becomes whether it inevitably leads to disregarding international 
obligations. These questions go to the heart of international law’s capability to be effectively 
implemented and respected in domestic legal systems.9  They deserve, therefore, to be 
addressed analytically. 
 
 
2. Hypotheses and goals. 
 
This thesis aims to explore and systematize the theoretical and practical implications of the 
tension that has just been outlined. It is underlied by three research hypotheses, which can be 
summarized in the following terms. 
The first hypothesis is that the aforementioned tension is to some extent inevitable. The 
reason why this hypothesis seems tenable is simple. International law’s claim to supremacy is 
absolute and generally unconcerned by any obstacles set by domestic political processes. To 
the contrary, in a domestic legal system the interest in compliance with international law can 
reasonably be expected to interact with other fundamental principles of domestic law relating 
to the prerogatives of the political branches.10 
                                                
9 As noted by A. NOLLKAEMPER, “Rethinking the Supremacy of International Law”, Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht 2010, p. 65 ff., p. 71, “the question of conformity of national law with international 
obligations is a matter of international law because, first, it undermines the effectiveness of international law 
and, second, States can incur responsibility at the international level for failing to abide by their international 
obligations”. 
10 On the broader topic of the interplay between international law and fundamental principles of domestic 
law, see generally F.M. PALOMBINO, “Compliance with International Judgments: Between Supremacy of 
International Law and National Fundamental Principles”, ZaöRV 2015, p. 503 ff., particularly p. 510 (noting, 
with reference to the US Supreme Court decision Medellín v. Texas, that the separation of powers can constitute 
one of such fundamental principles that national courts may wish to safeguard). On Medellín, see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2. See also A. PETERS, “Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitutional Law”, 
Vienna Online Journal on International Constitutional Law 2009, p. 170 ff.; E. BENVENISTI, A. HAREL, 
“Embracing the Tension between National and International Human Rights Law: The Case for Discordant 
Parity”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2017, p. 36 ff. 
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The second hypothesis is that international law is scarcely suited to addressing and solving 
such concerns. This assumption stems from two considerations. First, international decision-
making still is (or is perceived to be) scarcely democratic, a feature which seems unlikely to 
change anytime soon. Second, and most importantly, there is no universally agreed definition 
of democracy or of separation of powers. It seems therefore sensible to assume that the 
conundrum can have no uniformly accepted solution, and that every national legal system will 
try to safeguard the prerogatives of its political branches in accordance with its own domestic 
specificities. For this reason, the tension can be explored effectively only if one adopts a 
chiefly domestic law perspective, as will be done in the following chapters. 
The third hypothesis is that the tension, however inevitable, does not necessarily lead to non-
compliance. Although this might occasionally happen, the supposition is that this tension is 
mostly vented in ways which do not compromise respect for international obligations. This 
means, otherwise stated, that the domestic countervailing concerns are – or, at the least, 
potentially could be – addressed through the physiological processes of implementation of 
international law in domestic law, and that chronical conflicts represent – or could represent – 
exceptions. In order to prove if this is true, it will be necessary to explore in detail how 
specific legal systems relate to the prerogatives of the political branches in the 
implementation of international obligations. 
Against the backdrop of these hypotheses, the analysis of domestic legal systems will be 
guided by the following aims. Firstly, it will seek to assess why and how national legal 
systems ensure that political authorities comply with international law and how pervasive is 
the impact of domestic countervailing concerns. Secondly, it will analyze in detail how 
national courts grappling with such competing imputs behave and what judicial techniques 
have been devised to manage this tension. Thirdly, it will advance propositions on how 
domestic organs, and particularly national courts, should behave when addressing these issues 
and which rules or techniques can contribute to effectuating a balance between competing 
needs. 
 
 
3. The principle of freedom in implementation of international law and its limits: 
implications for the role of national political authorities. 
 
Before embarking on the analysis of the main questions underpinning this research, it is 
necessary to briefly explore the international legal framework governing the implementation 
of international obligations in national legal orders and to enquire into the role for national 
political authorities resulting from this regime. 
The default approach of international law to its implementation in domestic legal orders is 
moulded by the interplay of two fundamental rules. Firstly, a state cannot justify non-
compliance with international obligations by pleading provisions of its own domestic law. 
Secondly, it is immaterial how a state concretely performs its international obligations, as 
long as it complies with them in practice. These two principles are often respectively referred 
to as the principle of supremacy and that of neutrality. 
The principle of supremacy is supported by compelling international authority. Its earliest 
formulation dates back to the 1872 Alabama Claims arbitration award. The U.S. claimed that 
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Great Britain had violated its obligation to remain neutral in the course of the Civil War by 
allowing Confederate vessels to use its ports. The tribunal held that Great Britain could not 
justify itself by adducing that it did not possess the necessary legislation to prevent access to 
its ports to commerce raiders.11 This principle has been consistently restated in the case law of 
both the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). For example, in the Free Zones case, the PCIJ held that “it is certain that France cannot 
rely on her own legislation to limit the scope of her international obligations”.12 International 
law’s claim to supremacy over domestic law is all-encompassing, therefore including also 
supremacy over domestic constitutional law.13 This principle has also been codified in Art. 27 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, pursuant to which “[a] party may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”,14 
and in Art. 32 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.15 
The principle of neutrality arises as a consequence of the principle of supremacy’s exclusive 
emphasis on compliance. So far as deficiencies of domestic law do not cause non-compliance, 
general international law is unconcerned with the manner in which states set out their 
municipal legal systems.16 This principle is usually understood as indifference towards 
                                                
11 Alabama claims of the United States of America against Great Britain, Award of 14 September 1872, 
reprinted in J.B. MOORE (ed.), History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States 
has been a Party, Washington, 1898, p. 653 ff. 
12  Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v. Switzerland), Order of 6 
December 1930 (Series A, No. 24), p. 12. See also Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. 
Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 116, Individual Opinion of Judge Alvarez, p. 152 (“[i]nternational 
law takes precedence over municipal law. Acts committed by a State which violate international law involve the 
responsibility ofthat State”). 
13 Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in Danzig Territory, 
Advisory Opinion of 4 February 1932 (Series A/B, No. 44), p. 24 (“a State cannot adduce as against another 
State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international law or 
treaties in force”); Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 12 ff., p. 65 (“The rights guaranteed under the Vienna Convention are treaty rights which 
the United States has undertaken to comply with in relation to the individual concerned, irrespective of the due 
process rights under United States constitutional law”). 
14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331, entered into force 27 
January 1980 (VCLT). The only exception to Art. 27 is set forth by Art. 46: “A State may not invoke the fact 
that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law 
regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and 
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance”. 
15 International Law Commission, “Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 31 ff. See Art. 32: “The responsible 
State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to comply with its obligations 
under this Part”; and Art. 3: “The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by 
international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by 
internal law”. On these provisions, see P.M. DUPUY, “Relations Between the International Law of Responsibility 
and Responsibility in Municipal Law”, in J. CRAWFORD, A. PELLET, S. OLLESON (eds.), The Law of International 
Responsibility, Oxford, 2010, p. 173 ff. 
16 R. JENNINGS, A. WATTS, cit., p. 82; P. MALANCZUK, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International 
Law, London-New York, 19977, p. 64; T. BUERGENTHAL, “Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in 
National and International Law”, Recueil des cours 1992, vol. 235, p. 303 ff., p. 320; E. BORCHARD, “The 
Relation Between International Law and Municipal Law”, Virginia Law Review 1940, p. 137 ff., p. 143; M. 
MENDEZ, The Legal Effects of EU Agreements, Oxford, 2013, p. 58 (“Strikingly, international law continues to 
have remarkably little to say on the issue of the domestic legal effects of treaties, with the basic rule remaining in 
place that States are free to determine how they meet their treaty obligations”). For an isolated dissenting voice, 
see P. PESCATORE, “Conclusion”, in F.G. JACOBS, S. ROBERTS (eds.), The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, 
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various implementation techniques (e.g. between automatic incorporation and ad hoc 
transformation)17 but it implicates, in fact, a more radical corollary: states are not required to 
conform their domestic legal orders to international law, as long as the substance of 
international law is respected in concrete cases.18 Even though prominent commentators 
contend that a general obligation to bring national law in agreement with international law 
does in fact exist, they nonetheless acknowledge, at the same time, that states disregarding 
this obligation would not commit an internationally wrongful act unless compliance is 
hampered.19 In reality, as the ILC noted in 1977, “the commands of international law in many 
cases, especially where they have to be enforced through the State’s internal system, stop 
short at the outer boundaries of the State machinery”.20 
General international law’s minimalist approach to the regulation of domestic implementation 
processes is first and foremost a reflection of state practice. States do not protest against the 
way in which other states carry out their obligations.21 But it is also revealing to put this 
approach into a broader perspective. The principle of neutrality as regards the means of 
international law’s domestic implementation is but an aspect of a wider principle, i.e. the one 
according to which, where international law provides no binding rules, state sovereignty is 
presumed to be unconstrained. This is commonly referred to as the “Lotus principle” after the 
1927 Lotus case, where the PCIJ resorted to this background presumption.22 It is not within 
the scope of this work to assess whether this presumption is still tenable in contemporary 
international law, a point which is debated in scholarship.23 Be that as it may, this principle, 
                                                                                                                                                   
London, 1987, p. 273 ff., p. 275 (“Incorporation procedures and methods based on ‘transformation’ are therefore 
by their very essence incompatible with good faith in international relations. By ratification a state promises 
unqualified implementation of a treaty […] while by using the ‘transformation’ method for incorporation the 
same state retains the possibility of not implementing a treaty at all, or of implementing only part of it, or of 
altering its effect unilaterally”). 
17 See e.g. P. MALANCZUK, cit., p. 64. 
18 A. CASSESE, International Law, Oxford, 20052, p. 218; A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 70. 
19 J. CRAWFORD, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, 20128, p. 52 (arguing that 
“there is a general duty to bring national law in conformity with” international law, but that “normally a failure 
to bring about such conformity is not in itself a breach of international law”); G. FITZMAURICE, “The General 
Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law”, Recueil des cours 1957, 
vol. 92, p. 1 ff., p. 89 (speaking of a “general obligation to harmonize the state’s domestic law with its 
international obligations […] But a State does not commit a direct breach of international law merely by not 
doing this. The immediate breach strictly arises only if and when the State, by reason of the failure or deficiency, 
is actually unable to carry out a specific international obligation on a definite occasion”). See also R. JENNINGS, 
A. WATTS, cit., p. 85-86 (whether international law requires states to harmonize domestic law to international 
law is “uncertain”: it depends on whether a specific international norm is about possessing a certain law or 
performing a certain act). 
20 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-ninth session, 9 May-29 July 
1977, UN Doc. A/32/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1977, vol. II, Part Two, p. 19. 
21 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 71. 
22 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), Judgment of 7 September 1927 (Series A, No. 10), p. 
30-31 (“there is no principle of international law […] which precludes the institution of the criminal proceedings 
under consideration. Consequently, Turkey, by instituting, in virtue of the discretion which international law 
leaves to every sovereign State, the criminal proceedings in question, has not, in the absence of such principles, 
acted in a manner contrary to the principles of international law”). On the “Lotus principle”, see M. 
KOSKENNIEMI, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument, Cambridge, 2005, p. 
255-258; A. PETERS, “Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?”, Leiden Journal of International Law 
2011, p. 95 ff. 
23 For critical views on the “Lotus principle”, see e.g. G. FITZMAURICE, “The General”, cit., p. 56-59; C. 
TOMUSCHAT, “Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will”, Recueil des cours 1993, vol. 241, 
p. 195 ff., p. 210-212. 
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despite being a product of its time, still provides an accurate description of the default 
approach of general international law toward domestic implementation of international 
obligations. 
The freedom of states to choose the means of international law implementation should not be 
absolutized, though. Such freedom, however broad, is merely interstitial. It stops where 
international law establishes more specific rules on how states should carry out their 
obligations. 
First of all, the content of domestic law is not altogether irrelevant from the perspective of 
general international law.24 States are required to carry out their obligations in good faith.25 
This entails the necessity to harmonize national law with international law, if and to the extent 
that the harmonization is necessary to ensure compliance with international obligations. This 
cannot but be appreciated on a case-by-case basis. In Exchange of Greek and Turkish 
Populations, the PCIJ held that a state is obliged to change its domestic law in such a way “as 
may be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken”.26 In LaGrand, the 
ICJ remarked that “a distinction must be drawn between that rule as such and its specific 
application in the present case”, thus denying that legislation as such could amount to a 
breach of international law.27 The same approach underpinned the Avena Interpretation 
Judgment, where the ICJ held that, in order to comply with the earlier Avena Judgment, the 
United States could “choose the means of implementation, not excluding the introduction […] 
of appropriate legislation, if deemed necessary […]”.28 Changes in legislation, therefore, are 
not required per se. Ultimately, compliance remains the focal point.29 
Furthermore, more detailed international obligations concerning domestic implementation are 
frequently established by treaty. It would be impossible to explore all such obligations in this 
introduction. However, it is opportune to briefly describe the two most prominent and 
widespread categories of such obligations: namely, obligations bring domestic law into 
                                                
24 Such a position was seemingly espoused by Judge Percy Spender in his Separate Opinion in the Case 
Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. 
Sweden), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1958, p. 55, p. 125-126: “it is competent for a State party to any treaty or 
convention to pass a law binding on its own authorities to the effect that, notwithstanding anything in the treaty 
or convention, certain provisions thereof binding on that State shall not apply, or to legislate in terms clearly 
inconsistent with, and intending to override, the terms of an existing treaty […] But that in no way would be 
relevant to the question whether that legislation […] is or is not in breach of […] obligations binding upon the 
State”. 
25 See Art. 26 VCLT (Pacta sunt servanda): “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must 
be performed by them in good faith”; UN General Assembly, Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, 
6 December 1949, A/RES/375, Art. 13: “Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or 
its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty”. 
26 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion of 21 February 1925 (Series B, No. 10), 
p. 20. 
27 LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 466, p. 497. 
28 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2009, p. 3, para. 44 (emphasis in text added). 
29 W.N. FERDINANDUSSE, Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts, The 
Hague, 2006, p. 135 (“All liberties flowing from the freedom of implementation are subject to the condition of 
effective compliance with international law”). 
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conformity with international law, and obligations to ensure judicial control over violations of 
international law committed by public authorities.30 
As regards the former category, i.e. the obligations to ensure that domestic legislation is 
compatible with international law, typical examples can be found in the field of the 
unification of private law,31 or in treaty obligations to make certain conducts punishable 
offenses under domestic law.32 But the most prominent examples of the category under 
analysis are included in regional and universal human rights conventions. Although the 
formulations vary significantly from case to case, such instruments frequently require states to 
ensure, inter alia, the compatibility of their internal law. Take, most notably, Art. 2(2) of the 
ICCPR: “[w]here not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each 
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with 
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such 
laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant”.33  Art. 2(1) of the ICESCR establishes an obligation to pursue the 
progressive realization of its rights “by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures”.34 Finally, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
found that “in ratifying the Convention the Contracting States undertake to ensure that their 
domestic legislation is compatible with it”.35 
                                                
30 On the idea that some international norms would behave differently from other norms as far as their 
domestic reception is concerned, see J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER, “Beyond the Divide”, in J. NIJMAN, A. 
NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law, Oxford, 2007, 
p. 341 ff., p. 343. 
31 See e.g. Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (1 July 1964), 834 
UNTS 107, Art. 1(1): “[e]ach Contracting State undertakes to incorporate into its own legislation, in accordance 
with its constitutional procedure […] the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods […] forming the 
Annex to the present Convention”. 
32 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (27 November 1997), UN General 
Assembly Res. A/52/653, Art. 4(a) (setting forth an obligation to “establish as criminal offences under […] 
domestic law” the terrorist acts that the Convention aims to repress). 
33 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966), 999 UNTS 171. A nearly 
identical provision is is included in Art. 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969), 
1144 UNTS 123. See O. SCHACHTER, “The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law”, in L. 
HENKIN (ed.), The International Bill of Rights: the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 1981, p. 
311 ff. 
34 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966), 993 UNTS 3. For 
further cases, see Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(10 December 1984), 1465 UNTS 85, Art. 2(1): “[e]ach State Party shall take effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction”; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (21 December 1965), 660 
UNTS 212, Art. 2(d): “Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including 
legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization”; African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (27 June 1981), 1520 UNTS 217, Art. 1: states parties “shall recognize 
the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other 
measures to give effect to them”; Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989), 144 UNTS 123, 
Art. 4: “States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention”. 
35 Maestri v. Italy, App. No. 39748/98, Judgment, 17 February 2004, p. 15, para. 47. Art. 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (4 November 1950), 213 UNTS 222 does not refer to legislative implementation 
but merely establishes an obligation for states parties to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. Another multilateral human rights treaty lacking explicit 
reference to legislative implementation is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (18 December 1979), 1249 UNTS 14. 
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As regards the scope of all these obligations, it is possible to advance the argument that the 
fundamentals of the principle of neutrality generally remain operational. The requested result 
of conforming internal law to international law may be achieved in a variety of ways, not only 
through the passing of new legislation, but also by means of executive exercise of legislative 
power, by judicial pronouncements striking down inconsistent legislation, or even through 
inaction, if the substance of the international legal standards is thought to be already 
guaranteed in domestic law. Finally, for such obligations to be effectively carried out, it is not 
sufficient to merely conform domestic law to international law: ultimately, the substance of 
international law ought to be respected in practice.36 
This is all the more evident with regard to the abovementioned provisions of human rights 
treaties calling for legislative implementation. The language of such provisions clearly entails 
broad discretion.37 Essentially, these norms require states to guarantee the effective protection 
of the treaty rights by all means that may be necessary,38 which constitutes no derogation 
from the ground principles analyzed before. In fact, these norms are nothing else than 
restatements of the rule that states must carry out international obligations in good faith. 
Accordingly, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) stated in its General Comment 3 that 
“article 2 of the Covenant generally leaves it to the States parties concerned to choose their 
method of implementation”.39 Similarly, in Litgow the ECtHR confirmed that, in principle, it 
maintains a position of neutrality over the means adopted by states to ensure an effective 
realization of the convention rights.40 
                                                
36 S. BARIATTI, L’interpretazione delle convenzioni internazionali di diritto uniforme, Padova, 1986, p. 61 
(for uniform law conventions to be properly implemented, “non basta […] l’emanazione di una norma interna 
che riproduca il contenuto della norma internazionale, ma è necessario che questa riceva completa e corretta 
attuazione nello Stato per raggiungere concretamente lo scopo per cui è preordinata”); B. CONFORTI, “Obblighi 
di mezzi ed obblighi di risultato nelle convenzioni di diritto uniforme”, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale 1988, p. 233 ff., p. 243. 
37 Y. SHANY, “How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative Analysis of the Influence of 
International Human Rights Treaties upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts by Domestic Courts”, 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2006, p. 341 ff., p. 348 (describing Art. 2(2) ICCPR as “discretionary 
language”). 
38 S. JOSEPH, J. SCHULTZ, M. CASTAN, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary, Oxford, 2000, p. 9 (“article 2 [ICCPR], the general obligation provision, essentially 
requires States Parties effectively to protect rights at the municipal level”); M. CRAVEN, The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on its Development, Oxford, 1995, p. 128 
(“[w]atever the intricacies of the implementation process, it would appear that the ultimate objective of the 
Covenant is the ‘full realization’ of the rights”). 
39 HRC, “General Comment 3 – Article 2 (Implementation at the National Level)”, 29 July 1981, 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9. 
40 Lithgow and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9006/80, Jugdment, 8 July 1986, p. 68, para. 205 
(“Although there is thus no obligation to incorporate the Convention into domestic law, […] the substance of the 
rights and freedoms set forth must be secured under the domestic legal order, in some form or another”). See 
also Colozza v. Italy, App. No. 9024/80, Judgment, 12 February 1985, p. 11, para. 30 (“The Contracting States 
enjoy a wide discretion as regards the choice of the means calculated to ensure that their legal systems are in 
compliance with the requirements of Article 6 […]. The Court’s task is not to indicate those means to the States, 
but to determine whether the result called for by the Convention has been achieved”). As noted by A. 
NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effect of the ECHR and Judgments of the ECtHR on National Law – Comments on the 
Paper of Enzo Cannizzaro”, Italian Yearbook of International Law 2009, p. 189 ff., p. 196, with reference to the 
obligations formulated by the ICJ, they “generally are obligations of result. They require that particular remedies 
are provided, but are agnostic on the question of whether such remedies are performed by the courts or by the 
legislature”. 
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Nonetheless, it should also be considered that carrying out international human rights 
obligations may be difficult, or even impossible, in presence of structural deficiencies of 
national law. A dysfunctional implementation within domestic law can give rise to large-scale 
violations, which, in turn, can make it indispensable to conform internal law to international 
law. This is the reason why regional and international human rights bodies often recommend 
or require changes in legislation.41 While adhering in principle to the rule of freedom of 
means of implementation, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has held 
that “in many instances legislation is highly desirable and in some cases may even be 
indispensable”.42 The Human Rights Committee is commonly assertive in requiring changes 
in the domestic legislation of states parties.43 The ECtHR has introduced a procedure (so-
called pilot judgment) to deal with systemic deficits in implementation which give rise to a 
spate of identical (“repetitive”) cases: the Court commonly indicates to state authorities how 
to remedy these deficiencies at the national level, which often entails changes in domestic 
law.44 
As for the obligations to provide effective domestic remedies available to private parties, by 
which they can seek redress for infringements of international law committed by state 
authorities, they too are commonly included in human rights instruments. For example, Art. 
2(3)(a) of the ICCPR establishes an obligation upon states parties to provide effective 
remedies for violations of treaty rights “committed by persons acting in an official capacity”. 
This article also establishes, at the letters (b) and (c), that such a remedy must consist in a 
determination by a judicial, administrative or legislative authority, or by any other competent 
authority, and that the remedies shall be enforced by domestic authorities. Pursuant to Art. 13 
of the ECHR, “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity”. Similar effective 
remedy clauses are included in most human rights instruments, including Art. 8 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.45 
                                                
41 For general thoughts on this point, see W.N. FERDINANDUSSE, cit., p. 160; F. MCKAY, “What Outcomes 
for Victims?”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, Oxford, 2013, p. 
921 ff., p. 939-940. 
42 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States 
Parties Obligations”, 14 December 1990, E/1991/23, para. 3. See also, inter alia, “General Comment No. 5: 
Persons with disabilities”, 25 November 1994, E/C.12/1994/13, para. 13 (“The methods to be used by States 
parties in seeking to implement their obligations under the Covenant […] include […] the need to legislate 
where necessary and to eliminate any existing discriminatory language”); “General Comment No. 7: The right to 
adequate housing (Art. 11.1): forced evictions”, 20 May 1997, E/1998/22, para. 10 (“it is clear that legislation 
against forced evictions is an essential basis upon which to build a system of effective protection.”). 
43  See e.g. HRC, “Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Italy”, 1 May 2017, 
CCPR/C/ITA/CO/6, para. 9 (requiring to “take all measures necessary, including the adoption of comprehensive 
anti-discrimination legislation, to ensure that its legal framework […] provides full and effective protection 
against discrimination). 
44 See e.g. Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, App. No. 43517/09, Judgment, 8 January 2013 (dealing with 
the structural overcrowding of Italian prisons and prompting changes in domestic legislation to establish an 
effective redress). On this case see F. FAVUZZA, “Torreggiani and Prison Overcrowding in Italy”, Human Rights 
Law Review 2017, p. 153 ff. 
45 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948), UN Doc. A/810, Art. 8 (“Everyone has the 
right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted 
him by the constitution or by law”). See also International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, cit., Art. 6 (“States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection 
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A violation of the obligation to ensure effective remedies may occur in two different 
situations: firstly, where domestic law provides for effective remedies, but they have not been 
available in the concrete case; or, secondly, where domestic law does not provide for effective 
remedies at all. In the latter case, the obligation under scrutiny overlaps in scope with the 
obligation to conform domestic law to international law, in that compliance with the right to 
an effective remedy requires the necessary changes in domestic law.46 In this regard, the 
ECtHR case law concerning Art. 13 is particularly revealing. On multiple occasions, the 
Court has required states to amend structural shortcomings in their legislation concerning 
remedies for actions of state authorities. In Varga v. Hungary, for instance, the Court was 
faced with issues arising from the systemic overcrowding of Hungarian prisons. In a pilot 
judgment, it held that the Hungarian government was under an obligation to make substantive 
changes to municipal law in order to ensure the availability of effective domestic remedies 
allowing detainees to complain about their conditions of detention.47 
In this case, too, the principle of state freedom to choose the means of international law 
implementation is compressed, but its most basic tenets are not contradicted. In particular, it 
should be considered that it is indifferent whether individuals are entitled to invoke domestic 
law or international law, as long as the substance of the treaty rights is complied with. 
Furthermore, human rights instruments are generally indifferent to whether a state establishes 
judicial, administrative or other means of redress. As regards the ECHR, for example, “[t]he 
authority referred to in Article 13 […] may be a court […] as well as an administrative 
authority, a governmental authority or a parliamentary body”.48 
Finally, it can be contended that the external checks on law-enforcing domestic authorities 
required by the obligations under consideration are essentially result-oriented. Their goal is to 
ensure the effective realization of substantive rights, not to establish limits on political power 
per se. It follows from this premise that international law allows for the role of executive 
authorities to re-expand whenever their intervention is required for the substance of 
international law not to be violated. 
Several factors support this conclusion. For example, in general terms, an independent 
judiciary is necessary to ensure a proper implementation of international human rights law at 
the domestic level.49 However, from the viewpoint of international law, independent courts 
                                                                                                                                                   
and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial 
discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention”). The 
ICESCR does not have an effective implementation clause; however, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights held that “in many cases, the other ‘means’ used could be rendered ineffective if they are not 
reinforced or complemented by judicial remedies”: see “General Comment 9: The domestic application of the 
Covenant”, 3 December 1998, E/C.12/1998/24, para. 3. 
46 See e.g. HRC, “General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment)”, 10 March 1992, para. 14 (“Article 7 should be read in conjunction with 
article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. […] The right to lodge complaints against maltreatment prohibited by 
article 7 must be recognized in the domestic law.”). 
47 Varga and Others v. Hungary, App. No. 14097/12 et al., Judgment, 10 March 2015. 
48 C. GRABENWARTER, European Convention on Human Rights – Commentary, Munich, 2014, p. 333. 
However, in order for the remedy to be effective, the deciding autority must not have been involved in the 
alleged violation of the right: see e.g. Calogero Diana v.. Italy, App. No. 15211/89, Judgment, 15 November 
1996, para. 41. 
49 See e.g. Art. 14(1) ICCPR (in criminal proceedings, “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law”); Art. 6(1) ECHR (“In the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a 
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are only a means to an end, i.e. ensuring compliance. If an independent judiciary does not 
achieve the right substantive result, it is not only acceptable but even required that political 
authorities step in and override the incorrect judicial decision. From this perspective, judicial 
independence is but another feature of domestic law which the state cannot plead to justify its 
non-compliance.50 For the same reason, the courts’ interpretive reliance on the political 
authorities is generally acceptable as long as it produces the right result.51 The same can be 
said with regard to actions taken by the political branches in violation of domestic law, if such 
actions prevent international law from being violated.52 In sum, the international obligation to 
ensure effective remedies may be regarded as obligations to adopt a cooperative model of 
implementation between state organs, in which each organ – be it the judiciary or one of the 
political branches – can competitively correct the mistakes of the others in the application of 
international law. 
The above sheds light on important characteristics of the relationship between international 
law and domestic legal systems. International law’s approach to its domestic implementation 
is generally focused on the achievement of effective compliance.53 While the principle of 
neutrality may be compressed, to a certain extent, by special sets of treaty obligations, the 
compliance-centered approach remains the bedrock of the international normative framework 
concerning domestic application. As a consequence, the international legal framework is 
generally indifferent to domestic political processes.54 International law limits the actions of 
state organs from the outside: political branches, just like any other state organ, are agencies 
for carrying out international obligations, and are therefore required to ensure respect for 
international law. As a rule, this does not entail any internal component, i.e. does not translate 
                                                                                                                                                   
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”). It 
should be noted that these provisions apply to claims based not only on international law, but also on domestic 
law. On the role of independent courts in international law implementation, see also Chapter 3, Section 2. 
50 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 55 (“the state (ie the government) needs to be in a position to 
correct or intervene in acts of the judiciary that may contravene international law. When courts apply 
international law correctly, no tension will exist. But in view of the (not merely hypothetical) possibility that 
courts do make incorrect decisions, international law requires the political branches to exercise a control that, by 
definition, may limit independence. […] In this respect at least, the independence of courts is not an end in itself 
but a means toward an effective performance of legal rights and obligations, which may be duly limited when 
independent courts cannot provide for such performance”). 
51 J. ARATO, “Deference to the Executive. The US Debate in Global Perspective”, in H.P. AUST, G. NOLTE 
(eds.), The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts. Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence, Oxford, 
2016, p. 198 ff., p. 202-203. See also D. SLOSS, “United States”, in SLOSS (ed.), The Role of Domestic Courts in 
Treaty Enforcement. A Comparative Study, Cambridge, 2009, p. 504 ff., p. 524 (“deference to the executive is 
not always unilateralist”). 
52 P. MALANCZUK, cit., p. 71 (“if the enforcement of the rule is left to the executive, which enforces it in 
such a way that no breach of international law occurs, all is well”). 
53 A. MARSCHIK, “Hard Law Strikes Back – How the Recent Focus on the Rule of Law Promotes 
Compliance with Norms in International Relations”, in I. BUFFARD, J. CRAWFORD, A. PELLET, S. WITTICH (eds.), 
International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation. Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner, Leiden-
Boston, 2008, p. 61 ff., p. 68-69; M. KUMM, “International Law in National Courts: The International Rule of 
Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model”, Virginia Journal of International Law 2003-2004, p. 19 ff., p. 
22 (the international rule of law “is best understood more narrowly to mean literally what it says: that nations, in 
their relationships to one another, are to be ruled by law. The addressees of international law, states in particular, 
should obey the law. They should treat it as authoritative and let it guide and constrain their actions. The 
international rule of law is realized to the extent states do in fact obey international law”). 
54 R. SUMMERS, “A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law”, Ratio Juris 1993, p. 12 ff. (formal conceptions of 
rule of law are content independent and thus preferrable because politically neutral). 
 16 
into any obligation to create domestic legal constraints on the authority of national political 
authorities to choose the means of international law implementation. 
The above proves two points. Firstly, states retain substantial room for maneuver in the 
domestic application of virtually all international norms. Secondly, international law is 
endowed with a considerable capacity to adapt to, or rely on, the role of national political 
authorities under domestic law. It has been contended that “[t]o secure the space for national 
competences for the matters regulated by international law [is] one way to defer to political 
legitimacy attached to national law”.55 Therefore, in discharging international obligations, 
national legal systems are allowed to take into account relevant domestic policy concerns, 
within the ceiling set by the requirement of compliance. Against this normative backdrop in 
international law, an accurate description of the role of national political authorities in the 
application of international law can only be charted by shifting the focus to the practice of 
national legal systems. 
 
 
4. Fundamental policy factors influencing the way international law is implemented in 
domestic legal systems. 
 
From the viewpoint of international law, the role of national political branches is easy to 
describe: qua components of the state, they are expected to carry out international obligations. 
If one looks at their role in the implementation of international law from the perspective of 
domestic law, however, the situation appears more complex. In domestic legal systems, 
limitations on the prerogatives of national political authorities are generally perceived to come 
at a price: they may be regarded, for example, as limiting democratic decision-making, or as 
upsetting the constitutional balance of state powers. These concerns operate also in the field 
of the domestic application of international obligations. The willingness of domestic legal 
orders to commit the political branches to comply with international law largely depends on 
such policy considerations. 
This section aims to identify the countervailing factors that are potentially relevant in the 
domestic application of international law. Its scope is not to describe the way in which 
specific legal systems implement international obligations, which will be done in the 
following chapters, but only to set the stage of the future analysis by providing a concise 
overview of the main problematic points. In one way or another, the policy concerns which 
come into play are similar in all domestic legal environments. The following paragraphs, 
more specifically, outline the three most oft-invoked concerns: namely, domestic democracy, 
separation of powers, and national sovereignty. They also try to assess to what extent these 
concerns are prima facie justified and whether international law can do something to resolve 
them. 
                                                
55 M. KANETAKE, “The Interfaces Between the National and the International Rule of Law: A Framework 
Paper”, in M. KANETAKE, A. NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), cit., p. 11 ff., p. 39. See also P.M. MCFADDEN, 
“Provincialism in United States Courts”, Cornell Law Review 1995, p. 4 ff., p. 47 ( “black-box theory [i.e. 
freedom of implementation] makes a great deal of sense, from a global perspective, because it recognizes both 
the fact and legitimacy of states having organized themselves in different ways. It would be an unwarranted 
interference in domestic affairs, as well as impractical, to require that specific institutions carry out international 
obligations”). 
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4.1. Safeguard of democratic legitimacy. 
The role of national political authorities in the domestic application of international law can 
be influenced, first and foremost, by a concern about the protection of domestic democracy. 
The concept of democracy does not have any uniformly accepted meaning,56 nor does this 
research aim to provide one. For the present purposes, it is sufficient – and most explanatory 
– to take a relativist approach to the concept. Regardless of how democracy is construed in a 
specific legal environment, the acts of the legislature and, to a lesser but significant extent, of 
the executive are usually deemed to be the primary means through which the democratic will 
expresses itself.57 To the extent this is the case, any limitation on the freedom of action of the 
political branches may potentially affect the democratic process and counter the aspirations of 
the prevailing majority.58 When applied to the domestic implementation of international law, 
this concern tends to emphasize the need for political supervision in the discharge of 
international obligations.59 
The problem is of course magnified by the alleged lack of democratic legitimacy of 
international law.60 In domestic legal environments, indeed, there could be a reluctance to 
                                                
56 C. TOMUSCHAT, “Democracy and the Rule of Law”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), The Oxford, cit., p. 469 ff., p. 
482-483. On the many possible notions of democracy, see generally D. HELD, Models of Democracy, Stanford, 
20063. 
57 This relativist understanding of democracy has a limit, in that it also applies to legal environments which 
should be considered, for all intents and purposes, authoritarian. Here, of course, the asserted intention of 
protecting the democratic will may hinge on different underlying concerns. As noted by B.Z. TAMANAHA, “A 
Concise Guide to the Rule of Law”, in G. PALOMBELLA, N. WALKER (eds.), Relocating the Rule of Law, Oxford-
Portland, 2009, p. 3 ff., p. 5, “[i]n democratic societies, the limitation of the law-making power of the 
government is criticised for overruling or restricting democratic law-making; in authoritarian states, it hampers 
the ruling authority from using the law to do as it desires”. 
58 In US constitutional theory, this problem is generally referred to as “countermajoritarian difficulty”. This 
concept was first conceived in 1962 in relation to the judicial checks on congress and the executive: see A.M. 
BICKEL, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, Indianapolis, 1962, p. 16 
(“judicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our system”). For a critical analysis of this concept, see B. 
FRIEDMAN, “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy”, 
New York University Law Review 1998, p. 333 ff. 
59 See e.g. J. GOLDSMITH, “Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?”, Chicago 
Journal of International Law 2000, p. 327 ff., p. 338-339 (“When the human rights community demands that the 
United States make international human rights treaties a part of domestic law in a way that circumvents political 
control, it evinces an intolerance for a pluralism of values and conditions, and a disrespect for local democratic 
processes”); R.P. ALFORD, “Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution”, American Journal of 
International Law 2004, p. 57 ff., p. 58-61 (“The international countermajoritarian difficulty would suggest that 
international norms cannot be internalized within our Constitution unless such norms are first internalized by our 
people as our community standards”); J.H. JACKSON, “Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy 
Analysis”, American Journal of International Law 1992, p. 310 ff., p. 313 and 330-331 (suggesting that 
democratic countries should avoid the combined effect of automatic incorporation of international law and 
higher status of treaties in domestic law); W.J. HOPKINS, “New Zealand”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), International 
Law and Domestic Legal Systems. Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion, Oxford, 2011, p. 429 ff., p. 
446 (“International law can be bad law. Given the limited legitimacy that international law has, it is 
constitutionally questionable whether such ‘bad law’ should be applied uncritically in the domestic context”). 
60 The literature on the democratic deficit of international law and institutions is extensive. See, ex multis, 
J. CRAWFORD, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law, The Hague, 2014, p. 400 (democracy 
is not a feature of the international legal order, but emerging principles of international law may tend toward its 
protection); J. RUBENFELD, “The Two World Orders”, Wilson Quarterly Autumn 2003, p. 22 ff., p. 34 
(“international law is a threat to democracy and to the hopes of democratic politics all over the world”); J. 
RUBENFELD, “Unilateralism and Constitutionalism”, New York University Law Review 2004, p. 1971 ff. 
(contrasting domestic “democratic constitutionalism” with an “international constitutionalism” seeing 
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apply norms that are assumed – rightfully or otherwise – not to be subject to the same 
standards of democratic legitimacy as domestic norms.61 An involvement of the national 
political branches in the implementation process may be seen to remedy this shortcoming, at 
least in part,  by operating as a democratic filter on the reception of international norms. 
This view is not uncontroversial. In particular, two major criticisms have been levelled at the 
idea that the asserted democratic deficit of international norms should or could be addressed 
at the domestic level in the process of implementing international law. 
It has been suggested, first of all, that it would be misleading to see international law as a 
system of norms superimposed on the will of national political authorities, because national 
political branches participate in multiple ways in the process of creation of international 
norms. As argued by Basak Cali, “democratic-friendly theoretical approaches […] 
contain[…] the idea of the illegitimate imposition of external commands over the domestic 
political authority – an authority whose primary duty is to respect and reflect the will of its 
citizens”. 62  However, “‘[j]urisdictional limits to the authorities of sovereigns, and 
participation, implying active agency of sovereigns in the making of international laws 
demand that we conceive political authorities not as recipients of imposed international law, 
but as actors co-operating, albeit imperfectly, to create international regulation”. 63  By 
adopting this position, in whole or in part, the problem of the lack of democratic legitimacy of 
international law would seem to be defeated at the source: being created through the acts of 
national political organs, international norms would share the same legitimizing basis as 
domestic norms. 
This view is not wholly convincing, though, because of the unexpressed voluntarist argument 
that lies at its heart. Voluntarism, i.e. the idea that all rules of international law would find 
their origin in some form of state will, has been persuasively debunked in scholarship.64 The 
lack of actual control of state authorities over the country’s international obligations is quite 
evident in the case of general international law, which may bind states without or even against 
their consent.65 But perhaps even more importantly, state authorities do not necessarily have 
full de facto control over the treaty obligations they undertake. Although the international law 
                                                                                                                                                   
“constitutional law not as an act of democratic self-government, but as a check or restraint on democracy”); S. 
WHEATLEY, “A Democratic Rule of International Law”, European Journal of International Law 2011, p. 525 ff.; 
A. BERNARDINI, La sovranità popolare violata nei processi normativi internazionali ed europei, Napoli, 1997; J. 
D’ASPREMONT, “The Rise and Fall of Democracy Governance in International Law: A Reply to Susan Marks”, 
European Journal of International Law 2011, p. 549 ff.; G.H. FOX, B.R. ROTH, “Introduction: The Spread of 
Liberal Democracy and Its Implications for International Law”, in G.H. FOX, B.R. ROTH (eds.), Democratic 
Governance and International Law, Cambridge, 2010, p. 1 ff. 
61 M. KANETAKE, “The Interfaces”, cit., p. 39 (“Behind national contestations and avoidance always lies 
the democratic (il)legitimacy of international law and institutions in the eyes of the national guardians of the rule 
of law”); D. BODANSKY, “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?”, American Journal of International Law 1999, p. 596 ff., p. 606 (arguing, with reference 
to international environmental law, that international law impinging on domestic law “will be held to the same 
standards of legitimacy”). 
62 B. CALI, The Authority of International Law: Obedience, Respect, and Rebuttal, Oxford, 2015, p. 97. 
63 Ibid., p. 127. 
64 For a vigorous criticism of voluntarism see A. PELLET, “The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in 
International Law-Making”, Australian Yearbook of International Law 1992, p. 22 ff. See also R.A. FALK, cit., 
p. 55-57 (analyzing the erosion of the consent-oriented basis of authority of international law). For a defense of 
consent as the basis of international law, see P. WEIL, “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?”, 
American Journal of International Law 1983, p. 413 ff. 
65 C. TOMUSCHAT, “Obligations”, cit., p. 275 ff. 
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of treaties formally safeguards the freedom of states with regard to treaty-making,66 political 
and factual pressures may considerably limit this freedom in practice.67 For example, weak 
states may undergo strong pressures to participate in treaty regimes; the content of treaties 
evolves over time in manners which may deviate considerably from the states’ initial 
undertakings; and the power to interpret and modify treaties may be entrusted to international 
institutions largely independent from state control.68 
Finally, even assuming that states ultimately do have control over their international 
obligations, voluntarism would still be a poor surrogate of democracy. As compellingly noted 
by Joseph Weiler, although it might be “tempting to conflate the principle of Consent, so 
deeply rooted in the normative discourse of international law and its principal legitimating 
artifact, with democracy”, this principle is in fact “part of a very different vocabulary, namely 
that of sovereignty and sovereign equality (and inequality). It is, in some ways, the opposite 
of democracy, since it is based on the legal premise, even if at times a fiction, that the 
collectivity has neither the power nor, certainly, the authority to impose its will on individual 
subjects other than through their specific or systemic consent, express or implied”.69 
Another scholarly view – which may well combine with the one just described – holds that, if 
international law does indeed suffer from a deficit of democratic legitimacy, this issue should 
be resolved primarily at the international level and cannot be healed within the national legal 
system.70 In the words of Ward Ferdinandusse, “democratic legitimacy is not substantially 
furthered by requiring implementing legislation that does not leave any substantial choices. If 
one wants to enhance the quality of the law-making process, that improvement must take 
place where the law is actually made, which is on the international level”.71 
Although this argument has its merits, it is also open to some objections. Firstly, because the 
process of democratization of international law is still in its infancy, a tension with domestic 
democratic processes is inevitable at least in the current state of international law. Secondly, 
                                                
66 See e.g. Arts. 48-52 VCLT, regulating the following causes of invalidity of treaties: error, fraud, 
corruption of a representative, coertion of a representative and coertion of the state by threat or use of force. 
67 A. PELLET, “The Normative”, cit., p. 42-43 (it is “pure hypocrisy” to “assume that, when a State 
concludes a treaty without error or fraud, corruption or coercion in the sense of the Vienna Convention, its will is 
[…] free”). 
68 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects of Treaties in Domestic Law”, in C.J. TAMS, A. TZANAKOPOULOS, A. 
ZIMMERMANN (eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2014, p. 123 ff., p. 
125-127 (criticizing the idea that a state is in full control of its treaty obligations); A. NOLLKAEMPER, “Inside or 
Out: Two Types of International Legal Pluralism”, in J. KLABBERS, T. PIIPARINEN (eds.), Normative Pluralism 
and International Law: Exploring Global Governance, Cambridge, 2013, p. 94 ff., p. 104 (“where consent might 
formally be available, its role is reduced by the fact that it appears late in the process and for many states, 
nonparticipation in international regimes is not an option”). See also S. KADELBACH, “Domestic Constitutional 
Concerns with Respect to the Use of Subsequent Agreements and Practice at the International Level”, in G. 
NOLTE (ed.), Treaties and Subsequent Practice, Oxford, 2013, p. 145 ff. (analyzing issues of domestic 
democratic legitimacy raised by treaty interpretation in light of subsequent practice). 
69 J.H.H. WEILER, “The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy”, ZaöRV 
2004, p. 547 ff., p. 548. 
70 A. PETERS, “The Globalization of State Constitutions”, in J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), cit., p. 
251 ff., p. 284 (“the hollowing out of domestic democracy can hardly be counteracted by reforms on the national 
level alone. Notably, the strengthening of the rights of domestic parliaments in governmental decision-making in 
foreign affairs is necessary, but not sufficient to safeguard democracy. This insight leads to the quest for a 
compensatory democratization of global governance”); B. CALI, cit., p. 15 (“Instead of insisting that domestic 
procedures are more deliberative – and, therefore, superior – we ought to think about the duties that domestic 
authorities have in making international law more deliberative – and enhance its legitimacy repertoire”). 
71 W.N. FERDINANDUSSE, cit., p. 100. 
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and perhaps more importantly, there is no universal concept of democracy to implement at the 
international level. For this reason, it is strongly debatable that democratic concerns could be 
addressed in the international sphere in a manner which could satisfy all national sensibilities 
and approaches. At best, submitting international norms and institutions to – however 
rudimentary – forms of democratic legitimation might decrease the occurrence of national 
contestation on grounds of democratic deficit of international law.72 Ultimately, however, the 
protection of democracy remains an intrinsically domestic problem. It seems therefore 
inevitable that domestic legal orders will shape the techniques of implementation of 
international law in such a way as to render them compatible with their own understanding of 
domestic democracy. 
 
4.2. Separation of powers. 
A second prominent policy factor influencing the attitude of national legal systems toward the 
reception of international law is the domestic separation of powers. This term is used here to 
refer to the constitutional equilibrium between the legislature, the executive and the courts. In 
specific legal environments, issues of separation of powers may also arise with regard to the 
relationship between the central government and local authorities.73 
Considerations of separation of powers are to some extent intertwined with the safeguard of 
democracy,74 but they do not correspond in full to the policy concerns analyzed in the 
previous paragraph. There, the focus was on the protection of domestic democracy as a whole 
from the potentially disruptive external influence of international law, under the assumption 
that democratic decision-making can be channeled through the acts of both the legislature and 
the executive. On the other hand, in a perspective of domestic separation of powers, the focus 
is not so much on the protection of state democracy as a whole vis-à-vis international law, but 
rather on protecting state organs – and their constitutional prerogatives – from each other. In 
the division of competence between the various components of the state machinery involved 
in the application of international law, the influence of the domestic separation of powers 
plays out in all cases, regardless of the democratic legitimation that international norms are 
perceived (not) to possess. 
A first prong of this policy concern relates to the interactions between the executive and the 
legislature. National executives are generally entrusted with their country’s international 
relations, thus playing a primary role in the formation of international norms. Most notably, 
virtually all national legal systems empower the executive to negotiate international 
agreements and to manage the state’s participation in international organizations and in inter-
governmental policy-making. This generates a widespread concern that national executives 
might use international law as a lever to increase their lawmaking powers to the detriment of 
the prerogatives of the legislature.75 This concern becomes more pressing where international 
                                                
72 See e.g. S. KADELBACH, cit., p. 153 (arguing that the existence of a body entrusted with treaty 
interpretation may help overcome the constitutional legitimacy issues raised by the evolutionary interpretation of 
the treaty). 
73 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects”, cit., p. 127-130 (distinguishing between horizontal and vertical 
separation of powers). 
74 W.N. FERDINANDUSSE, cit., p. 101. 
75 See e.g. E. BENVENISTI, G.W. DOWNS, “Court Cooperation, Executive Accountability, and Global 
Governance”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 2008-2009, p. 931 ff., p. 931-932 
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norms are meant to be applied in domestic legal orders in a position which potentially 
competes with domestic legislation. 
National constitutions commonly attempt to remedy these issues by involving the legislature 
either in the treaty-making process or in the implementation phase.76 Whether the legislature 
actually retains any substantive powers or can only rubber-stamp executive choices depends 
on the political dynamics of each legal system.77 It is also true, on the other hand, that the 
powers of executives in international law-making should not be overstated. One may refer 
again to the above-mentioned argument that a state does not always have full control over its 
treaty obligations. An executive with quasi-exclusive constitutional authority to stipulate 
treaties does not necessarily have an actual power to determine the content of the treaty 
obligations it undertakes.78 
Separation of powers concerns considerably influence the application of international law by 
the judiciary. National courts may be reluctant to apply international law in ways which 
appear to them to overstep the boundaries of the judicial function. A large number of factors 
can be relevant in this regard, such as the courts’ independence from the political branches, 
the scope of judicial review of executive action, and the possibility or otherwise to strike 
down primary legislation. The courts’ attitude in this field may be aimed not only at 
protecting legislative prerogatives from executive intrusion, for example by limiting the 
domestic effects of agreements stipulated by the executive in lack of authorization from the 
legislature,79 but also at protecting the prerogatives of the executive.80 The two considerations 
are often strictly interconnected, in that the protection of executive powers can indirectly 
safeguard the prerogatives of the legislature, as the organ conferring authority to the 
executive.81 
                                                                                                                                                   
(“the regulatory power that globalization has transferred to international organizations […] operating at the 
international level has been vested in the executive branches of a few powerful states that were the system’s 
principal architects”). 
76 D.B. HOLLIS, “A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law and Practice”, in D.B. HOLLIS, M.R. BLAKESLEE, 
L.B. EDERINGTON (eds.), National Treaty Law and Practice, Leiden-Boston, 2005, p. 1 ff., p. 32 (“no state has a 
situation where the executive operates entirely without legislative limitations on the exercise of its authority”). 
See generally S.A. RIESENFELD, F.M. ABBOTT (eds.), Parliamentary Participation in the Making and Operation 
of Treaties: A Comparative Study, Dordrecht, 1994. 
77 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects”, cit., p. 128. 
78 E. BENVENISTI, “Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of 
Attitudes of National Courts”, European Journal of International Law 1993, p. 159 ff., p. 177 (arguing that 
concerns that the application of international law not expressly approved by the legislature should be limited on 
grounds of separation of powers are “unpersuasive in many respects”); M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism: The 
Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties”, Columbia Law Review 2007, p. 
628 ff., p. 695 (in many countries of common law, “structural changes have rendered this separation of powers 
concern much less problematic”). 
79 See e.g. Higgs and Mitchell v. The Minister of National Security and others [2000] 2 AC 228, Privy 
Council Appeal No. 45 of 1999, paras. 10-11 (“The Crown may impose obligations in international law upon the 
state without any participation on the part of the democratically elected organs of government. But the corollary 
of this unrestricted treaty-making power is that treaties form no part of domestic law unless enacted by the 
legislature”). 
80 E. BENVENISTI, “Judicial Misgivings”, cit., p. 164 (commenting on the “attitude shown by some courts 
towards the executive’s role in treaty-making and its effects on the domestic legal system. In this context the 
courts’ interpretation increased the Government's power”). 
81 On this point see E. BENVENISTI, “United We Stand: National Courts Reviewing Counterterrorism 
Measures”, in A. BIANCHI, A. KELLER (eds.), Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge, Oxford, 2008, p. 251 
ff., p. 258-259. 
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4.3. National sovereignty. 
The need to protect national sovereignty is sometimes presented as a relevant policy concern 
in the field of domestic application of international law.82 
In its most common usage, sovereignty is a catchword denoting all rights held by a state both 
domestically, in the form of control over its territory, and externally, in the form of capacity 
to act on the international plane.83 The exact definition of the concept, however, is a matter of 
dispute among scholars of international law. Martti Koskenniemi has famously distinguished 
between “pure fact” and “legal” approaches to sovereignty.84 In the former perspective, state 
sovereignty is an occurrence which precedes international law and is not dependent on it: the 
state’s sphere of liberty is unconstrained, unless the state itself chooses to restrain it.85 The 
latter perspective sees sovereignty as a product of the law, which can only be exercised within 
the boundaries of international norms.86 Others have simply done away with the concept.87 
Probably as a consequence of the uncertainties over its definition, the argument that 
sovereignty could be undermined in the process of domestic implementation of international 
obligations lacks clarity to some extent, if compared to the safeguard of democracy and of the 
separation of powers. On the one hand, commentators who raise sovereignty concerns in this 
field commonly refer to the need to preserve room for domestic decision-making processes.88 
                                                
82 On the impact of considerations related to sovereignty on the domestic application of international law in 
the US, see J.T. PARRY, “International Law in State Courts: Sovereignty, Resistance, Contagion, and 
Inevitability”, Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution 2013, p. 76 ff. 
83 J. CRAWFORD, Brownlie’s, cit., p. 448. On the concept of sovereignty, see SS “Wimbledon” (UK v. 
Germany), Judgment of 17 August 1923 (Series A, No. 1), p. 15 ff. The PCIJ was called upon to decide whether 
under the Treaty of Versailles, which provided for freedom of transit through the Kiel Canal, Germany could 
prevent shipments of arms to Poland during the Polish-Soviet War, to which it was neutral. Germany contended 
that this right was an “essential part” of its sovereignty. Although conceding a restrictive interpretation of the 
Treaty, the Court rejected Germany’s argument and famously held that it “decline[d] to see in the conclusion of 
any Treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of 
its sovereignty. No doubt any convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise 
of the sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the 
right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty” (p. 25). 
84 M. KOSKENNIEMI, cit., p. 228-233. 
85 See e.g. C. SCHMITT, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Chicago, 2005 
(translation by G. Swab; 1st ed. 1922), p. 5 (defining sovereignty as the ability to decide on the exception, e.g. to 
rule in situations where the legal system breaks down) and p. 12 (“The existence of the state is undoubted proof 
of its superiority over the validity of the legal norm. The decision frees itself from all normative ties and 
becomes in the true sense absolute. The state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-
preservation”). 
86 H. KELSEN, “Théorie générale du droit international public: problèmes choisis”, Recueil des cours 1932, 
vol. 42, p. 121 ff., p. 182-192. 
87 L. HENKIN, “That ‘S’ word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, et cetera”, Fordham 
Law Review 1999, p. 1 ff. 
88 R.P. ALFORD, cit., p. 58 (arguing, with reference to the usage of “global opinions” – a concept which 
includes human rights treaties – in constitutional interpretation, that it “dramatically undermines sovereignty by 
utilizing the one vehicle – constitutional supremacy – that can trump the democratic will reflected in state and 
federal legislative and executive pronouncements”); A. BERNARDINI, cit., p. 14 (constitutional mechanisms of 
automatic incorporation of customary international law, such as Art. 10 of the Italian Constitution, “completely 
elude the aspect of state sovereignty […] and even more that of popular sovereignty”); D. FELDMAN, “Monism, 
Dualism and Constitutional Legitimacy”, Australian Yearbook of International Law 1999, p. 105 ff., p. 105 (the 
“monist” constitutional model – i.e. automatic incorporation of international law – “restricts the sovereignty of 
the state, and may accordingly limit the capacity of the internal political process to oversee the extent of the 
state’s international obligations and domestic powers”); T. CRUZ, “Defending U.S. Sovereignty, Separation of 
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In this case, the term alludes in fact to popular sovereignty and, therefore, does not appear 
different from the concept of domestic democracy, as defined in Paragraph 3.1. 
On the other hand, the way in which international obligations are discharged in a national 
legal order does not seem to have the capacity to encroach upon state sovereignty, because it 
does not modify the extent of the state’s international obligations.89 Furthermore, state 
sovereignty is safeguarded by the background presumption of neutrality of international law 
as to the means of domestic implementation, which makes it so that the allocation of the 
implementing powers between state organs is by and large a matter of domestic concern. 
Against this backdrop, it seems inappropriate to consider state sovereignty as an autonomous 
policy concern influencing the modalities of international law reception in domestic law. 
 
 
5. Structure of the work. 
 
To summarize, international law and national law approach limitations on national political 
authorities in different ways. On the one hand, international law generally takes a compliance-
centered approach to domestic implementation. Being organs of the state, national political 
authorities are required to act in conformity with international law. On the other hand, from 
the standpoint of domestic legal systems, submitting the political branches to the authority of 
international law entails a tension with a number of fundamental policy considerations, which 
boil down to the safeguard of the majoritarian will and of the separation of powers. 
The following chapters will analyze how these policy considerations influence the way in 
which national legal systems implement international obligations; whether such policy 
hurdles inevitably lead states to non-compliance with international obligations; and whether 
and how competing demands relating to compliance with international law and the safeguard 
of domestic political processes can be balanced in practice. 
Chapter 2, in particular, will analyze the relationship between the prerogatives of the national 
political branches and the techniques through which international norms are formally made 
part of domestic law. It will classify such techniques according to the amount of legal 
constraints they impose on the national lawmaking authorities and will analyze their policy 
rationale and implications. 
Chapter 3 will examine the application of international law by national courts against state 
authorities and, in particular, will try to assess the impact of considerations relating to the 
prerogatives of the political branches on the determination of the direct applicability of 
international law. This chapter will critique in detail the tendency of national courts to limit 
                                                                                                                                                   
Powers, and Federalism in Medellín v. Texas”, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 2010, p. 25 ff. 
(arguing, with reference to the US Supreme Court decision Medellín v. Texas which held an ICJ judgment to be 
non directly applicable, that “the central issue in Medellin was a question of U.S. sovereignty – who makes the 
laws that bind the citizens of the United States. Are the American people governed by judges, courts, and laws of 
nations other than our own, or are they governed by the United States Constitution, by the U.S. Congress, the 
United States government, and ultimately by ‘We the People’?”). On Medellín v. Texas, see Chapter 3, Section 
3.2. 
89 See e.g. J.H. JACKSON, cit., p. 323 (“it is sometimes argued that urging the direct application of treaties is 
tantamount to ‘interference in the internal affairs’ of a sovereign state”). 
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the domestic application of international norms in order to safeguard the prerogatives of state 
authorities. 
Chapter 4 will turn its focus to the techniques of consistent interpretation, i.e. to the use of 
international law in the interpretation of domestic norms. It will examine the most common 
arguments advanced by national courts to limit the extent of consistent interpretation in ways 
that are perceived to protect the prerogatives of the political authorities and will put forward 
an understanding of consistent interpretation aimed at overcoming such arguments. 
Finally, a short concluding chapter will summarize the research findings and will attempt a 
final assessment against the backdrop of the three research hypotheses outlined above. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Status of International Law in Domestic Legal Systems 
and Constraints on Political Authorities 
 
 
 CONTENT: 1. Introduction. The domestic status of international law as a limit on political authorities. – 
2. The overarching notions of monism and dualism: a critique. – 3. Supremacy of international law over primary 
legislation. – 3.1. The domestic law dimension of the concept of supremacy. – 3.2. Supremacy of international 
law in the practice of national legal systems. – 3.3. Policy implications: issues of democratic legitimacy and 
separation of powers and their influence on national case law. – 4. Automatic standing incorporation of 
international law without supremacy over primary legislation. – 4.1. Automatic incorporation without supremacy 
in the practice of national legal systems. – 4.2. Policy implications: the debate on the legitimacy of the 
incorporation of customary international law in common law legal systems. – 5. Lack of formal constraints on 
national political authorities in the implementation of international law. – 6. Conclusions: compliance with 
international law as a fundamental principle in domestic legal systems. 
 
 
1. Introduction. The domestic status of international law as a limit on political 
authorities. 
 
This chapter analyzes the formal interactions of national legal systems with international law, 
i.e. the de jure status that international law is granted in domestic legal orders. The reception 
of international norms within the hierarchy of municipal norms constitutes the most 
immediate way in which future actions of state authorities can be compelled to comply with 
international law.1 
Domestic legal systems deal with the issue of international law implementation by resorting 
to a staggering variety of techniques. Such techniques impose differing curbs on the 
lawmaking powers of the political branches, in order to ensure their compliance with 
international obligations. The intensity of these limitations may be described by resorting to a 
spectrum. Legal curbs on the lawmaking are at their zenith in situations where, first, the 
reception of international law in domestic law is not made contingent upon any decisions by 
political authorities, and second, international law is prioritized over all the acts of the 
political branches, including primary legislation. At the opposite extreme of the spectrum 
there are cases where international law can be implemented domestically only through the 
acts of the political branches, which retain full discretion on whether to act contrariwise. In 
between these two extremes, a great supply of intermediate solutions can be found. 
                                                
1 A. CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions and International Law”, Recueil des cours 1985, vol. 192, p. 342 ff., 
p. 444 (noting that states may create “internal machinery for ensuring that [international obligations] are 
complied with by all national authorities, including the lawmakers”). See also T. GINSBURG, “Locking In 
Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law”, New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics 2005-2006, p. 707 ff. (arguing, from the perspective of constitutional precommitment theory, 
that constitutional provisions incorporating international law represent “means of placing policies beyond the 
control of any domestic actor”); and, in a similar vein, T. GINSBURG, S. CHERNYKH, Z. ELKINS, “Commitment 
and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law”, University of Illinois Law 
Review 2008, p. 201 ff. 
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It has been noted that the choice to commit the political branches to the respect of 
international law is a “deeply political question” which reflects “political decisions on the 
allocation of power” both between different state powers and between the state and the 
international legal order.2 Given the nature of such decisions, it comes at no surprise that they 
are commonly made in constitutional texts.3 Whenever the choices regarding the status of 
international law in domestic law are made by a constitution, the component of constraint of 
political authorities is self-evident.4 However, it would be simplistic to think that limits on the 
powers of political authorities in implementing international obligations can only stem from a 
constitution. Even where international law can be applied domestically only through acts of 
the legislature or the executive, the freedom of these organs may encounter a number of 
limits, controls and external influences. 
In the choices regarding how to implement the various sources of international law within a 
domestic legal system, the influence of the interests and values described in the previous 
chapter manifests itself in very clear terms. Each legal system is called upon to resolve the 
tension between the intention to facilitate state compliance with international obligations and 
the will to preserve room for maneuver for domestic political actors. The clashing, interacting 
and blending of these competing values in light of national interests and sensibilities gives 
shape to the multitude of implementation techniques that can be met in practice. 
The attitudes of domestic legal systems toward the reception of international norms have 
already been the subject of detailed analysis in legal doctrine.5 For this reason, this chapter 
does not aim to make an encyclopedic description of the solutions adopted in domestic law. It 
aims, instead, to look at this issue exclusively from the perspective of the constraints on 
political discretion as regards implementation of and compliance with international law, in 
order to single out relevant tendencies which are common to a significant number of national 
legal systems. 
In order to do so, the chapter is structured along these lines. Firstly, Section 2 will lay down 
the theoretical foundations of the chapter by introducing the concepts of monism and dualism, 
which are commonly used to describe the interactions between national law and international 
law. This section will argue that these concepts are not able to provide a clear description of 
how national legal relate to international law, and that different categories should be used to 
this end. Accordingly, the subsequent sections will describe three large-scale approaches to 
international law that can be identified in national legal systems. Section 3 will deal with the 
cases in which all political authorities appear to be ousted from any decisions concerning the 
reception of international law in domestic law, because the former is incorporated 
automatically and is granted primacy over domestic primary legislation. Section 4 will 
                                                
2 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects of Treaties in Domestic Law”, in C.J. TAMS, A. TZANAKOPOULOS, A. 
ZIMMERMANN (eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2014, p. 123 ff., p. 
124. 
3  V. JACKSON, “Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement”, Harvard Law 
Review 2005, p. 109 ff., p. 112 (arguing that national constitutions have become “sites for implementation of 
international law”). 
4 T. GINSBURG, “Locking”, cit., p. 710 (“Constitutions represent self-binding acts, whereby drafters restrict 
the actions available to future politicians”). 
5 See in particular the extensive surveys of domestic constitutional law performed by A. CASSESE, “Modern 
Constitutions”, cit., and G. BARTOLINI, “A Universal Approach to International Law in Contemporary 
Constitutions: Does It Exist?”, Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 2014, p. 1287 ff. 
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analyze cases in which the automatic incorporation of international law is not coupled with its 
primacy over the acts of the legislature. Section 5 will explore the residual category where the 
implementation of international law requires an intervention by the political branches. Lastly, 
Section 6 will draw some general conclusions and will lay the foundations of the enquiries to 
be conducted in the following two chapters. 
 
 
2. The overarching notions of monism and dualism: a critique. 
 
The monism-dualism debate is the locus classicus of the topic of the status of international 
law in domestic legal systems. These two concepts have shaped nearly every discussion on 
this subject for decades and have exercised a significant influence over state practice.6 For 
these reasons, an introductory analysis of these terms is unavoidable.7 
To begin the analysis, it must be underscored that such concepts have been defined in 
inconsistent ways.8 In particular, it is possible to identify two radically different usages in 
legal discourse. On the one hand, they have been used to describe the theoretical relationship 
between domestic law and international law in general and abstract terms, with the aim to 
identify inherent features which would inform the very essence of that relationship.9 On the 
other hand, the two terms have also been employed to describe the attitudes of specific 
national legal systems towards international law.10 The following discussion will start off with 
the former usage and will describe how the meaning of the two terms evolved toward the 
latter usage. 
The debate over the relationship between the international and the national legal orders, which 
revolved around abstract notions of monism and dualism, peaked in the 19th century and in 
the early 20th.11 Simply put, the concept of monism describes the idea that law is a unitary 
phenomenon and, thus, that international law and national law necessarily constitute parts of 
the same legal order. Conversely, dualism depicts national law and international law as 
separate realms of law, each supreme in its own field of operation.12 
                                                
6 D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, The Intersection of International Law and Domestic Law. A Theoretical and 
Practical Analysis, Cheltenham, 2015, p. 16. 
7 J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER, “Introduction”, in J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), New Perspectives 
on the Divide Between National and International Law, Oxford, 2007, p. 1 ff., p. 6 (it is inevitable “to build on 
the legacy of what historically have been the two main theories on the matter”). 
8 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application of Treaties”, in D.B. HOLLIS (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties, 
Oxford, 2012, p. 367 ff., p. 368 (noting that “there is no single, agreed definition of the terms”). 
9 D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, cit., p. 17 ff. (describing this approach as “philosophical”). 
10 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 368-369 (distinguishing the two usages of monism and 
dualism). 
11 J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER, “Introduction”, cit., p. 6-10. 
12 The literature on the subject is extremely vast. On the difference between these notions, see, ex multis, J. 
CRAWFORD, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, 20128, p. 48-50; R. QUADRI, “Cours 
général de droit international public”, Recueil des cours 1964, vol. 113, p. 239 ff., p. 280-290; G. SPERDUTI, “Le 
principe de souveraineté et le problème des rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne”, Recueil des 
cours 1976, vol. 153, p. 319 ff., p. 333-337; P.M. DUPUY, “International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law”, 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2011; D.P. O’CONNELL, “The Relationship Between 
International Law and Municipal Law”, The Georgetown Law Journal 1960, p. 431 ff.; K.J. PARTSCH, 
“International Law and Municipal Law”, Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1987, p. 238 ff.; G. SLYZ, 
“International Law in National Courts”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 1995-
1996, p. 65 ff., p. 67-71; M.N. SHAW, International Law, Cambridge, 20147, p. 92-95; M. VIRALLY, “Sur un pont 
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To put this debate into the right perspective, it should be noted that it was underpinned from 
the outset by political ideolologies.13 Monist thinkers, such as Alfred Verdross and Hans 
Kelsen, generally sought to assert the superiority of international law as a limit to the absolute 
power of nation-states, a position which was often permeated by “universal, cosmopolitan, or 
even utopian connotations”.14 As a theoretical construct, monism bore in itself the promise of 
quasi-unfiltered constraints on domestic political authorities. In the purest form of monism, 
international law would have automatically been part of domestic legal systems – actually, no 
separation fence could have even been conceived between the two realms – and it would have 
done so from a general position of supremacy over national law.15 
Dualist thinking, for its part, started off at the hands of Heinich Triepel and Dionisio Anzilotti 
with the ambition to provide a realistic description of the interrelationship between national 
legal systems and international law.16 It arose, in particular, from the recognition that the 
(domestic) validity of domestic law was not contingent on whether it conformed with 
international obligations.17 
It is commonly acknowledged that the course of dualism was deviated by subsequent, less 
refined legal thinking towards a deferential attitude for absolute state sovereignty.18 It is 
interesting to recall, however, that dualism itself was born as a reaction to the (then 
widespread) theories contesting the legal character of international law on the grounds that 
only state law could be qualified as law proper. This idea stemmed from two assumptions: 
that all law had to originate from the will of the sovereign, and that the only sovereign entities 
were nation-states. Strongly influenced by the Hegelian conception of state and by Austinian 
                                                                                                                                                   
aux anes: les rapports entre droit international et droits internes”, Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin, Paris, 1961, p. 
488 ff. 
13 J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER, “Introduction”, cit., p. 6. 
14 Ibid., p. 10. Among authors espousing a monist viewpoint, see most notably A. VERDROSS, “Le 
fondement du droit international”, Recueil des cours 1927, vol. 16, p. 247 ff., in particular p. 287-296 
(introducing “la primauté du droit des gens et la conception unitaire du droit”); H. KELSEN, “Les rapports de 
système entre le droit interne et le droit international public”, Recueil des cours 1926, vol. 14, p. 227 ff., in 
particular p. 275-288 for his criticism of dualism and p. 289-298 for an exposition of his positivist and logical 
monism, where the validity of all national legal orders is ultimately traced back to the Grundnorm of 
international law; J.G. STARKE, “Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law”, British Yearbook of 
International Law 1936, p. 66 ff.; G. SCELLE, Précis de droit des gens, Paris, 1932, p. 31-32. 
15 See e.g. J.G. STARKE, cit., p. 75-78; D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, cit., p. 20 (but noting that many monist 
scholars did not espouse this premise, which they evidently considered unrealistic). 
16 H. TRIEPEL, “Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international”, Recueil des cours 1923, vol. 1, 
p. 73 ff.; D. ANZILOTTI, Corso di diritto internazionale, Roma, 19283. More recently, see G. ARANGIO-RUIZ, 
“International Law and Interindividual Law”, in J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), cit., p. 15 ff. On the 
realistic basis of dualism, see G. SPERDUTI, “Dualism and Monism: A Confrontation to Be Overcome”, Italian 
Yearbook of International Law 1977, p. 31 ff., p. 31-32. See also G. ARANGIO-RUIZ, Gli enti soggetti 
dell’ordinamento internazionale, Milan, 1952, commented on in the following terms by J.L. KUNZ in American 
Journal of International Law 1953, p. 512: “The author of the volume under review shares the dualistic doctrine, 
but blames many of its representatives for logical fallacies. He gladly admits that the monistic doctrine of the 
primacy of international law is logically unattackable, and more coherent and elegant; but he holds that the 
starting-point of the monistic doctrine is in utter contradiction with the reality of international law as actually in 
force”. As is well known, dualist thinking has historically had a long-lasting influence on Italian legal thought: 
see C. SANTULLI, Le statut international de l’ordre juridique etatique, Paris, 2001, p. 266-267, ft. 556 
(describing the “croisade permanente” fought by J.L. Kunz against generations of Italian dualists). 
17 D. ANZILOTTI, cit., p. 54; G. SPERDUTI, “Dualism”, cit., p. 32. 
18 J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER, “Introduction”, cit., p. 8. 
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positivism,19 this premise led to relegate international law to an external projection of state 
will, or “external public law” (äusseres Staatsrecht).20 With a view to reassert the fully legal 
character of international law, dualist thinkers argued that international law, as a legal system 
different from national law, could legitimately have a different origin than the sheer will of a 
single sovereign entity, just as much as it had different subjects: states, instead of 
individuals.21 However, in order not to depart from rigidly positivist foundations, which 
traced back the very concept of law to some form of sovereign will, early dualists had to 
postulate that international law originated from the collective will of states. This proposition 
was fundamentally dogmatic in nature and later came to be discarded by Anzilotti himself.22 
Some scholars have argued that, from a logical point of view, there seems to be no alternative 
to the concepts of monism and dualism.23 On the other hand, the rigidity of the dichotomy has 
also prompted doctrinal attempts to overcome it. According to a widespread opinion, the 
monism-dualism debate has lost most of its meaning and the topic of the domestic application 
of international law should be addressed pragmatically, by looking at the practice of each 
legal system.24 Others have tried to devise alternative theoretical frameworks, or to discard 
the very logical roots of the debate as shaky. 
Gerald Fitzmaurice famously tried to resolve the debate by denying that international law and 
national law could share any field of operation. In his words, “the entire monist-dualist 
controversy is unreal, artificial and strictly beside the point, because it assumes something 
that has to exist for there to be any controversy at all – and which in fact does not exist – 
namely a common field in which the two legal orders under discussion both simultaneously 
                                                
19 J. AUSTIN, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, London, 1832, p. 268 (“Every positive law, or 
every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a member 
or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or 
(changing the expression) it is set by a monarch, or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of 
subjection to its author”). 
20 G. SPERDUTI, “Dualism”, cit., p. 31; D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, cit., p. 26-28. This position is sometimes 
referred to as a “state-centric” form of monism: see e.g. D.P. O’CONNELL, cit., p. 432 (speaking of “monism in 
reverse”); A. VERDROSS, cit., p. 289 (“La théorie de la primauté du droit national […] qui cherche à fonder le 
droit des gens sur le droit national, veut […] créer une construction moniste, c'est-à-dire une construction 
unitaire du droit”). But see J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER, “Introduction”, cit., p. 7, speaking of these theories as 
a form of dualism. 
21 D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, cit., p. 32-33. 
22 G. SPERDUTI, “Dualism”, cit., p. 32, ft. 3. As noted by G. GAJA, “Dualism – A Review”, in J. NIJMAN, A. 
NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), cit., p. 52 ff., p. 57, dualism does not necessarily have roots in voluntarism. 
23 J.H.F VAN PANHUYS, “Relations and Interactions Between International and National Scenes of Law”, 
Recueil des cours 1964, vol. 112, p. 1 ff., p. 14 (“Writers pretending that an intermediate position is possible 
often only camouflage a dualist or monistic point of view”); R. QUADRI, cit., p. 280 (“ce débat est destiné à se 
prolonger même si ses termes doivent subir des changements essentiels”) and p. 290 (“it is necessary to be a 
dualist or a monist”; for the notion of “structural monism” embraced by the Italian author, see ibid., p. 290-297; 
more recently, see J. KLABBERS, International Law, Cambridge, 2013, p. 290 (“tertium non datur”). 
24 G. SPERDUTI, “Le principe”, cit., p. 333 (citing C. ROUSSEAU, Droit international public, Paris, 1970, p. 
48, who called the debate a “vaine querelle”); R. JENNINGS, A. WATTS, Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, 
London-New York, 1992, p. 54 (“the doctrinal dispute is largely without practical consequences”); B. 
CONFORTI, “Cours général de droit international public”, Recueil des cours 1988, vol. 212, p. 9 ff., p. 41 
(speaking of “disputes stériles et anachroniques entre monistes et dualistes”); J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER, 
“Introduction”, cit., p. 11 (“Neither dualism nor monism in their traditional form are able to capture the diversity 
of the processes of globalization”); M. SORENSEN, “Principes de droit international public”, Recueil des cours 
1960, vol. 101, p. 1 ff., p. 109 (“ce débat théorique est épuisé”). 
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have their spheres of activity”.25 However, this contestation is now untenable, because 
international law regulates a wide array of matters of direct domestic concern and commonly 
overlaps in scope with domestic law.26 Moreover, in any event, the attempt to contest the 
roots of the debate led Fitzmaurice to nothing else than embracing a strongly dualist 
proposition.27 
Another – perhaps even more blunt – attempt to overcome the dichotomy is ascribable to 
Armin von Bogdandy, who has contended that “[m]onism and dualism should cease to exist 
as doctrinal and theoretical notions for discussing the relationship between international law 
and internal law”, and should give way to a theory of legal pluralism.28 However, the concept 
of legal pluralism does not appear to indicate a way to get past the dichotomy, because 
dualism and pluralism are in fact synonyms.29 Speaking of pluralism may be more appropriate 
only in the sense that it can more effectively reflect the variety of features among national 
legal systems.30 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the classical debate has not lost all of its relevance and that 
it can still illuminate some fundamental characteristics of both the international and the 
national legal order. From a conceptual point of view, the fundamental premise of dualism 
seems to be able to withstand objection: legal systems theoretically can be self-contained, in 
the sense that “within each system the only existing rules are those that are part of the 
system”.31 This, however, does not necessarily imply that they are in practice, to the point that 
                                                
25 G. FITZMAURICE, “The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the 
Rule of Law”, Recueil des cours 1957, vol. 92, p. 1 ff., p. 71. See also P. MALANCZUK, Akehurst’s Modern 
Introduction to International Law, London-New York, 19977, p. 64 (quoting Fitzmaurice’s passage in text). 
26 G. ARANGIO-RUIZ, “International Law”, cit., p 32 (such a supposed “ratione materiae separation” is 
“surely inexistent”). 
27 It is sufficient to note the similarities between the passage by Fitzmaurice quoted in text and the 
following point made by H. TRIEPEL, “Les rapports”, cit., p. 83: “Puisque le droit interne et le droit international 
ne régissent pas les mêmes rapports, il est impossible qu’il y ait jamais une «concurrence» entre les sources des 
deux systèmes juridique”. See also R. QUADRI, cit., p. 290 (“L'affirmation des juristes anglais qu’il n’y a pas de 
domaine commun en ce qui concerne l’action des deux ordres juridiques, n’est que l'argument dualiste de la 
distinction des matières et des sources”); G. ARANGIO-RUIZ, “International Law”, cit., p. 32. 
28 A. VON BOGDANDY, “Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship Between 
International and Domestic Constitutional Law”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2008, p. 397 ff., p. 
399-401. Among other authors embracing legal pluralism, see, most notably, N. KRISCH, Beyond 
Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law, Oxford, 2012. 
29 According to A. VERDROSS, cit., p. 289, who first used the term “dualism”, “la construction dualiste du 
droit […] vaudrait mieux dire construction pluraliste du droit”. See also G. SPERDUTI, “Le principe”, cit., p. 336 
(“le dualisme est une des manières d'entendre le pluralisme juridique, c'est-à-dire de représenter la réalité du 
monde juridique comme résultant de la coexistence d'une pluralité d'ordres juridiques originaires et, à ce titre, 
formellement séparés et distincts l'un de l'autre. Mais, justement, la notion de dualisme doit être considérée 
comme comprise dans celle de pluralisme, sans en épuiser la portée”); R. QUADRI, cit., p. 280 (“l’école dualiste 
ou mieux pluraliste”; italics in the original); G. ARANGIO-RUIZ, “International Law”, cit., p. 17. 
30 G. GAJA, cit., p. 53. See also J. CRAWFORD, Brownlie’s, cit., p. 50, ft. 17 (“to talk simply of dualism is to 
imply that national legal systems all have the same features. Why should this be?”). 
31 G. GAJA, cit., p. 52-53 (defining dualism by reference to the self-contained character of international law 
and domestic law). For similar views, see also D. HALJAN, Separating Powers: International Law Before 
National Courts, The Hague, 2013, p. 73 (“Each legal system establishes its own criteria for the validity and 
legitimacy of the laws applied in it”); F.G. JACOBS, “Introduction”, in F.G. JACOBS, S. ROBERTS (eds.), The 
Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, London, 1987, p. xxiii ff., p. xxiv (“the effects of international law […] 
within the legal order of a State will always depend on a rule of domestic law”); T. TREVES, Diritto 
internazionale. Problemi Fondamentali, Milano, 2005, p. 647-648. 
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the self-contained nature of legal systems can often be regarded as no more than a formality.32 
In fact, whether or not a legal system is concretely self-contained depends on the setting of 
the legal system itself.33 Moreover, although the statement according to which there is no 
tertium besides the two theories may be justified when reasoning in strictly positivist terms,34 
one cannot deny that there are significant extra-positivist rapprochements which blur the 
distinction between the two doctrines.35 
All this notwithstanding, it is still useful to conceptualize international law and domestic legal 
systems as separate realms of law. This theoretical premise, indeed, has significant practical 
implications. Monism’s promise of unfiltered constraints on national governments has 
remained unkept. The international rules governing the process of domestic implementation 
acknowledge the theoretical separation between legal systems. International law does not 
automatically become part of national law. Instead, it confines itself to regulating certain 
profiles of how domestic legal orders should implement international obligations. 
The meaning of monism and dualism, for its part, has commonly shifted towards a descriptive 
usage, which is not incompatible with the self-contained nature of the legal orders.36 Monism 
and dualism, in other words, have thus more commonly come to define the way in which 
specific national legal systems choose to relate to international law. In this case, the two terms 
refer to the role of national legislatures and, in particular, to whether the national 
constitutional setting requires domestic legislation to give effect to international obligations.37 
By and large, if a constitution automatically incorporates international law in domestic law, 
without the need for further legislation, the legal system as a whole is deemed to be monist. 
Conversely, a dualist legal system is one where the parliament needs to legislate in order to 
make international law part of domestic law.38 In this case, the terms monism and dualism are 
                                                
32 E. CANNIZZARO, B.I. BONAFÈ, “Beyond the Archetypes of Modern Legal Thought. Appraising Old and 
New Forms of Interaction Between Legal Orders”, in M. MADURO, K. TUORI, S. SANKARI (eds.), Transnational 
Law. Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking, Cambridge, 2014, p. 78 ff., p. 80-81 (contemporary legal 
orders are “interdependent, interconnected, permeable with each other or even porous”) and p. 95 (noting the 
“emergence of relations between legal orders that escape the alternative between supremacy and subordination, 
and are rather based on mutual recognition and cooperation”); G. SPERDUTI, “Dualism”, cit., p. 49 (accepting the 
monist idea of an institutional link between legal systems and the dualist distinction of legal system, thus 
formulating a principle of “coordination of legal systems on institutional bases”); A. NOLLKAEMPER, National 
Courts and the International Rule of Law, Oxford, 2011, p. 13. 
33 G. GAJA, cit., p. 62. 
34 As noted by E. CANNIZZARO, B.I. BONAFÈ, cit., p. 80-81, both monism and dualism build on the strongly 
positivist premise of exclusivity of legal orders, i.e. “the premise that a legal order is either completely 
dependent or completely independent”. This is not to deny that monist thought was often influenced by natural 
law conceptions. This was the case, most notably, of Verdross: see B. SIMMA, “The Contribution of Alfred 
Verdross to the Theory of International Law”, European Journal of International Law 1995, p. 33 ff. 
Conversely, Kelsen’s monism was a purely formal and, thus, strongly positivist construct: see D.T. 
BJÖRGVINSSON, cit., p. 23-26. 
35 J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER, “Beyond the Divide”, in J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), cit., p. 341 
ff. (analyzing emergence of values common to both international law and domestic law, dispersion of authority 
and deformalization). 
36 G. SLYZ, cit., p. 113; D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, cit., p. 17. 
37 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 367 (noting that “the monist-dualist divide hinges on the role 
of the legislative branch”) and p. 368-369 (differentiating between theoretical and descriptive usages of the terms 
and favoring the latter). 
38 C. BRÖLMANN, “Deterritorialization in International Law: Moving Away from the Divide Between 
National and International Law”, in J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), cit., p. 84 ff., p. 85 (“the monist-dualist 
opposition is used also (and nowadays perhaps foremost) to refer to a classification of existing constitutional 
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usually considered interchangeable with other terms, e.g., respectively, incorporation and 
transformation. Incorporation, in particular, has been defined as the approach under which 
international law becomes internal law once it enters into force on the international plane, 
while transformation as the requirement for “additional domestic procedures” for international 
law to become part of domestic law.39 
This usage of the terms most likely originated from the recognition that the doctrinal stances 
on monism and dualism, particularly at the early stages of the dispute, had some influence on 
the drafters of national constitutions.40 For example, the technique of incorporation of 
international law is often described as a product of monist thought and that of transformation 
as a byproduct of theoretical dualism.41 However, one should be careful in drawing facile 
parallelisms between the theoretical usage of monism and dualism and their descriptive usage. 
In fact, contemporary domestic mechanisms of reception of international law seem to be quite 
independent from any ideological underpinning.42 Furthermore, as noted by Mattias Kumm, 
“[t]he very idea that that the national constitution is decisive for generating the doctrines that 
structure the relationship between national and international law is dualist. This is true, even 
where the constitution determines that international law is part of the law of the land”.43 
The usage of monism and dualism to describe the constitutional set-ups of national legal 
systems is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, most countries adopt a variety of 
solutions with reference to different sources of international law.44 Secondly, the dichotomy 
                                                                                                                                                   
systems, based on the way in which these incorporate international law”); R. HIGGINS, Problems and Process: 
International Law and How We Use It, Oxford, 1994, p. 207 (similarly arguing that “the difference in response 
to a clash of international law and domestic law in various domestic courts is substantially conditioned by 
whether the country concerned is monist or dualist in its approach”). For usages of monism and dualism to 
classify legal systems, see e.g. J.H. JACKSON, “Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy 
Analysis”, American Journal of International Law 1992, p. 310 ff., p. 313-315; A. AUST, Handbook of 
International Law, Cambridge, 20102, p. 76; J. KLABBERS, cit., p. 294 (dividing states between dualist and 
monist); Y. SHANY, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations Between National and International Courts, Oxford, 
2007, p. 11 ft. 48 (terming France and the U.S. “monist countries” and the U.K. “dualist”); L. FERRARI-BRAVO, 
“International and Municipal Law: The Complementarity of Legal Systems”, in R. MACDONALD, D.M. 
JOHNSTON (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and 
Theory, The Hague-Boston-Lancaster, 1983, p. 715 ff., p. 743, ft. 45 (terming the Italian constitution 
“dualistic”); T.M. FRANCK, A.K. THIRUVENGADAM, “International Law and Constitution-Making”, Chinese 
Journal of International Law 2003, p. 467 ff., p. 470; L.F. DAMROSCH, S.D. MURPHY, International Law. Cases 
and Materials, Saint Paul, 20146, p. 621-622 (dividing state approaches between monist and dualist). 
39 D.B. HOLLIS, “A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law and Practice”, in D.B. HOLLIS, M.R. BLAKESLEE, 
L.B. EDERINGTON (eds.), National Treaty Law and Practice, Leiden-Boston, 2005, p. 1 ff., p. 40. 
40 See e.g. G. SPERDUTI, “Dualism”, cit., p. 44-46 (noting influence of dualist thought in the practice of 
Italy, Germany and Scandinavian countries). 
41 See e.g. D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, cit., p. 32 (linking transformation to the thought of Triepel). 
42 G. GAJA, cit., p. 60. As a vivid example of this, it can be recalled that, during the drafting of the Italian 
Constitution, dualist Gaetano Morelli proposed, together with Roberto Ago, the adoption of a broad automatic 
incorporation clause (which many would certainly term monist), spanning both general international law and 
treaties. The proposal failed to be approved, so that the Constitution only provided for the automatic 
incorporation of general international law (see Art. 10, para. 1). See R. AGO, G. MORELLI, “I rapporti 
internazionali dello Stato nella futura Costituzione italiana”, report discussed on 12 February 1946 before the 1st 
Sub-commission of the Italian Constituent Assembly, reproduced in Rivista di diritto internazionale 1977, p. 334 
ff. 
43 M. KUMM, “Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement”, in S. 
CHOUDHRY (ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge, 2007, p. 256 ff., p. 258. 
44 See e.g. A. PAULUS, “National Courts and the International Rule of Law – Remarks on the Book by 
André Nollkaemper”, Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 2012, p. 5 ff., p. 9 (criticizing the classification of the 
German legal order as dualist: “it is ‘monist’ with regard to general international law, but does not recognize its 
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“tends to obscure key functional differences” among legal systems, i.e. does not give an 
adequate account of how national organs, particularly courts, interact with international 
norms.45 And thirdly, this usage places nearly-exclusive emphasis on the component of 
automatic incorporation of international law and leaves in the shadow another fundamental 
point of the interplay between international law and domestic law, i.e. the domestic 
hierarchical rank granted to international law.46 
Also a narrower descriptive usage, consisting in referring to specific techniques of 
implementation and to specific sources of international law, can generate confusion.47 Indeed, 
it is not at all clear whether some mechanisms of reception of international law should be 
described as monist, dualist, or possibly hybrid.48 For example, the German and Italian 
practice to implement a treaty via an ad hoc piece of legislation containing a renvoi to the 
international source achieves the practical effect of giving the treaty domestic legal effects on 
its entry into force; moreover, in Italy the treaty is introduced in domestic law with a rank 
higher than ordinary laws. Inconsistent views have been expressed on whether this practice 
would represent a form of monism-incorporation or dualism-transformation.49 
This confusion depends on the fact that too many different legal phenomena are put under the 
same descriptive heading of monism and dualism. For example, the 2016 ILA Final Report 
Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts with International Law describes all judicial 
doctrines restricting or enhancing the field of application of international law in a domestic 
legal system by resorting to the monism-dualism spectrum.50 The tendency to conflate such a 
                                                                                                                                                   
supremacy vis-à-vis the constitution; it requires parliamentary consent to the ratification of important 
international agreements, but does not require their separate transformation in domestic law as, for instance, UK 
law does; and, lastly, allows European and some other international law to have direct effect in the domestic 
legal system.”). See also G. ARANGIO-RUIZ, “International Law and Interindividual Law”, in J. NIJMAN, A. 
NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), cit., p. 15 ff., p. 20; J. CRAWFORD, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International 
Law, The Hague, 2014, p. 218 (“classifying a state’s constitutional design as either monist or dualist is not so 
much an exercise in absolutes as a matter of degree”). 
45 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 368. On the “functional differences” in the practice of legal 
systems, i.e. the use of international sources in the practice of national courts, see below Chapters 3 and 4. 
46 See, for example, E. DE WET, “South Africa”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), International Law and Domestic 
Legal Systems. Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion, Oxford, 2011, p. 567 ff., p. 580, noting that the 
South African Constitution has a “monist approach” to international custom since it provides for its automatic 
incorporation. At the same time, however, that constitution ranks custom in a position subordinate to acts of 
Parliament. 
47  See e.g. T. BUERGENTHAL, “Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and 
International Law”, Recueil des cours 1992, p. 303 ff., p. 316 (distinguishing monist and dualist states only with 
reference to treaties). 
48 See e.g. M.P. VAN ALSTINE, “The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement. Summary and 
Conclusions”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement. A Comparative Study, 
Cambridge, 2009, p. 555 ff. (speaking of “traditional dualist states” and “hybrid monist states”). 
49 See T. BUERGENTHAL, “Self-Executing”, cit., p. 341 (considering Italy and Germany “monist states” vis-
à-vis treaties); A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects”, cit., p. 140 (mentioning transformation of treaties as the 
ordinary practice of Italy); G. SPERDUTI, “Dualism”, cit., p. 44 (with the Italian ordine di esecuzione, “dualism 
triumphs”). The ambivalent nature of the German approach to treaties is correctly described in D.B. HOLLIS, cit., 
p. 40-41. For a more thorough analysis of the techniques of international law implementation in Germany and 
Italy, see the next two sections of this chapter. 
50 A. TZANAKOPOULOS, “Final Report. Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts with International 
Law”, presented at the International Law Association Johannesburg Conference, 2016, p. 9-11. More 
specifically, the Report argues that constitutional set-ups of “monism/incorporation” and 
“dualism/transformation” are positioned “at the opposite ends of a spectrum” and that a number of judicial 
doctrines “come into play and position the various legal orders all along the spectrum”. Among the techniques 
asserted to moderate “monism/incorporation”, and which are collectively termed “blunting” or “avoidance 
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wide array of legislative and judicial techniques under the same two headings further 
impoverishes the descriptive ability of these concepts. 
In sum, the descriptive usages of these terms appear to be inherently ambiguous, as much as 
their philosophical prototypes. At most, the two terms can loosely describe different attitudes 
or degrees of openness towards international law.51 By using the terms in this way, one does 
nothing else than recognize the unquestionable influence of monist and dualist ideals on 
political and constitutional theory. Monism, for example, soon came to be acknowledged not 
as a faithful description of reality but as an aspiration to be realized within national legal 
systems; and under a clear monist influence, many scholars concluded that “constitutions of 
states should provide for the status of international law and accept its superiority over 
domestic law”.52 
Most notably, Hersch Lauterpacht, while recognizing that “la suprématie formelle du droit 
interne à l'intérieur de l'Etat est encore un principe de droit positif”, wondered – in the light of 
his belief in monism, “si les Etats civilisés ne devraient pas non seulement adopter le droit 
international comme partie intégrante de leur Constitution, mais encore se priver du pouvoir 
d’édicter, même par voie de modification constitutionnelle, des lois contraires à la disposition 
constitutionnelle fondamentale qui fait du droit international une partie intégrante de leur 
système”. By doing so, he envisioned what he termed (at the time of his third Hague lectures, 
in 1937) “a radical innovation”: “un frein au pouvoir législatif” operated by national courts.53 
For all the foregoing reasons, the analysis contained in the following pages will not be 
articulated around the concepts of monism and dualism. Instead, it will conceptualize the 
relationship between the domestic and the international realms of law by having regard to 
both the role of state organs in the implementation phase (i.e. the issue of domestic validity) 
and the hierarchical interactions between international and national sources of law (i.e. the 
issue of domestic supremacy). The role of political authorities in the domestic application of 
international law is shaped, in its formal dimension, by the interplay of these two elements. 
 
 
3. Supremacy of international law over primary legislation. 
 
Today, the “radical innovation” envisioned by Lauterpacht in 1937 has consistently found its 
way into national legal systems. Although it has been argued that, from a purely numerical 
viewpoint, the most common practice in legal systems seems to be the prioritization of 
conflicting domestic law over international law,54 cases of prioritization of international law 
over domestic law are far from rare or isolated and span a significant number of legal 
systems. Such cases concern both general international law and international agreements. 
                                                                                                                                                   
techniques”, are “non-justiciability (wherein one might include the political question doctrine), the act-of-state 
doctrine, denials of standing, and the doctrine of non-self-execution of treaties, among others”. On the other 
hand, “dualism/transformation” is said to be moderated by a series of “blunting techniques” which principally 
include consistent interpretation and the concept of legitimate expectations. 
51 E. CANNIZZARO, B.I. BONAFÈ, cit., p. 79 (noting that the two terms only depict “mental archetypes”). 
52 D.T. BJÖRGVINSSON, cit., p. 29. 
53 H. LAUTERPACHT, “Règles générales du droit de la paix”, Recueil des cours 1937, vol. 62, p. 95 ff., p. 
145-146. 
54 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects”, cit., p. 143. 
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National constitutions ensuring the supremacy of international law in the national legal order 
aim to constrain the actions of both the executive and the lawmakers. The constraining effect 
is maximized if supremacy is coupled with a mechanism of automatic standing incorporation 
of international law, i.e. a system whereby the domestication of international law is not made 
contingent upon the will of the political branches. In such cases, deviations from international 
law obligations could be achieved only through complex processes of constitutional revision 
or quasi-constitutional lawmaking. 
The following pages will first of all clarify the scope of the concept of supremacy as used in 
this section, and will distinguish it from the international law dimension of the concept of 
supremacy (Section 3.1). Section 3.2 will provide a rundown on relevant examples of 
prioritization of international law over acts of national parliaments and will briefly examine 
the policy reasons which lead domestic legal systems to adopt this approach to the 
implementation of international norms. Section 3.3 will then attempt a policy assessment of 
these techniques with reference to both domestic democracy and the separation of powers and 
will argue that these considerations may prove very influential on the practice of national 
courts. 
 
3.1. The domestic law dimension of the concept of supremacy. 
Before turning to the relevant practice of domestic legal systems, a few remarks on the 
concept of supremacy are needed. In general terms, supremacy can be defined as the 
prioritization of international law over national law.55 Such a concept can be applicable in 
both the international and the domestic legal orders; however, there is no necessary logical or 
institutional connection between the international and the domestic dimensions of the 
principle. 
Put differently, supremacy of international law in the domestic legal sphere is not a 
consequence of the undisputed supremacy of international law in the international legal 
order.56 International law does not provide for any obligation to grant its norms constitutional 
or supra-statutory status in national law, as long as effective compliance is not hampered.57 
This is a direct consequence of the formal self-contained nature of the legal orders, as has 
been described in the previous section. What is supreme in one legal system may well not be 
supreme in another – or, for that matter, may well not be recognized as valid and applicable 
within the other legal order. As clearly expressed by the ICJ in the ELSI case, “[c]ompliance 
with municipal law and compliance with the provisions of a treaty are different questions. 
What is a breach of treaty may be lawful in the municipal law and what is unlawful in the 
municipal law may be wholly innocent of violation of a treaty provision”.58 Even more 
                                                
55 Ibid., p. 142. 
56 On the international law principle of supremacy, see more thoroughly Chapter 1, Section 3. 
57 G.L. NEUMAN, “International Law as a Resource in Constitutional Interpretation”, Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 2006-2007, p. 177 ff., p. 184 (“International law does not require its norms to be given 
constitutional status even when they are directly at issue, let alone when they are relevant only by analogy”). For 
a contrary view, see Y. SHANY, “How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative Analysis of the 
Influence of International Human Rights Treaties upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts by Domestic 
Courts”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2006, p. 341 ff., p. 355 (adopting, however, a very broad 
understanding of “incorporation into constitutional law”, which encompasses also techniques different from 
formal incorporation, i.e. consistent interpretation). 
58 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 15 ff., para. 73. 
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explicitly, the ECtHR has consistently taken the view that the right to an effective remedy 
does not include the right to challenge domestic legislation before a national authority, on the 
grounds of its inconsistency with the Convention or equivalent domestic legal norms.59 
The international law principle of supremacy, then, must be understood in the sense that 
international law must prevail over national law in the international legal order itself.60 This 
section, in its turn, only deals with the cases in which international law is granted supremacy 
in the domestic legal order. Because this type of supremacy cannot be traced back to the 
authority of international law, it cannot but derive from a fundamental constitutional choice of 
the domestic legal order itself.61 
A further clarification is in order. Supremacy is here understood as the prioritization of 
international law over statutes or other domestic sources having the same rank, i.e. over 
ordinary acts issued by national legislatures. This implies that a source of international law, 
although not supreme in the present sense, may prevail over other municipal sources which 
rank lower in the domestic hierarchy: these cases will be dealt with in the next section.62 
This limitation also implies that, for the scope of the present section, the hierarchical relation 
between international law and a country’s constitution is not taken into consideration, as long 
as international sources are supreme over ordinary legislation. The relationship between 
international law and national constitutions has momentous theoretical and practical 
implications, which have been subject to detailed analysis in legal scholarship.63 Admittedly, 
this feature of the present study, whereby all cases of prioritization of international law over 
legislation are conflated, may come at the price of some oversemplification. This restriction 
appears nonetheless justified because, as will be more thoroughly demonstrated below, the 
key point in the assessment of the latitude of national political authorities in the 
implementation of international obligations is the extent to which international norms have 
the capacity to outdo the acts of parliament. 
 
3.2. Supremacy of international law in the practice of national legal systems. 
Turning now to some relevant examples from the practice of domestic legal systems, national 
constitutions can first of all accord supremacy to general norms of international law.64 These 
                                                
59 See e.g. Greens and M.T. v. U.K., App. No. 60041/08 and 60054/08, Judgment, 23 November 2010, 
para. 90. 
60 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 280-281. 
61 G. FITZMAURICE, cit., p. 68-69; D.B. HOLLIS, cit., p. 39 (“although states accept the VCLT rules on 
treaty priority as a matter of international law, they have not always viewed these rules as requiring specific 
consequences for the role of treaties as a matter of national law”). 
62 For example, the uptake of international agreements in the US legal system is not dealt with in this 
section, although treaties do prevail over certain domestic law sources such as state laws: see T. BUERGENTHAL, 
“Self-Executing”, cit., p. 344. 
63  See e.g. F.M. PALOMBINO, “Compliance with International Judgments: Between Supremacy of 
International Law and National Fundamental Principles”, ZaöRV 2015, p. 503 ff. 
64 This category includes, first and foremost, customary international law, i.e. the source referred to by Art. 
38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ (26 June 1945), 33 UNTS 993. Here the expression general international law is 
preferred, because provisions incorporating international custom are often held to refer as well to other unwritten 
sources of international law, notably the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations (see Art. 
38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute) or general principles of international law. This notwithstanding, as noted by G. 
BARTOLINI, cit., p. 1310, ft. 58, it should be considered that these latter sources receive scant application in 
domestic law practice, and for this reason customary international law represents by far the most relevant part of 
the category analyzed here. 
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sources are often neglected by constitutional texts. 65  However, relevant examples of 
prioritization of general international law can be found, inter alia, in the constitutions of 
Germany, Italy and (according to some scholars) Austria. 
Art. 25 of the 1949 German Basic Law is explicit in providing for the supremacy of generally 
recognized rules of international law over ordinary laws, in that it reads as follows: “[t]he 
general rules of public international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall 
take precedence over the laws and shall directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of 
the federal territory”. This article is commonly understood as giving international customary 
law a rank higher than statutes but inferior to the Constitution.66 
Unlike the Basic Law, Art. 10(1) of the Italian Constitution (pursuant to which “[t]he Italian 
legal system conforms to the generally recognised principles of international law”) and Art. 
9(1) of the Austrian Constitution (“The generally recognized rules of international law are 
regarded as integral parts of federal law”) do not specify the hierarchical rank, which has to 
be established by interpretive means. In Italy, there is agreement among commentators and in 
case law that the norms referred to by Art. 10 are granted constitutional status.67 This outcome 
derives from a reading of the provision as implying that the whole Italian legal system shall 
conform to general international law,68 thus including ordinary laws and, in principle, the 
Constitution itself. 
Conversely, there is no shared understanding of Art. 9 of the Constitution of Austria. While 
some have contended that this provision confers upon general international law the rank of 
federal statutory law, others maintain that this rank should always be equal to federal 
constitutional law. The view which seems to be most commonly accepted lies somewhere in 
between, arguing that the rank would depend on the content of the norm and that general 
international law may have constitutional status if the enactment of a rule of that same content 
could only be achieved by a constitutional law.69 
Interestingly, all the aforementioned articles have been claimed to incorporate not only 
general norms of international law but also treaties, as an effect of the reception of the 
principle pacta sunt servanda. These arguments, however, have always been rejected by 
Constitutional Courts.70 
Turning to the prioritization of international treaties, as recently as in 1987, Antonio Cassese 
noted that “very few states [were] willing to go so far […] as to ensure at the constitutional 
                                                
65 G. BARTOLINI, cit., p. 1310; T. GINSBURG, S. CHERNYKH, Z. ELKINS, cit., p. 223-226 and 233; A. 
CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions”, cit., p. 368. 
66 B. SIMMA, D.E. KHAN, M. ZÖCKLER, R. GEIGER, “The Role of German Courts in the Enforcement of 
International Human Rights”, in B. CONFORTI, F. FRANCIONI (eds.), Enforcing International Human Rights in 
Domestic Courts, The Hague-Boston-London, 1997, p. 71 ff., p. 75-76; H.P. FOLZ, “Germany”, in D. SHELTON 
(ed.), cit., p. 240 ff., p. 245-246. 
67 F. FRANCIONI, “The Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Enforcement: Reflections on the 
Italian Experience”, in B. CONFORTI, F. FRANCIONI (eds.), cit., p. 15 ff., p. 28-29; G. CATALDI, “Italy”, in D. 
SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 328 ff., p. 344-345. 
68 A. CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions”, cit., p. 371. 
69 E. HANDL-PETZ, “Austria”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 55 ff., p. 89. 
70  See generally A. CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions”, cit., p. 398-399; E. BENVENISTI, “Judicial 
Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts”, 
European Journal of International Law 1993, p. 159 ff., p. 162. For an example of this viewpoint, see R. 
QUADRI, cit., p. 304-306. 
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level that treaties are not disregarded by national authorities”.71 Instances of prioritization of 
international agreements, after the historical first of the 1931 Spanish Constitution, 72 
remained somewhat desultory. The situation has changed significantly over the course of the 
last decades, to the point that granting supremacy to international agreements seems to be a 
rather common solution in contemporary constitutions.73 
In Italy, for example, the hierarchical rank of treaties is considered to be above that of 
ordinary laws. This can be traced back to a 2001 constitutional amendment and to its 
interpretation rendered by the Constitutional Court. Originally, the Italian Constitution did not 
deal with any aspects of the domestic implementation of treaties. In the debates held in the 
Constituent Assembly, proposals were put forward to provide for the automatic standing 
incorporation of both general international law and international agreements.74 However, 
influential members of the Assembly contended that the Constitution should give leeway to 
the state to adopt sovereign acts in contravention of treaty obligations.75 For this reason, as 
seen above, Art. 10(1) of the Italian Constitution only provides for the automatic standing 
incorporation of general international law. 
However, pursuant to post-reform Art. 117, para. 1, “[i]n performing their legislative powers, 
the State and the Regions shall respect the Constitution and obligations arising from 
international law and European Community law”. Shortly after the reform, there was 
disagreement among commentators on the impact of the new text of Art. 117(1) on the 
relationship between Italian law and international law: while some favored a literalist reading 
of the provision, thus arguing that it elevated the rank of international treaties in the hierarchy 
of norms,76 others contested this conclusion based on a systematic reading of new Art. 117(1) 
– chiefly, on its location in Title V of Part II of the Italian Constitution, dealing with the 
division of powers between the Regions and the Central Government – and on concerns 
relating to the separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the regions.77 
The former interpretation was later espoused by the Constitutional Court.78 
Interestingly, while the Italian Constitution provides for a generalized supremacy of 
international law over domestic law, it does not set forth a mechanism of automatic standing 
incorporation of treaties. Instead, in a similar way as in Germany, treaties are incorporated by 
means of an ad hoc provision (ordine di esecuzione). Because of this, Italy is frequently 
                                                
71 A. CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions”, cit., p. 411-412. 
72 Ibid., p. 360-361; see also T. GINSBURG, S. CHERNYKH, Z. ELKINS, cit., p. 209 (arguing that making 
treaties superior to domestic law is a post-1944 phenomenon). 
73 G. BARTOLINI, cit., p. 1301-1302. 
74 See the report drafted by R. AGO, G. MORELLI, cit., and, for a comprehensive appraisal, A. CASSESE, “Il 
contributo degli internazionalisti ai lavori del Ministero per la costituente”, Rivista di diritto internazionale 
1977, p. 47 ff., particularly p. 52-53. 
75 This was, most notably, the opinion of the leader of the Italian Communist Party, Togliatti. See on this 
point A. BERNARDINI, La sovranità popolare violata nei processi normativi internazionali ed europei, Napoli, 
1997, p. 19. 
76 B. CONFORTI, “Reflections on the Recent Amendments to the Italian Constitution Concerning Respect 
for International and European Community Law”, Italian Yearbook of International Law 2001, p. 3 ff. 
77 E. CANNIZZARO, “La riforma ‘federalista’ della Costituzione e gli obblighi internazionali”, Rivista di 
diritto internazionale 2001, p. 921 ff. 
78 Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 348 of 24 October 2007 and Judgment No. 349 of 24 October 2007 
(so-called “twin judgments”, or sentenze gemelle). See the comment by G. CATALDI in Italian Yearbook of 
International Law 2007, p. 292 ff. 
 39 
described as “dualist”,79 but this view somewhat neglects the practical reality of the legal 
system. Since the order of execution is routinely approved and included in the act of 
Parliament which authorizes the ratification, treaties normally become part of domestic law.80 
This comes very close to an automatic incorporation, if not in form at least in substance. But 
this, of course, does not rule out the hypothetical possibility for the Parliament not to enact 
the ordine di esecuzione, thus not incorporating the treaty and making it necessary to provide 
for transforming legislation. 
In Russia, Art 15(4) of the Constitution states that “international treaties and agreements of 
the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an international treaty 
or agreement of the Russian Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the 
rules of the international agreement shall be applied”. Although there is some controversy in 
legal scholarship as to exact status of international agreements in domestic law, this 
constitutional provision is at the very least clear in incorporating all treaties and in 
establishing their priority over conflicting laws. 81  It has also been noted that this 
constitutional provision enjoys a special status because it is inserted in the first chapter of the 
Constitution, which can only be amended through a special procedure: in practice, this makes 
Art. 15(4) unchangeable by the Parliament.82 
Among other relevant examples of prioritization of treaties, one should recall the Dutch 
Constitution, which establishes, at Art. 93, the automatic incorporation of international 
treaties in domestic law, and whose Art. 94 provides as follows: “Statutory regulations in 
force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with 
provisions of treaties […] that are binding on all persons”.83 Mention should be made also of 
Art. 55 of the French Constitution, pursuant to which “Les traités ou accords régulièrement 
ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous 
réserve, pour chaque accord ou traité, de son application par l'autre partie”.84 This article has 
exercised significant influence over the constitutions of the Francophone world; particularly, 
the constitutional texts of French-speaking African countries manifest a clear openness to 
international law and often textually reproduce Art. 55 of the French Constitution.85 
It should be added, in conclusion, that another way of committing the actions of all state 
authorities to international law compliance is to enshrine the relevant principles of 
international law within a constitution. Both general international law and international 
                                                
79 See e.g. A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects”, cit., p. 140. 
80 F. FRANCIONI, “The Jurisprudence”, cit., p. 25. 
81 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 374 (hierarchical status of treaties in Russia is contested); 
G.M. DANILENKO, “International Law in the Russian Legal System”, American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 1997, p. 295 ff., p. 296 (Art. 15 “establishes a higher normative status for treaty rules”); T. 
GINSBURG, “Locking”, cit., p. 719-720 (arguing that the Russian legal system is more “internationalist” than 
those of Germany or the Netherlands); Y. TIKHOMIROV, “Russia”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 517 ff., p. 523-
524; W.E. BUTLER, “Russian Federation”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 410 ff., p. 427-432. 
82 S.Y. MAROCHKIN, “International Law in the Courts of the Russian Federation: Practice of Application”, 
Chinese Journal of International Law 2007, p. 329 ff., p. 330. 
83 On this provision, see A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Netherlands”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 326 ff., p. 333-
334. 
84 On this article, see E. DECAUX, “France”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 207 ff., p. 216 and p. 223-226. 
85 M. KILLANDER, H. ADJOLOHOUN, “International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa: 
An Introduction”, in M. KILLANDER (ed.), International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa, 
Pretoria, 2010, p. 3 ff., p. 5. 
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agreements can exercise such an influence over the drafting of a constitution.86 The inclusion 
of internationally-oriented norms, or of norms which are substantially equal in content to 
international law, is not always easy to detect. In the field of human rights, for example, it is 
common for constitutions to contain extensive bill of rights which may embody principles 
drawn from international custom and agreements and blend them with broader – or also 
narrower – guarantees.87 
This rundown on the relevant practice of national legal systems begs one fundamental 
question as regards the policy underpinning of the techniques of implementation which have 
been just described. More specifically, given that the choice to prioritize international law 
over domestic law depends solely on the national legal order, the question arises of which 
factors lead a legal system to accord this much authority to international legal sources. 
This is a question which cannot have one single answer. At the most basic level of 
understanding, and as in all forms of legislative implementation of international law, the 
(constitutional) legislature manifests its intention to ensure or facilitate the state’s compliance 
with international obligations.88 But this is merely a general statement, in that facilitating 
compliance with international law may not necessarily require its formal primacy over acts of 
Parliament. Besides the intention to ensure compliance, then, other factors must be present 
which lead a national legal system to value compliance with international law to the point of 
granting it a trumping effect over all acts of domestic political authorities. 
The choice to restrict the latitude of future political choices through the operation of 
international law may depend on a variety of historical and political considerations which it is 
impossible to list exhaustively. Constitutional commitments to respect international law may 
be introduced after a period of war or revolution in order to prevent a conflict from occurring 
again,89  or may signal the highest commitment of a newly born state – or a former 
authoritarian state – to be a law-abiding member of the international community.90 Not 
unexpectedly, the tendency to open up constitutions to international law peaked particularly in 
                                                
86 See the examples in A. CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions”, cit., p. 419 ff. (bans on war included in the 
constitutions of Italy, Germany and Japan); L. FERRARI-BRAVO, cit., p. 743 ft. 38 (noting that Art. 111 of the 
Italian Constitution, as amended in 1999, reproduces Art. 6 ECHR almost verbatim); G. BARTOLINI, cit., p. 1307 
(on the influence of international human rights standards on the drafting of the Couth African Constitution); V.S. 
VERESHCHETIN, “New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the Relationship between International Law and 
National Law”, European Journal of International Law 1996, p. 29 ff., p. 32-33. 
87 On this point, see generally A. TZANAKOPOULOS, “Judicial Dialogue as a Means of Interpretation”, in 
H.P. AUST, G. NOLTE (eds.), The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts. Uniformity, Diversity, 
Convergence, Oxford, 2016, p. 72 ff., p. 86-88 (terming these instances “consubstantial norms”). For specific 
cases in national law, see e.g. F. FRANCIONI, “The Jurisprudence”, cit., p. 20-21 (arguing that customary 
international law is “a meaningful addition” to the human rights catalogue of the Italian Constitution); B. SIMMA, 
D.E. KHAN, M. ZÖCKLER, R. GEIGER, cit., p. 77 (on the tendency of German courts to rely on domestic human 
rights standards, assuming that they are more favorable than international customary law). 
88 G. BARTOLINI, cit., p. 1302 (“The clear aim of these constitutional provisions is mainly to avoid the 
infringment of international obligations by the State in question”). See also B. CONFORTI, International Law and 
the Role of Domestic Legal Systems, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993, p. 44 (according to whom “international 
law, once it becomes formally valid within the State, is sustained by a dual normative aim of the internal system: 
first, that certain relations be regulated in conformity with international norms, and, second, that international 
obligations be complied with”). 
89 V.S. VERESHCHETIN, cit., p. 30; A. CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions”, cit., p. 351. 
90 L. FERRARI-BRAVO, cit., p. 733; V.S. VERESHCHETIN, cit., p. 38; A. CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions”, 
cit., p. 357 (on the international law provisions of the 1919 Weimar Constitution being “a sort of captatio 
benevolentiae vis-à-vis the victors”). 
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Western countries after World War II;91 and this tendency has again manifested itself after the 
dissolution of the socialist block in the wave of new constitutions of Eastern European and 
Central Asian countries.92 
Other reasons for devising stable constitutional mechanisms to receive international law 
within national legal systems may be identified in the objectives to pursue the protection of 
human rights,93 to safeguard a market-oriented economy94 or to facilitate admission to 
international organizations.95 These exigencies are again more pressing when a country is 
overcoming an authoritarian regime, which produces a more critical necessity to control the 
actions of national political authorities.96 Lastly, the choices of constitutional legislators can 
be shaped by a country’s legal and doctrinal traditions,97 or by reason of the influence 
exercised by the constitutions of other countries.98 
In sum, the variety of factors leading to the prioritization of international law in domestic law, 
as well as their chiefly domestic character, allows for no reductio ad unum. Moreover, one 
should not underestimate that such considerations do not necessarily lead constitutional 
drafters to bestow domestic supremacy on international norms. In certain legal systems, these 
reasons lay at the roots of the choice to give international norms a hierarchical primacy over 
domestic legislation; however, in other national legal systems the very same reasons may 
involve the creation of mechanisms of automatic incorporation of international law which, 
although aimed at facilitating compliance with international obligations, are devoid of special 
hierarchical features. Whether one or the other implementation technique is chosen depends 
primarily on the significance that the concept of parliamentary supremacy has in a given legal 
environment. This point will be explored more thoroughly in Section 4. 
 
3.3. Policy implications: issues of democratic legitimacy and separation of powers and 
their influence on national case law. 
                                                
91 P. DE VISSCHER, “Les tendences internationales des constitutions modernes”, Recueil des cours 1952, 
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may be explained by the traditionally circumspect approach of the Soviet and Russian legal doctrine to 
customary norms of international law”). 
98 The drafting of constitutional provisions is often influenced by constitutions of foreign countries. See J. 
ELSTER, “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process”, Duke Law Journal 1995, p. 364 ff.; E. 
MCWHINNEY, Supreme Courts and Judicial Law-Making: Constitutional Tribunals and Constitutional Review, 
Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster, 1986, p. 3-9. 
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The exact identification of the sources of international law which are to be held supreme 
based on constitutional provisions may be a contentious point. This issue may be disputed, for 
example, in cases where a constitution generically refers to all international agreements en 
bloc. In cases where the same constitution also requires some form of parliamentary approval 
in the making of certain categories of treaties, it may be uncertain whether also executive 
agreements should rank higher than ordinary legislation. It may also be uncertain, for 
instance, whether supremacy should extend to acts of international organizations established 
by treaties which rank higher than legislation, or to treaties concluded by local authorities in 
federal and regional states.99 
In such cases, the delimitation of the extent of domestic supremacy of international law is an 
interpretive question that should be addressed by the courts, primarily constitutional and 
supreme courts. Policy considerations relating to domestic democracy and separation of 
powers are potentially crucial factors in the courts’ assessment in this regard. 
For this reason, without neglecting the variety of practical solutions and of underlying 
rationales, it is opportune to make some general remarks as regards the way in which the 
granting of domestic supremacy to international law interacts with possible concerns relating 
to the safeguard of domestic democracy and separation of powers, and how such concerns 
may influence the activities of supreme and constitutional courts called upon to interpret, 
clarify and delimit the scope of the constitutional provisions establishing the priority of 
international law. 
First of all, it is clear that democratic concerns surrounding the domestic implementation of 
international law may seem particularly pressing when constitutions try to submit the 
activities of future legislatures to compliance with international law.100 
This argument, however, requires caution. More specifically, this paragraph submits that it is 
necessary to distinguish between two different situations, depending on whether or not the 
material content of the international norms that are granted supremacy over domestic 
legislation is substantially equivalent (or at least homogeneous) to the content of a national 
constitution, as may happen in the field of the protection of fundamental human rights. 
If this is the case, the effects of the supremacy of international norms over domestic 
legislation do not differ, in substance, from the effects of the supremacy of the constitution 
over legislation. This is because the granting of constitutional (or quasi-constitutional) rank to 
international law is a way of protecting the very same values and rights safeguarded by 
domestic constitutionalism.101 Simply, a constitution may show higher trust in the protection 
of these rights at the international level, rather than at the domestic level.102 In this case, the 
policy implications of the domestic supremacy of the national constitution and of 
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international law are identical and, therefore, the supremacy of international law over 
domestic legislation does not appear problematic from a policy perspective of domestic 
democracy. 
This assessment finds consistent empirical evidence in the fact that the constitutions of 
democratizing countries – where the need to constrain political action to safeguard democracy 
is more pressing – are more likely to give international law a domestic status higher than 
legislation. 103  Moreover, this is also particularly clear in the case of prioritization of 
international human rights, whose supremacy in the domestic legal order may guarantee a 
more effective protection of the same substantial rights typically enshrined in a 
constitution. 104  This explains the choice of several national constitutions not to grant 
supremacy to international treaties en bloc but only to human rights treaties,105 as goes for a 
number of constitutions in Latin American and Eastern European countries.106 Similarly, in 
Austria the European Convention of Human Rights has been incorporated within the body of 
constitutional law by means of a constitutional statute.107 In these cases, it is clear that 
international law is prioritized because its material content deserves prioritization. The 
content of such international norms is essentially constitutional in nature.  
This argument, however, has a limit, because it only applies to international law rules which, 
by reason of their content, may be considered of constitutional or quasi-constitutional 
relevance in a given legal system. To the contrary, the argument expressed above would not 
suffice to defend, on policy grounds, the granting of supremacy to international agreements 
relating to trivial matters or, more generally, to matters that are not considered of fundamental 
importance by a domestic legal system.108 In such cases, one should conclude that it is only 
the interest in ensuring respect of international obligations that weights the constitutional 
balance in favor of prioritization of international law regardless of its material content. These 
constitutional provisions could signal that ensuring compliance with international obligations 
is appraised as so much of a fundamental axiom that some degree of compression of domestic 
democracy should be regarded as a tolerable collateral damage. 
But this conclusion is rather problematic: indeed, in principle, constitutional compression of 
future government action should be confined to “norms deemed so essential to government 
that they need to impose rigidity”.109 It should be recalled, incidentally, that also in the 
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109 J.H. JACKSON, cit., p. 331 (emphasis in the original). 
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international legal order the hierarchical supremacy of norms is grounded on their substantive 
content.110 It would not seem inappropriate to apply the same logic to the prioritization of 
international norms within national legal systems. 
Secondly, the granting of supremacy to international agreements may also entail a tension 
with the domestic separation of powers. This tension can manifest itself in two somewhat 
different respects. 
Firstly, as in all situations in which international agreements negotiated or concluded by the 
executive are given domestic force of law without the need for an act of parliament, an issue 
of separation of powers between the executive and the legislature arises. There is a concern, 
more specifically, that the executive’s exclusive or predominant authority in the stipulation of 
international treaties, when coupled with automatic treaty incorporation, may give the 
executive a de facto legislative power, thus encroaching on the prerogatives of the legislature. 
When treaties are granted supremacy over ordinary legislation, this concern, of course, may 
appear more pressing, because the hands of the legislature would be tied. 
Secondly, a more peculiar issue arises when treaties are granted a status equal to the 
constitution. Besides – or instead of – being seen as a curb on political authorities, this 
mechanism of treaty implementation may also be regarded as strenghtening the scope of 
authority of the political branches. This is because, in the event of such an enhanced form of 
supremacy, political authorities, by adhering to a treaty, may be able to supplement or even 
alter the constitution, i.e. the very law by which they are supposed to be controlled.111 On 
closer inspection, this assertion closely echoes the former: the argument in question simply 
applies the same logic to the treaty-making power of executive and legislature combined, and 
conjures up possible malign alterations of the constitutional setting. 
These arguments could seem preposterous. Indeed, to the extent the supremacy of 
international law is enshrined in the constitution, it could be argued that separation of powers 
concerns should be discarded ab initio, because a constitution – by definition – can modify 
the ordinary setting of the domestic separation of powers. With particular regard to the latter 
criticism, moreover, international law which is supreme over national law in the domestic 
legal order ultimately constrains the authority of state organs irrespective of the fact that state 
organs themselves have consented to it. This is particularly clear for inward-looking treaty 
norms – i.e. norms regulating matters of domestic concern – that oblige domestic organs to 
behave in a certain way towards individuals. It is hard to imagine how these norms, if 
effectively enforced, could enhance the latitude of political authorities in contravention of the 
provisions of a constitution. 
Although these counter-arguments are generally sound, they may lose weight in seemingly 
uncertain situations, i.e. where it is not entirely clear whether a particular source of 
international law should be included among those to be prioritized according to the relevant 
constitutional provisions. One can refer again to the examples made at the beginning of this 
                                                
110 M. IOVANE, “Metodo costituzionalistico e ruolo dei giudici nella formulazione dei principi generali del 
diritto internazionale”, Ars interpretandi 2008, p. 103 ff., p. 107. 
111 R.P. ALFORD, “Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution”, American Journal of 
International Law 2004, p. 57 ff., p. 61-62 (arguing, although with reference to the use of treaties in interpreting 
the Constitution, that this “has the potential to elevate impermissibly their constitutionally circumscribed 
authority” and that “if Congress cannot define the contours of a constitutional guarantee by statutory enactment, 
neither can it do so […] through the treaty-making power”). 
 45 
section, e.g. to executive agreements. In such cases, whether or not to extend the higher rank 
to those categories of acts depends on a choice between an extensive or a restrictive reading 
of the constitutional provision. This is an interpretive choice which is not policy neutral. 
Indeed, some have argued that the extension of the hierarchical supremacy to those cases 
should be avoided insofar as it risks altering the ordinary configuration of the separation of 
powers in a significant way.112 
Similarly, also the rank of binding acts produced by international organizations could stir 
significant separation of powers concerns in some circumstances. Obviously, such concerns 
would be groundless where a constitution clarifies the domestic status of these acts. However, 
this rarely occurs in practice.113 A significant exception is provided by Arts. 93 and 94 of the 
Dutch Constitution, pursuant to which the status of “resolutions by international institutions” 
is equivalent to that of treaties and is thus superior to ordinary laws. Where the constitution is 
silent on the point, the domestic status of these acts could be disputed. 
In this regard, it seems appropriate to deal separately with the issue of automatic 
incorporation and with that of the hierarchical rank. As regards the former, it has been argued 
that, where a treaty is part of domestic law, also the treaty-based sources should be considered 
as automatically incorporated.114 Whether this approach should be adopted is outside the 
scope of the present work, and may certainly depend also on the nature of the acts of a 
specific organization. In any event, the most significant separation of powers concerns are 
raised not by the incorporation of such acts per se, but by the hierarchical rank that they could 
be granted. As has been correctly noted, participation in international organizations enhances 
the law-making role of executives,115 so that allowing the acts in question to automatically 
supersede all acts of national parliaments, in lack of an express constitutional stipulation in 
this sense, might constitute an undesirable outcome. Conversely, it appears that separation of 
powers concerns cannot be convincingly expressed with regard to decisions of international 
tribunals, by reason of their institutional independence from national executives. 
To summarize, the above has shown three points. Firstly, the extent to which international law 
norms should be held supreme in a domestic legal system is not always clear-cut and can be 
subject to clarification by the courts by means of interpretation. Secondly, there are peculiar 
situations in which the supremacy of international law is hardly justifiable on policy grounds, 
both in terms of domestic democracy and of separation of powers. And thirdly, these two 
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problematic scenarios overlap to a large extent, i.e. policy concerns may be caused precisely 
because (and to the extent that) the relevant constitutional provisions are indeterminate. 
Under these conditions, one might expect national courts to exploit the margin for 
interpretation left by the constitution and to refrain from interpreting the relevant provisions 
too extensively, in order to alleviate or fix such policy concerns. 
The most obvious yardstick that the courts may resort to in the determination of the extent of 
supremacy is the role played by national legislatures in the formation of the international 
norms at issue. Indeed, when constitutions provide for automatic incorporation and higher 
status of international agreements, legislatures are usually involved in the treaty-making 
process. Clearly, this reflects precisely the concern that the executive may alter the domestic 
separation of powers if it could form international obligations which automatically become 
part of domestic law without any legislative approval; indeed, the legislature usually retains a 
stronger role in the implementation phase where executives can bind the state without 
limitations.116 Notably, also supreme courts and the population may be involved in the treaty-
making, e.g. to verify a treaty’s compatibility with the constitution or to approve the 
ratification of a certain treaty by popular vote.117 
Admittedly, the control that parliaments exercise on the treaty making is more often than not 
devoid of real substantive power; moreover, parliamentary approval may be required by a 
constitution for reasons which are not related to the domestic effects of the treaty in 
question.118 However, according to the features of each specific legal system, it would seem 
reasonable for courts to give due weight to these domestic guarantees of democratic decision-
making by limiting the effects of domestic supremacy to agreements (and likewise treaty-
based sources) to which the legislature has in some way assented; all the more so since such 
agreements are usually those deemed more important by reason of their material content. 
Interestingly, this has not always been the case. The judiciaries of different countries have 
addressed the problem of delimiting the extent of the prioritization of international law 
(specifically, international agreements) in radically different ways. A comparison between 
Russian and Italian courts can illustrate this point. 
On the one hand, considerations of separation of powers have surfaced in the jurisprudence of 
the Russian Supreme Court. In a judicial decree binding on lower courts, this court has 
circumscribed the scope of Art. 15(4) of the Russian Constitution by differentiating between 
several categories of treaties according to the attribution of treaty-making power between 
state organs. According to the Court, only agreements whose ratification received prior 
approval by means of federal law can have trumping effect over domestic legislation. All 
other treaties would only prevail over subordinate normative acts.119 
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Conversely, considerations relating to separation of powers seemed completely off the radar 
of the Italian Constitutional Court when it held that, following the 2001 constitutional 
amendment, all treaties had to be considered as ranking higher than ordinary laws in the 
Italian legal system. Although this interpretation of Art. 117 was made in reference to the 
ECHR, the Court did not differentiate between the ECHR and other, less fundamental, 
treaties.120 The attitude of the Italian Constitutional Court is all the more relevant when 
considering that it is not altogether clear whether the hierarchical elevation of treaties in the 
Italian legal system was an outcome that the 2001 constitutional legislator really intended to 
reach.121 
In sum, this highlights somewhat contradictory elements regarding the policy implications of 
the domestic prioritization of international law. To the extent the letter of the constitution 
allows, national courts may – and this work submits that, on many counts, they should – 
clarify and restrict the extent of international law supremacy to cases in which a higher status 
of international law is materially justified and does not raise too serious issues of separation 
of powers. Notwithstanding this, national courts may prove reluctant to deal with the scope of 
international law supremacy in the domestic legal order. 
This apparent inconsistency can be explained. National courts could perceive not to possess 
sufficient authority to determine the scope of domestic supremacy of international sources. 
Instead, they could prefer to address the policy problems relating to treaty supremacy on the 
level of direct application, which they perceive as providing a firmer ground for judicial 
interventionism. In John H. Jackson’s words, “if the court has some leeway regarding direct 
applicability, but worries that it may not have such leeway regarding higher status, it would 
be highly tempted to discover an appropriate way to refuse direct application”.122 The peculiar 
problems raised by limitations on direct application will be addressed in the following 
chapter. 
 
 
4. Automatic standing incorporation of international law without supremacy over 
primary legislation. 
 
This section analyzes a lower stage of constraint on the role of domestic political authorities 
in the implementation of international law, i.e. cases where a mechanism of automatic 
standing incorporation of international law is in place, but domesticated international norms 
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are not considered formally supreme over the acts of parliament. Instead, they may assume a 
rank equal to or lower than that of primary legislation. 
Such mechanisms of incorporation reflect a different balance between the need to ensure 
compliance with international obligations and domestic countervailing concerns. On the one 
hand, the effectiveness of international norms is enhanced by the fact that the political 
branches are stripped of the authority to decide whether or not to implement it within the 
country’s national law. On the other, however, the political authorities retain leeway to 
disregard international law by adopting acts in its violation. 
This section is divided in two paragraphs. Paragraph 4.1 will include an analysis of relevant 
examples of implementation techniques of this kind and a brief assessment of the policy 
rationales which underpin them. Paragraph 4.2 will expound on some peculiar issues of 
democratic legitimacy and separation of powers which have been raised with regard to the 
incorporation of customary international law in several common law legal systems. 
 
4.1. Automatic incorporation without supremacy in the practice of national legal 
systems. 
Mechanisms of automatic incorporation of international law which do not grant any 
hierarchical supremacy over ordinary law are commonly found in national constitutions. Like 
the cases of supremacy previously analyzed, they span both general international law and 
treaty law. 
As far as the former is concerned, the first historical example was set by the 1919 Weimar 
Constitution, which provided that “[t]he generally recognized rules of international law are 
deemed to form part of German federal law and, as such, have binding force”.123 The Russian 
Constitution provides a more recent instance. The already mentioned Art. 15(4) sets forth a 
mechanism of automatic incorporation of both general international law and international 
treaties (“[t]he universally-recognized norms of international law and international treaties 
and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system […]”) 
but only provides for the prevalence of treaties over domestic statutes.124 At a yet lower level 
of constitutional deference for international custom, Art. 232 of the Constitution of South 
Africa incorporates this source “unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament”.125 
Cases of national constitutions incorporating international agreements without proclaiming 
their primacy over national statutes abound. A prominent example is the Supremacy Clause of 
the US Constitution (Art. VI, clause 2), according to which treaties, just like the Constitution 
and the laws of the US, constitute “the supreme law of the land”. According to the literal 
wording of this provision, treaties have an rank equal to federal statutes;126 they prevail over 
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state laws and constitutions.127 This interpretation of the formal status of treaties has been 
espoused, in principle, by US courts as early as in Foster v. Neilson, where Chief Justice 
Marshall notably stated that a treaty “is […] to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent 
to an act of the legislature […]”.128 
In Germany, strictly speaking, the constitution provides for no mechanism of automatic 
implementation of treaties. However, as argued above, and in a manner similar to Italy, the 
incorporation of a treaty in domestic law immediately follows from the treaty’s obtainment of 
binding force on the international plane. This is because the legislature’s assent to treaty 
ratification, given pursuant to Art. 59, para. 2, of the Basic Law, is also interpreted as giving 
the treaty domestic legal force. The hierarchical rank of treaties thus incorporated is held to be 
equal to ordinary statutes, i.e. to the act by which the Bundestag expressed its consent.129 
Prior to the 2001 constitutional amendment and the 2007 Constitutional Court intervention on 
the matter, also the Italian legal order dealt with the incorporation of treaties in this fashion.130 
Another meaningful example of this trend is Egypt, where treaties have been deemed by the 
Court of Cassation to possess the status of domestic legislation since as early as 1956.131 Art. 
151 of the 2014 Constitution confirms that treaties acquire force of statutory law upon 
publication.132 
Lastly, a mention should be made of Art. 231(4) of the South African Constitution, which 
adopts a quite unique ambivalent attitude towards treaty implementation. According to this 
provision, “any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into 
law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic […]”.133 A literal interpretation of this article 
seems to confine the automatic incorporation of treaties only to those possessing “self-
executing” character. This reference, however, is rather confusing because of its technical 
inaccuracy. As will be more thoroughly exposed in Chapter 3, the concept of self-executing 
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treaty should be understood as referring not to the incorporation of treaties within the 
domestic legal order but only to their applicability by domestic courts. In practice, there have 
seemingly been no cases in which a treaty provision has been deemed automatically 
incorporated within the South African legal system.134 
To summarize, this technique of implementation of international law presents both 
similarities with and differences from the instances of prioritization of international law dealt 
with in the previous section. 
On the one hand, also in the cases analyzed in this section no sanction by domestic 
lawmaking authorities is needed in order for international law to become internally valid.135 In 
principle, the determinants of this choice do not differ from those that in other contexts lead to 
the choice to prioritize international law: the primary objective of automatic incorporation is 
always to ensure state compliance with international obligations. The insertion of the 
Supremacy Clause in the US Constitution, for example, rested on the urge to put an end to the 
states’ repeated violations of the treaties binding on the United States.136 The automatic 
incorporation “decrease[s] the likelihood that national authorities will refuse or neglect to 
provide transforming norms”.137 
In the present case, however, the weight of domestic countervailing concerns leads the 
balance between freedom of political action and legal curbs over its compliance with 
international law to a different, less drastic outcome. In particular, the idea of “sacredness of 
legislation”,138 as the primary embodiment of democratic will, advises against implementation 
mechanisms which leave no opportunity to the legislature to adopt acts in contravention of 
international obligations. The result is a mechanism of incorporation which leaves more scope 
to the action of political branches and, most notably, confers upon them an “option to breach” 
international law.139 
In particular, where international law is granted a status equal to ordinary law, the 
distinguishing feature of this mechanism is that it is devised first and foremost to limit 
executive action, while seeking to preserve the latitude of the legislature.140 In this case, the 
relation between statutes and international law is usually regulated by the later-in-time rule 
and the principle lex specialis derogat generali.141 The “option to breach”, moreover, is 
obviously more pervasive in legal systems (like South Africa’s) where domestic law generally 
prevails over inconsistent international law, the latter’s rank being lower than statutes.142 
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The policy function of this option could not be overstated. In systems where the ideal weight 
of parliamentary supremacy is strong, a constitutional commitment to compliance with 
international law is only acceptable insofar as compensatory guarantees of the democratic 
process are also in place. In certain legal environments, the reassuring existence of a safety 
valve for national political actors may be regarded as a necessary precondition for allowing 
for the automatic incorporation of international law, that is, an element without which there 
would most likely be no constitutional commitment at all. 
This underlying policy motivation (i.e. protection of the role of the legislature and, broadly 
speaking, of democratic processes) helps explain the reason why national courts have 
generally proven assertive in safeguarding the role of national legislatures, when called upon 
to elucidate the scope of automatic international law incorporation and its relationship with 
domestic statutes. In particular, in many legal systems only treaties whose stipulation has 
received some form of parliamentary approval are placed on the same footing as ordinary 
laws. The relevant separation of powers considerations are in no way different from those 
which may influence the delimitation of the extent of domestic supremacy of international 
law, so that it is sufficient to refer to what has been argued above in that regard. 
In Germany, for example, these considerations exclude that executive agreements, although 
automatically incorporated in domestic law, could trump domestic legislation. Such lower-
ranking treaties – besides being subordinate to acts of Parliament – may also manifest a 
tension with expressions of the democratic will other than statutes. In the Waldschlösschen 
case, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany was called upon to decide over an apparent 
conflict between a treaty concluded without prior consent by the Parliament (specifically, the 
UNESCO World Heritage Convention) and the outcome of a local referendum. Although it 
eventually tried to reconcile the two by interpretation, the Court said in an obiter that a 
manifestation of domestic democracy, in principle, should prevail over such treaties.143 
 
4.2. Policy implications: the debate on the legitimacy of the incorporation of customary 
international law in common law legal systems. 
The process of incorporation of customary international law in several common law 
jurisdictions deserves a separate analysis, insofar as it does not depend on any express 
constitutional or statutory provision. 
International custom is generally held to be automatically incorporated within the English 
common law.144 Admittedly, this seemingly straightforward statement does not come free of 
complexities. One of the earliest formulations of this classic proposition is ascribable to 
William Blackstone, who wrote that “the law of nations […] is here adopted in […] full 
extent by the common law, and is held to be part of the law of the land”.145 At the time it was 
formulated, however, this position did not find much corroboration in the practice of English 
courts and was probably perceived by the author more as a principle of “irrefutable 
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rationality”;146 let alone that the eighteenth century notion of jus gentium was in fact very 
different from what is meant today by customary international law in that, besides questions 
of international law proper, it included, inter alia, maritime law and the lex mercatoria.147 
Notwithstanding these early intricacies, the authority supporting the traditional understanding 
of the principle of incorporation of customary international law is presently undisputable.148 
Even oft-cited judicial cases purported to hold the contrary – more specifically, the dicta of 
some judges in the 1876 R v. Keyn case and various individual obiter from time to time – are, 
at most, ambiguous on the point, and do not adequately support the view that the reception of 
custom should be performed through transformation by legislation.149 The only necessary 
specification is that, as authoritatively argued in legal scholarship, the principle should 
preferably be construed in the sense that international customary law – rather than being part 
of the English common law – is one of its sources.150 For the purpose of this work, the 
adoption of the classic formulation of the principle of automatic incorporation of international 
custom will do no harm. 
In effect, with occasional uncertainties and national peculiarities, the principle in this 
formulation has flowed into the practice of numerous legal systems where international 
custom is considered to be incorporated pursuant to the Westminster model – i.e. 
hierarchically subject to the authority of parliamentary acts. This is the case, for example, of 
Nigeria, New Zealand, Canada, India and, more controversially, Australia.151 Also in Israel, 
the common law model of incorporation is followed.152 
That being said with regard to the received doctrine, it should be noted, however, that this 
principle’s long-standing status as a tenet of common law has not spared it occasional 
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criticism based on arguments of domestic democratic legitimacy and separation of powers. 
Given the peculiar features of this model of incorporation, the reasons are easy to grasp. As 
all forms of automatic incorporation of international norms, this mechanism can be perceived 
as (actually or potentially) compressing the democratic will or impinging on the physiology of 
the lawmaking power. But differently from the other models of automatic incorporation 
analyzed so far, the one under scrutiny cannot be easily justified by relying on an express 
constitutional provision. Instead, it could be regarded as a product of judicial activism or even 
as outright judicial lawmaking, something which could appear to question the overall 
legitimacy of the process. 
Such democratic legitimacy issues have been voiced in particularly clear terms in the United 
States. Customary international law has traditionally been held to be part of the US legal 
system in a hierarchical position subordinate to the Constitution but equal to federal law.153 
This position is supported by compelling authority, both in case law and in legal scholarship. 
In the Paquete Habana, the leading case on the Supreme Court’s attitude towards customary 
international law, the Court famously held that “[i]nternational law is part of our law […] 
where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, 
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations”, and enforced customary 
international law against US authorities.154 In Filártiga, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals 
acknowledged the incorporation within the US legal system of the customary prohibition of 
torture, and held that its violations, committed outside the territory of the United States, were 
actionable under the Alien Tort Statute, a 1789 statute granting jurisdiction to US federal 
courts for torts “in violation of the law of nations”.155 Also the American Law Institute’s 
influential Third Restatement on Foreign Relations espoused this view.156 
However, in recent years a revisionist trend has emerged in scholarship, challenging the 
legitimacy of customary international law incorporation on grounds of both democratic 
legitimacy and separation of powers.157 As far as the former is concerned, Curtis A. Bradley 
and Jack L. Goldsmith have contended that a model of automatic incorporation of 
international custom would be “in tension with basic notions of American representative 
democracy” because the formation of customary international law is independent from any 
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express support from the US political authorities and because its content would be “often 
uncertain”.158 Moreover, in its concurring opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Justice Scalia 
expressed in the following, very vocal, terms his contention that the incorporation model 
would shatter the separation of powers: “[f]or over two decades now, unelected federal judges 
have been usurping th[e] lawmaking power by converting what they regard as norms of 
international law into American law”.159 
It is well outside the scope of this work to determine whether customary international law 
should be considered as a part of the federal common law of the United States; this is a matter 
for domestic law scholars to ascertain. What can be argued here, instead, is merely that if the 
traditional position concerning the status of international custom is accepted, the 
aforementioned concerns over its legitimacy do not appear particularly convincing. 
As for the concerns based on domestic democracy, they are largely unsubstantiated for a 
number of reasons. First of all, these arguments certainly overdramatize the friction between 
the content of international law and domestic law; moreover, if custom is really “often 
uncertain”, as has been argued, then there is ample room for reconciling domestic law 
(including state law) by interpretive means and avoiding outright conflict resulting in 
abrogation of inconsistent norms. But let us leave aside these arguments, since the proponents 
of the revisionist trend tend to deal with the conflict in abstract terms, by treating it as a 
matter of principle. From this perspective, it should be kept in mind that the US legislature 
remains theoretically free to disregard custom by passing a conflicting statute. This is the very 
same option to breach which the Constitution leaves to the federal legislature with regard to 
international treaties. This is a strong argument in the sense that, in the US legal environment, 
domestic democratic values are considered to be sufficiently safeguarded by a mechanism of 
automatic incorporation which grants international sources the status of federal law. 
Moreover, incidentally, the principle of incorporation of customary international law has 
commonly been accepted also by the US federal political authorities, which makes concerns 
over the protection of their prerogatives even more untenable.160 
As for the concerns based on separation of powers, portraying the incorporation of customary 
international law as an (abusive and arbitrary) act of judicial lawmaking fundamentally misses 
the point. Indeed, this incorporation does not derive from a decision by the judges but has its 
roots in an implied norm of the domestic legal system – itself the product of a centuries-old 
legal tradition – which the courts confine themselves to apply. This is not different, in 
principle, from the situation in legal systems where constitutional provisions incorporating 
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international law are regarded as merely declaratory of an unwritten rule which would by 
itself suffice to make international law part of domestic law.161 
But even if one does not accept this view and instead considers the incorporation of 
customary international law in common law countries as a form of judicial lawmaking, the 
issues of separation of powers should also not be overplayed. Indeed, it has been maintained 
that this judicial activity involves much less lawmaking power than the creation of the 
common law, because – if acting correctly – a court does not create custom, but identifies it 
pursuant to legal principles detailed by international law itself and embraced, in the US, by 
the case law of the Supreme Court.162 
 
 
5. Lack of formal constraints on national political authorities in the implementation of 
international law. 
 
After the previous two sections, one last situation remains outstanding. International law may 
not be granted any qualified effect in domestic law, i.e. it may be neither automatically 
incorporated nor supreme over primary legislation. In these situations, in absence of formal 
constraints devised by domestic law, all choices concerning the application of international 
law rest upon the political branches. In such an event, several scenarios may take place. First, 
international law may be incorporated by an ad hoc provision containing a renvoi. Second, it 
may be transformed into domestic law by means of legislation. Or third, it may not be 
domesticated at all, either because its content is considered not to be at variance with 
domestic law, so that no amendment is needed, or for a deliberate choice to disregard it. 
The analysis performed in this section will proceed as follows. Firstly, it will categorize the 
most relevant cases of lack of qualified domestic effect of international law and will attempt 
to single out their main underlying rationales. Secondly, it will attempt to weigh up in a more 
analytic way the amount of latitude that political authorities enjoy in the application of 
international law in such cases. By doing so, the analysis will search for relevant exceptions 
to the ground rule, i.e. for cases where international law can have limited qualified effects in 
the domestic legal sphere, as well as for cases at the opposite extreme of the spectrum, i.e. 
where the lack of formal constraints in the domestication of international law translates in a 
de facto unbound latitude of national political authorities. 
The textbook example of international law lacking any qualified effect in domestic law can be 
drawn from the practice of several countries of common law with regard to international 
agreements. In English law, for instance, treaties which bind the UK on the international 
plane do not automatically become part of domestic law. In order for the content of the treaty 
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to be domesticated, an act of Parliament will be necessary.163 In In re McKerr, Lord Hoffman 
found this principle to be so incontrovertible that he asserted that “it should no longer be 
necessary to cite authority for the proposition that [a] Convention, as an international treaty, is 
not part of English domestic law”.164 The same rule is adopted in several other common law 
countries, such as Australia and Canada.165 It should be noted, however, that not all common 
law countries adopt the same approach: for example, the previous section has shown that the 
constitutions of the US and (to a minor extent) South Africa do provide for automatic 
incorporation of treaties. 
This approach is mainly a byproduct of considerations of separation of powers. In the UK and 
in countries adopting the same approach, treaties are traditionally concluded by the Crown, 
that is, under the sole authority of the executive. Because the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty prescribes that all legislation must be approved by the Parliament, the latter’s 
intervention is deemed indispensable in the implementing phase.166 This rule is still firmly 
applied, even in spite of a gradual increase of the role of the legislature in the process of 
treaty-making. This role may range from mere consultation before the conclusion of treaties 
which are considered of particular relevance to a more forceful, or even binding, role.167 
Under the so-called “Ponsonby rule”, ascribable to a constitutional convention dating back to 
the 1924, treaties subject to ratification are laid before (i.e. notified to) Parliament for 21 
sitting days before ratification.168 In the UK, according to the traditional formulation of this 
rule, the Parliament had no power to prevent ratification; however, this power has been 
formally conferred on it by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.169 
The common law model with respect to treaties, however, is not the only case in which the 
implementation of international obligations depends entirely on acts of the political branches. 
The situation in other legal systems appears to be even more radical. Indeed, differently from 
the English model, which transposes customary international law into the common law, the 
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constitutions of several countries do not provide for the automatic incorporation of any 
international sources. 
The 1982 Chinese Constitution, for example, does not define the status of either general 
international law or treaties in the domestic legal order.170 The constitutions of Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and Belarus make vague reference to the generally accepted norms of 
international law, but such statements seem to refer primarily to the handling of the countries’ 
international relations and are not intended to have domestic legal effects. 171  Issues 
concerning the domestic application of international law are completely neglected also by the 
constitutions of certain Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab 
Emirates.172 
A brief analysis of the situation in the Chinese legal system can help illuminate some of the 
peculiar features of these constitutional models of (non-)interaction with international law. 
China constitutes the primary case study among these legal systems both because of its 
relevance and for reasons of accessibility of sources. 
The lack of express constitutional regulation on the domestic status of international law has 
stirred controversy in Chinese scholarly circles. This can be explained in that, if put into 
perspective, some features of the Chinese model are rather unique. While the constitutional 
text ignores general international law altogether, it does consider treaties from the perspective 
of the distribution of the treaty-making power and establishes a fairly strong legislative 
control on the stipulation of treaties. Pursuant to Arts. 67(14), 81 and 89(9), treaties are 
concluded by the State Council, i.e. the executive branch, but the ratification of certain 
categories of treaties which are considered to be particularly relevant requires legislative 
approval by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. A first distinguishing 
feature of this constitutional set-up is that, in other countries, constitutional provisions 
establishing an enhanced form of control by the legislature on the conclusion of treaties are 
often (although not necessarily) coupled with some mechanism of automatic incorporation. 
Second, a rigid divide between the conclusion of treaties and their domestic implementation 
cannot be justified on grounds of separation of powers, because there is no separation of 
powers in the Chinese legal system.173 Third, such a rigid divide is also in no way attributable 
to common law influence, since China does not belong to that legal tradition.174 
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Similar considerations must have influenced the thought of some scholars who, particularly in 
the early years after the 1982 Constitution’s entry into force, tried to derive an implied 
mechanism of automatic incorporation of treaties from the constitutional provisions 
regulating the treaty-making power. They noted, more specifically, that the legislative act 
authorizing the ratification was similar in nature to the passing of a new law, from which it 
followed that it had to be regarded also as incorporating the treaty in domestic law. As Wang 
Tieya, an influential Chinese academic, put it, “[i]n the Chinese legal system […] laws and 
treaties appear to have equal legal force. In the P.R.C., as a general rule, there is no need of 
legislative enactment for the implementation of treaties. The internal effect of treaties comes 
immediately upon promulgation of the President of the P.R.C.”.175 
It is interesting to note that representatives of the Chinese government seemingly embraced 
the automatic incorporation theory in some (now outdated) statements before human rights 
treaty bodies. For example, in 1990 the representatives of the Chinese government to the 
Committee Against Torture declared that “[w]hen China acceded to any convention, it 
became binding as soon as it entered into force. China then fulfilled all its obligations, and it 
was not necessary to draft special laws to ensure conformity. If an international instrument 
was inconsistent with domestic law, the latter was brought into line with the former”.176 But 
these declarations are certainly not decisive, being just as trustworthy as all political 
statements trying to shield the government from international responsibility.177 
As a matter of fact, more recent scholarship has debunked this view, based mainly on the 
consideration that it is not borne out by any evidence in the practice of state organs. For this 
reason, as contended by Xue Hanqin and Jin Qian, the general rule is that treaties binding on 
China do not become part of national law automatically.178 The domestic application of 
international law rests upon ad hoc acts by the political authorities.179 
                                                
175 WANG T., “International Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives”, Recueil des cours 
1990, vol. 221, p. 195 ff., p. 329. For similar positions, see S. SHAO, “The Theory and Practice of the 
Implementation of International Law in China”, in J. CHEN, Y. LI, J.M. OTTO (eds.), Implementation of Law in 
the People’s Republic of China, The Hague, 2002, p. 197 ff., p. 198-199; J.Z. LI, S. GUO, “China”, in D. 
SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 158 ff., p. 187-188 (taking further the comparison between treaty-making and law-making 
processes and arguing that treaties concluded by the executive without legislative authorization rank lower in the 
hierarchy of domestic law, in a position equal to government regulations). This view has leaked in the works of 
Western scholars who have relied on those Chinese sources: see e.g. T.M. FRANCK, A.K. THIRUVENGADAM, cit., 
p. 487-489; D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 373-374; A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 73 
and 133; G.M. RUOTOLO, “L’applicazione interna degli accordi OMC, la prassi occidentale e le peculiarità di 
alcuni Paesi emergenti”, in A.R. GURRIERI, M. LORIZIO, C. NOVI (eds.), L’ascesa delle economie emergenti. 
Implicazioni economiche e giuridiche, Milan, 2010, p. 323 ff., p. 340. 
176 B. AHL, “Statements of the Chinese Goverment before Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Doctrine and 
Practice of Treaty Implementation”, Australian Journal of Asian Law 2010, p. 82 ff., p. 87. 
177 On states’ assertions that national law is consistent with international law and on the careful and strict 
approach that international tribunals should adopt, see Portugal v. Liberia (ILO Complaint) (1963), ILR 36, p. 
351 ff., p. 397-403 (holding that such assertions from states should not be lightly accepted). 
178 XUE H., JIN Q., “International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System”, Chinese Journal of 
International Law 2009, p. 299 ff., p. 300. This view is shared by W. SHI, “The Application of Treaties in China: 
Practice, Problems and Prospects”, AALCO Journal of International Law 2012, p. 115 ff., p. 130. For a more 
thorough analysis of the doctrinal debate, see P. ROSSI, “L’adattamento al diritto internazionale nell’ordinamento 
giuridico della Repubblica popolare cinese”, Rivista di diritto internazionale 2016, p. 425 ff.  
179 B. JIA, “A Synthesis of the Notion of Sovereignty and the Ideal of the Rule of Law: Reflections on the 
Contemporary Chinese Approach to International Law”, German Yearbook of International Law 2010, p. 11 ff., 
p. 41. 
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The Chinese Constitution’s disregard for the domestic application of international law can be 
easily traced back to historical and socialist influences.180 A similar pattern of strong cultural 
resistance to the acceptance of international law standards can arguably be identified at the 
root of all the other constitutions which ignore this subject. This is the case, for example, of 
the influence of Islamic law on a number of national constitutions.181 
To sum up, a number of legal systems require that some or all sources of international law can 
only be implemented by means of acts of the political branches. Faced with this description of 
the ground rule, however, one should not rush to conclude that such constitutional set-up 
inevitably results in total freedom – let alone arbitrariness – of the political authorities in this 
field. In order to have a clearer picture of how much leeway state authorities actually retain, it 
is opportune to brielfy look at the way international obligations are executed in practice in the 
domestic legal systems under scrutiny. By doing so, it may be possible to identify relevant 
exceptions and specifications to the basic principle. 
To a first approximation, the lack of predetermined qualified effects of international norms in 
the domestic legal order grants political branches a virtually exclusive authority in 
determining whether and how to implement those norms. In other words, their law-making 
prerogatives appear free from constraint. With regard to international agreements, evidence 
from several legal systems shows that, at least in theory, state authorities tend to ensure that 
the content of domestic law is in line with the international instrument before the latter 
becomes binding for the state on the international plane;182 but, as is clear, this assertion of 
principle not only does not entail any legal obligation to act accordingly, but is also wholly 
subject to discretionary assessment. For example, no external review is available if state 
authorities, as is often the case, refuse to make any changes to domestic law, based on the 
alleged consistency of domestic law with international law.183 
The same is true for the cases in which a treaty is made part of domestic law, in whole or in 
part, by means of ad hoc legislation: here as well, political authorities are free to determine 
whether or not to incorporate the treaty. The practice concerning the incorporation of treaties 
in common law legal systems is rather complex and multifaceted. In the UK, for example, the 
Parliament may incorporate a treaty or a part of it by attaching (or scheduling, in jargon) its 
text to a statute and explicitly clarifying that it gives effect to the said treaty,184 but the 
                                                
180 C. CAI, “International Law in Chinese Courts During the Rise of China”, American Journal of 
International Law 2016, p. 269 ff., p. 272 (identifying “two straightforward explanations […] for China’s silence 
regarding international law in its Constitution”: the influence of Soviet legal thought and “China’s history”, i.e. 
the “hostility” manifested by China to international law on account of bad memories dating back to the period of 
the so-called unequal treaties, which lasted from the First Opium War to the Second World War). 
181 On this issue, see generally R. MOSCHTAGHI, “The Relation between International Law, Islamic Law 
and Constitutional Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran – A Multilayer System of Conflict?”, Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 2009, p. 375 ff. See also A. CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions”, cit., p. 343-344 
(analyzing reasons behind “nationalist introversion” of state constitutions). 
182 See e.g. A. AUST, “United Kingdom”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 476 ff., p. 486; for example, the State 
Immunity Act 1978 was adopted with the main purpose to enable the U.K. to ratify the European Convention on 
State Immunity (16 May 1972) ETS No. 074 (ibid., p. 479). See also XUE H., JIN Q., cit., p. 306-308 (various 
examples from the practice of China, including, most notably, implementation of the WTO agreements). 
183 See, for example, G. VAN ERT, “Canada”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 166 ff., p. 170 (noting that in Canada 
treaty conformity is often ensured simply by retaining laws predating the treaty, especially in the field of human 
rights). 
184 D. SLOSS, “Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., 
p. 1 ff., p. 18; A. AUST, “United Kingdom”, cit., p. 479-480. An example of partial incorporation is the 
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incorporation may also result implicitly from the fact that a certain act was unequivocally 
adopted with a view to implement a treaty.185 The act of incorporation may be regarded as 
stripping the legislature of some discretion in the determination and selection of the 
international norms to import in domestic law, but this limitation would be merely de facto 
and certainly not de jure.186 It would then seem that the freedom of the lawmaking authorities 
remains always untouched. 
With regard to the practice of the UK, however, the above requires a caveat. Given that the 
UK does not have a codified constitution, it is unsurprising that it is not technically possible 
to grant international law a status higher than primary legislation in a way comparable to the 
practice of other legal systems which establish the domestic supremacy of international law. 
This notwithstanding, the UK Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates large portions of 
the ECHR in national law,187 is commonly considered to have become part of the UK 
constitution.188 This was acknowledged, for example, by Lord Justice Laws in Thoburn v. 
Sunderland City Council.189 
The Act puts in place an interesting mechanism which allows courts to review the 
conventionality of both primary and subsidiary legislation without formally affecting the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty.190 On the one hand, it establishes that courts can quash 
acts of public authorities held in violation of Convention rights – but this notion of public 
authorities does not include “either House of Parliament”.191 On the other hand, however, 
should a court find that a domestic piece of legislation violates one of the Convention rights, 
it can only issue a “declaration of incompatibility” which has no binding effect on Parliament 
and which may, but not must, trigger changes in domestic law.192 Despite its non-binding 
character, the declaration has proven an effective instrument in practice and has consistently 
                                                                                                                                                   
implementation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (16 April 1961) 500 UNTS 
95 by the U.K. Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act: see S.C. NEFF, cit., p. 622. For other examples of 
partial incorporation, see S. BEAULAC, J.H. CURRIE, cit., p. 120. 
185 S.C. NEFF, cit., p. 622; G. VAN ERT, cit., p. 171 (criticizing as unsophisticated recent decisions by 
Canadian courts holding treaties not incorporated “simply, it seems, because the treaties were not mentioned 
expressly in any statute”); S. BEAULAC, J.H. CURRIE, cit., p. 129 (treaty incorporation must be ascertained by 
reference to the intention of the legislature). 
186 For general considerations also applicable to legislative acts of transformation, see T. GINSBURG, 
“Locking”, cit., p. 727 (arguing that also legislation can constrain future choices of political leaders, but this 
depends on how cumbersome the legislative process is and, consequently, how likely the revision). 
187 See e.g. Section 1(1) of the Act, incorporating the rights included in Arts. 2 to 12 and 14 of the ECHR. 
188 A. PETERS, cit., p. 299-300. On this subject, see generally A. LESTER, “Human Rights and the British 
Constitution”, in J. JOWELL, D. OLIVER (eds.), The Changing Constitution, Oxford, 20117, p. 70 ff. 
189 Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151, para. 62: “[w]e should recognise a hierarchy of 
Acts of Parliament: as it were ‘ordinary’ statutes and ‘constitutional’ statutes”. The Human Rights Act was cited 
among the latter. See also McCartan Turkington Breen v. Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 277, p. 297. 
190 See generally A. KAVANAGH, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act, Cambridge, 
2009. As well captured by A. PAULUS, “The Emergence of the International Community and the Divide Between 
International and Domestic Law”, in J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), cit., p. 216 ff., p. 245, “[t]he British 
drafters have developed a host of ingenious instruments to square the circle and combine parliamentary 
supremacy with direct effect of international human rights jurisprudence”. 
191 For a critical assessment of this provision, see R. WINTEMUTE, “The Human Rights Act’s First Five 
Years: Too Strong, Too Weak or Just Right?”, King’s College Law Journal 2006, p. 209 ff., p. 213. 
192 See Section 4 of the Human Rights Act. 
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resulted in the adoption of necessary changes in legislation.193 For example, in A v. Secretary 
of State (the Belmarsh detainees case), the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords found 
the provisions of the UK Anti-terrorism Act 2001 on the arrest of foreign terror suspects to be 
in violation of Arts. 5 and 14 ECHR (right to liberty and prohibition of discrimination). The 
judgment triggered the passing of the Detention of Terrorism Act 2005, by which the 
Parliament changed legislation in a way consistent with the judgment.194 
This description of the UK practice concerning the implementation of the ECHR also allows 
to clarify another crucial point. Even where political authorities retain nearly-unbound 
freedom as regards the way to achieve the domestication of international law, this of course 
does not mean that they retain a comparable freedom in its enforcement. Once a treaty right is 
incorporated within the UK legal system, there is nothing, in principle, which prevents 
domestic courts from enforcing it against public authorities; and the same goes for all other 
legal systems of common law with a similar attitude towards treaties. This clarification is 
made in passing, because the issues relating to the judicial application of international law 
against public authorities will be the object of detailed analysis in the next chapter. Moreover, 
and also in passing, the judiciaries of these countries – by virtue of their position of 
independence from their respective governments – have often been able to compensate for a 
defective implementation of international obligations by resorting to interpretive techniques 
of consistent interpretation. This will be the subject of Chapter 4. 
What has just been pointed out allows to draw an important distinction from the practice of 
the legal systems whose constitutions – as outlined in the previous section – completely 
ignore any issues of domestic application of international law. Also these legal systems 
present a number of cases in which international treaty obligations have been incorporated in 
domestic law. Here, however, the trend seems to be in the direction of not incorporating 
norms of international law which may potentially impinge on the authority of the political 
branches, i.e. treaties potentially conferring rights to private parties against the government. 
One may again refer to China as the most prominent example. The PRC ordinary legislation 
includes numerous ad hoc provisions effectively establishing a mechanism of automatic 
incorporation of treaties regulating legal relations between private parties, and occasionally 
envisaging that treaties should take precedence over inconsistent national legislation.195 Based 
on these provisions, treaties regulating transnational civil relations, such as the 1958 New 
York Convention, have been consistently applied by Chinese courts.196 The incorporation of 
such treaties is admitted because they can have no effects on the extent of governmental 
                                                
193 C. CRAWFORD, “Dialogue and Declarations of Incompatibility Under Section 4 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998”, Denning Law Journal 2013, p. 43 ff., particularly p. 86 (noting that the vast majority of final 
declarations of incompatibility – 17 out of 18 – have resulted in changes in legislation); A. LESTER, cit., p. 87. 
194 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. See A. PAULUS, “The Emergence”, 
cit., p. 245-247. 
195 See, most notably, Art. 260 of the Civil Procedure Law, pursuant to which “[i]f an international treaty 
concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China contains provisions differing from those found in this 
Law, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply, unless the provisions are ones on which China has 
announced reservations”. Other examples are listed in XUE H., JIN Q., cit., p. 302-305. 
196 P. ROSSI, “Public Policy and Enforcement of Foreign Awards: An Appraisal of China’s Judicial 
Practice”, Diritto del commercio internazionale 2017, p. 299 ff., particularly p. 302-305. 
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authority. 197  Furthermore, the legislature retains full freedom to repeal the legislative 
provisions on treaty incorporation, as it has done on several occasions.198 Finally, and 
incidentally, it should be kept in mind that, in absence of real separation of powers, courts 
cannot be expected to play any supplementary role in the application of treaties vis-à-vis 
public authorities. 
In sum, this shows that, at a prima facie examination, China seems to be the prime example of 
a legal system in which the authority of state organs in the implementation of international 
obligations is not subject to any real form of constraint. Indeed, on the one hand, political 
authorities retain full control over the domestication of all international norms, with only 
exceptions minoris generis in the field of private international law; and on the other hand, in 
lack of effective judicial scrutiny, there appear to be no curbs on the enforcement of 
international law as well. In this respect, and more generally, it is also noteworthy that there 
are significant obstacles to the enforcement of private rights against public authorities before 
Chinese courts, which may effectively impair the domestic operation of international law 
even where it is transformed in national law.199 
 
 
6. Conclusions: compliance with international law as a fundamental principle in 
domestic legal systems. 
 
This chapter has surveyed the ways in which international law is implemented in domestic 
legal systems at a formal level. It has looked at this topic from one particular perspective, i.e. 
the relationship between domestic methods of implementation of international law and the 
prerogatives of the national law-making authorities. To this end, it has classified domestic 
mechanisms of international law implementation in three categories, depending on whether (i) 
international law can prevail over the acts of the legislature; (ii) international law is 
automatically incorporated into domestic law but it the legislature retains the power to act in 
breach of international obligations; or (iii) a discretionary intervention of the political 
branches is needed in order to implement international norms. As has been thoroughly 
demonstrated, each of these categories has a different policy rationale and raises peculiar 
policy issues. 
In conclusion of this analysis, the variety of different approaches is the first feature that 
catches the eye. At least on paper, the degree of openness to international law varies 
                                                
197 C. CAI, cit., p. 273 (“the maintenance of executive authority […] tends not to support the use of 
automatic incorporation of international law. But, since automatic incorporation can have little effect on 
executive authority in cases where the international legal rules govern solely the legal relations between private 
parties, no relative authority concerns arise in these contexts, and automatic incorporation is accordingly 
sometimes used”). 
198 C. CAI, cit., p. 274 (on the abrogation of Art. 72 of the Administrative Procedure Law). 
199 For example, it is generally acknowledged that in China human rights treaties are not part of domestic 
law and are implemented by means of domestic legislation: see XUE H., JIN Q., cit., p. 309. However, the extent 
to which citizens are allowed to implead the state for infringment of their rights under domestic administrative 
law is very limited, to the point that administrative litigation is in practice confined to non politically-sensitive 
personal and property rights. On this point see S. GUO, “Implementation of Human Rights Treaties by Chinese 
Courts: Practice and Problems”, Chinese Journal of International Law 2009, p. 161 ff., p. 177; J. CHEN, Chinese 
Law, cit., p. 248-249. 
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substantially between different legal systems. This chapter has advanced the argument that 
this variety can be traced back, first and foremost, to the different weight that national legal 
systems attach to the prerogatives of the political branches. Many legal systems embrace 
international law even to the point of committing the acts of the legislature to respect it. But 
in many legal environments, granting full-scale supremacy to international law over domestic 
legislation is not a feasible option. Fundamental considerations of domestic law, as well as 
historical, political and cultural factors, may make this impossible in practice. 
This diversity of national attitudes has contributed to fragmenting the study of the domestic 
application of international law. This explains the general turn to pragmatism which has 
occurred in legal doctrine with the fall of the grand theoretical edifices of monism and 
dualism.200 The belief has taken hold that the only information having a tangible practical 
utility is the content of each legal system’s positive legal rules governing the domestic 
implementation of international obligations. This position, at first glance, seems irrefutable. 
There can still be no unified theory of the relationship between international and domestic 
law. 
Notwithstanding this, at a closer scrutiny, the above analysis may also reveal a partial unity of 
the relevant trends. Indeed, the vast majority of legal systems do establish mechanisms aimed 
at facilitating compliance with international law. Even where the domestic supremacy of 
international law is impossible to achieve in practice, legal systems often commit the political 
branches to respecting international law. They do so, in particular, by creating legal 
mechanisms that constrain the acts of the political branches while, at the same time, leaving 
them an option to breach international law through the adoption of contrary acts. These legal 
systems, in sum, do commit the political branches to complying with international law, but 
also establish theoretical safety valves of domestic political processes. 
Against this backdrop, one could advance some conclusions. Admittedly, national legal 
systems balance the relevant interests at stake in different ways. And yet, the demand of 
compliance with international law appears always, with very few exceptions, to be a 
component of the balancing equation. Otherwise stated, most domestic constitutional 
frameworks allow to identify a principle demanding compliance with international law as a 
fundamental normative aim.201 
In some legal systems, the fundamental importance of compliance with international law has 
been expressly recognized. The German Bundesverfassungsgericht, for example, has 
extracted an unwritten constitutional principle of Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit des 
Grundgesetzes (i.e. constitutional friendliness, or openness, toward international law) from a 
systematic reading of all constitutional provisions in the field of internatonal law.202 The same 
fundamental objective can undoubtedly be derived from the relevant provisions of the Italian 
Constitution, as well as in other countries whose constitutions provide for the incorporation of 
                                                
200 R. JENNINGS, A. WATTS, cit., p. 54; J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER, “Introduction”, cit., p. 2-3; P. 
MALANCZUK, cit., p. 64. 
201 F.M. PALOMBINO, Gli effetti della sentenza internazionale nei giudizi interni, Napoli, 2008, p. 161-164. 
202 H.P. FOLZ, cit., p. 245-246; D. SLOSS, “Treaty Enforcement”, cit., p. 13-14 (also noting that a similar 
principle has been recognized in Polish case law). 
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international law in national law.203 But this does not only apply to countries where the 
incorporation of international law is made to some extent not contingent on the approval of 
the political branches. Indeed, the same can be said with regard to domestic legal orders 
traditionally considered to show less proclivity for the reception of international law.204 
As shown in the previous pages, national legal systems where it is hard to single out such a 
fundamental axiom appear to be the exception rather than the rule. Based on the empirical 
data analyzed so far, probably the only real exception is provided by legal systems with 
distinctively authoritarian traits, such as China. Here, as argued in the previons pages, the 
primacy that political authorities retain in international law implementation is nearly absolute. 
What is most unique is that in such legal environments not only law-making authorities but 
also, to a large extent, law-enforcing authorities retain – at least on paper – nearly unbound 
discretion in international law implementation. 
The concluding submission of this chapter is that the diffusion in national legal systems of a 
principle favoring respect of international obligations may be conceptualized in the terms of a 
mutualization of interests among national legal systems. 205  Indeed, as demonstrated 
extensively in this chapter, all domestic law mechanisms facilitating compliance with 
international obligations are not superimposed from the outside, but are a byproduct of 
domestic factors enhancing the interest in ensuring that the state meets its international 
obligations. The scope of this interest, however, evidently overlaps with the corresponding 
interest of other states and with the interest in the effectiveness of the international legal 
order. In this sense, the interest in compliance with international law can be defined 
mutualized. 
Nevertheless, the principle favoring compliance with international law remains one of 
domestic law. It interacts and blends in various ways with other interests and values of the 
domestic legal order and, not unlike any other principle of domestic law, may be molded, 
compressed or annulled depending on the contextual weight of the countervailing concerns. 
How national courts deal with such competing considerations will be the object of the next 
two chapters. 
                                                
203 A. BERNARDINI, cit., p. 9 (arguing that the provisions of the Italian Constitution regarding international 
law – including Arts. 10, 11, 35(3), and today 117(1) – have been read as “strumenti […] dell’adeguamento, o 
comunque di un favor, nei confronti di un ordine esterno”).  
204 B. CONFORTI, International Law, cit., p. 44, ft. 102 (contending that this aim can be perceived even in 
the English practice “of incorporating the international norm into an internal rule, as long as it is somehow 
possible to prove that the internal rule was adopted with a view to implementing the international norm”). See 
also L. WILDHABER, S. BREITENMOSER, “The Relationship between Customary International Law and Municipal 
Law in Western European Countries”, ZaöRV 1988, p. 163 ff., p. 204 (finding that, at the time of writing, the 
principle of “friendliness to international law” underpinned most Western European legal systems, to the point 
that “the practice in states without an explicit provision concerning the relationship between international law 
and municipal law is no different from the practice in states with such a clause in their constitutions”). 
205 The concept of mutualized interests has been formulated, in a different context, by J. D’ASPREMONT, 
“The Foundations of the International Legal Order”, Finnish Yearbook of International Law 2007, p. 219 ff., p. 
229-230 (arguing that the international legal order should be understood as “based on interests rather than global 
values”). For a more thorough discussion on this point, see also J. D’ASPREMONT, “Contemporary International 
Rulemaking and the Public Character of International Law”, Institute for International Law and Justice Working 
Papers 2006/12, particularly p. 12 ff. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Direct Application of International Law by National Courts 
and Constraints on Political Authorities 
 
 
 CONTENT: 1. Introduction. – 2. Theoretical foundations: national courts as the primary enforcers of 
international law. – 3. International law and assessment of direct applicability. – 3.1. Foundations: the PCIJ 
Advisory Opinion on the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig. – 3.2. The outgrowth of Danzig: determination of 
direct applicability as a matter of international law. – 3.3. Assessment: marginal role of international law in the 
determination of direct applicability. – 4. The domestic law perspective: direct applicability as an issue of 
separation of powers. – 4.1. Direct applicability as a consequence of the incorporation of international law in 
domestic law. – 4.2. Constitutional limits on the direct applicability of international norms. – 4.3. Limitations on 
direct applicability mandated by the political branches. – 4.4. Limitations on direct applicability based on the 
content of the international norms. – 4.4.1. An interpretive process governed by domestic law. – 4.4.2. 
International norms considered incomplete or vague. – 4.4.3. International norms having an inter-state character. 
– 4.4.4. International norms conferring rights or faculties to states. – 4.5. Concluding assessment: direct 
applicability and protection of the prerogatives of the political branches. – 5. Direct applicability of international 
law and judicial abstention in foreign affairs. – 6. Direct applicability and international law supremacy in 
domestic law. – 7. Extra-legal factors impairing direct applicability of international law. – 8. Conclusions. 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
The previous chapter has shown that national legal systems can establish a number of formal 
limits to the leeway of political authorities in the implementation of international law. For 
such limits not to remain just hollow statements of intent, however, the de jure status of 
international law in the domestic hierarchy of norms should correspond to its position and 
application in practice.1 As a matter of fact, a constitution’s friendliness towards international 
law and, more generally, the status that international sources are granted in domestic law, 
only increase the probability of international law being implemented. Whether this actually 
happens depends on the practice of national organs.2 For this reason, the goal of this chapter 
is to go beyond the formal analysis of national legal systems and to examine the functional 
variations occurring in practice. 
                                                
1 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application of Treaties”, in D.B. HOLLIS (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties, 
Oxford, 2012, p. 367 ff., p. 368; A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects of Treaties in Domestic Law”, in C.J. TAMS, A. 
TZANAKOPOULOS, A. ZIMMERMANN (eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties, Cheltenham-
Northampton, 2014, p. 123 ff., p. 141-142 (noting that “the explanatory power of [monism and dualism] is 
relatively limited” because of the practical variations among legal systems); D.B. HOLLIS, “A Comparative 
Approach to Treaty Law and Practice”, in D.B. HOLLIS, M.R. BLAKESLEE, L.B. EDERINGTON (eds.), National 
Treaty Law and Practice, Leiden-Boston, 2005, p. 1 ff., p. 47 (the differences between states which incorporate 
international law and states that do not are “diluted” in practice). 
2 P. MALANCZUK, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, London-New York, 19977, p. 68 
(“the actual implementation of such provisions by the courts and administration will matter more than lofty 
constitutional texts”). See also A. DENZA, “The Relationship between International Law and National Law”, in 
M.D. EVANS (ed.), International Law, Oxford, 20144, p. 412 ff. (considering the constitution only “the starting 
point for any examination of the relationship” between international and national law) and, in the same vein, G. 
BARTOLINI, “A Universal Approach to International Law in Contemporary Constitutions: Does It Exist?”, 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 2014, p. 1287 ff., p. 1288. 
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The assessment of the functional variations among legal systems is of primary importance 
from the perspective of the international legal system, too. Even where international law 
requires states to conform their domestic laws to the standards it sets forth, the fact that 
international norms are formally incorporated in a national legal system is immaterial if this 
validity is not matched by the actual practice of national organs. 3  The case law of 
international courts and human rights treaty bodies regarding the rule of exhaustion of local 
remedies is particularly illustrative in this regard. Just to name an example, in the 2001 Ogoni 
case, the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights found that, although the African 
Charter of Human Rights had been incorporated in Nigerian Law, decrees by the former 
Military government of Nigeria had in practice deprived the courts of jurisdiction over human 
rights violations; hence, it held that no domestic remedy could have been deemed available to 
the parties.4 
The main focus of this chapter is the analysis of the domestic effects of international law 
which derive from its direct applicability by national courts. According to the terminology 
adopted here, direct applicability is the possibility for domestic courts to apply international 
law as such as the rule of decision.5 The question whether international law is directly 
applicable arises in consequence of the incorporation of international sources in domestic law, 
regardless of whether this happens through standing or ad hoc incorporation or whether the 
incorporation is realized by means of a constitutional provision or a statutory provision. The 
distinguishing feature of direct application, therefore, is that it does not require the adoption 
of further measures by the legislature or the executive other than the act which incorporates 
international law in domestic law. This implies, for example, that issues of direct application 
arise de facto also in common law countries adopting the Westminster approach to treaties, as 
long as a treaty is incorporated in domestic law by an act of Parliament.6 
                                                
3 On this point, see also Chapter 1, Section 3. 
4 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) 
v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, 27 October 2001, para. 41. 
5 The present terminology largely conforms to the definition of direct application provided by Y. 
IWASAWA, “Domestic Application”, cit., particularly p. 21-28. 
6 Y. IWASAWA, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 27; D. SLOSS, “Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts. A 
Comparative Analysis”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement. A Comparative 
Study, Cambridge, 2009, p. 1 ff., p. 19 (noting that in the U.K. courts formally apply implementing statutes and 
not the treaty if the former incorporates the latter, but such a distinction is merely formal); D. SHELTON, 
“Introduction”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems. Incorporation, 
Transformation, and Persuasion, Oxford, 2011, p. 1 ff., p. 11, ft 46 (“[e]ven dualist countries where treaties 
must be incorporated into domestic law face this issue [i.e. direct applicability]”). Admittedly, this view is not 
shared by a large portion of commentators: see e.g. J. CRAWFORD, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International 
Law, Oxford, 20128, p. 64, for the view that in the U.K. all treaties are non-self-executing. Similarly, see C.M. 
VÁZQUEZ, “The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties”, American Journal of International Law 1995, p. 
695 ff., p. 697; T. BUERGENTHAL, “Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and 
International Law”, Recueil des cours 1992, p. 303 ff., p. 318 (“in dualist states all treaties are non self-
executing”); S. BEAULAC, J.H. CURRIE, “Canada”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 116 ff., p. 130 (holding that, 
“[s]ince Canada uses a dualist model, it does not address treaties in terms of self-executing […]”); S.C. NEFF, 
“United Kingdom”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 620 ff., p. 622 (“there is no distinction in UK law between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties”). See also L. ERADES, Interactions between International and 
Municipal Law, The Hague, 1993, p. 957 (arguing not only that “[i]n countries in which the courts apply English 
law, there can be no question of internal effects of treaties”, but even that “[t]he same is true with regard to other 
countries adhering to similar doctrines, such as Austria, Germany and Italy”). 
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To the contrary, two types of interactions of national courts with international law are not 
addressed by this chapter: firstly, the application of domestic legislation whose content is 
equal in substance to international law; and secondly, the techniques of consistent 
interpretation of domestic legislation, i.e. the usage of international law to interpret domestic 
law. This latter form of judicial application of international law – which, in certain 
circumstances, may yield results very similar in substance to (or barely distinguishable from) 
direct application – will be the subject of Chapter 4. 
One further clarification as regards the terminology is required. In other contexts, the question 
of direct applicability is often referred to with a number of other captions, including direct 
effect or self-execution. These terms, however, are shrouded with ambiguity in practice.7 In 
particular, the inconsistencies surrounding the concept of self-execution suggest the adoption 
of the clearer expression direct application, while the other terms will be treated here as 
synonyms. Always for the sake of simplicity, this section focuses on direct application by 
national courts, although the assessment of direct applicability is just as compelling for 
executive organs. 
Another point which needs clarification is that of the creation of private rights which can be 
enforced by individuals before a national court, a feature which is referred to in this section as 
individual enforceability of international norms. Other terms are often used to indicate similar 
concepts, for example standing, private cause of action, private right of action, or individual 
invocability. Although the precise contours of these terms may diverge in different national 
legal systems, they will be treated here as synonyms of individual enforceability.8 
The relationship between direct applicability and individual enforceability is somewhat 
problematic. On the one hand, the two concepts are sometimes used interchangeably in 
literature and case law.9 On the other hand, several commentators have underscored that they 
overlap only in part.10 In point of fact, the latter terminology is more rigorous, because the 
                                                
7 See generally M.P. VAN ALSTINE, “The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement. Summary and 
Conclusions”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 555 ff., p. 600 (noting the ambiguities in the idiom of the debate on this 
point). On the conflicting usages of the terms referred to in text, see C.M. VÁZQUEZ, “The Four”, cit. (analyzing 
four different usages of the term “self-execution” in U.S. case law); C.M. VÁZQUEZ, “Four Problems with the 
Draft Restatement's Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution”, Brigham Young University Law Review 2015, p. 1747 
ff. (critiquing the definition of self-execution in the draft Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations of the 
United States); E.T. SWAINE, “Taking Care of Treaties”, Columbia Law Review 2008, p. 331 ff., p. 353 (self-
executing is a “label used in maddeningly inconsistent ways”); A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 117 
ff. (using “direct effect” in a sense even broader than what is termed here direct application, including some 
forms of consistent interpretation). For yet another usage, see also T. BUERGENTHAL, cit., p. 321 (using the 
concept of self-execution to indicate that a treaty is subject to application by domestic organs, and that of direct 
application to refer to international law obligations to make a treaty self-executing). 
8 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effect of the ECHR and Judgments of the ECtHR on National Law – Comments 
on the Paper of Enzo Cannizzaro”, Italian Yearbook of International Law 2009, p. 189 ff., p. 190 (using these 
terms interchangeably to refer to “the entitlement of a person to rely on a rule of international law in national 
court proceedings”). 
9 E.T. SWAINE, cit., p. 355 (arguing that a non-self-executing treaty is one which cannot be invoked by a 
party in court without implementing legislation). The two concepts have often been conflated in U.S. case law: 
see e.g. Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979), p. 1298-1299 (“unless a 
treaty is self-executing, it must be implemented by legislation before it gives rise to a private cause of action”). 
10 M.P. VAN ALSTINE, cit., p. 604; J.H. JACKSON, “Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy 
Analysis”, American Journal of International Law 1992, p. 310 ff., p. 317-318; C. FOCARELLI, Diritto 
internazionale, vol. I, Padova, 20122, p. 282 (distinguishing between “applicabilità diretta” and “azionabilità 
individuale”). It should be noted that the concept of individual enforceablity is sometimes referred to as “direct 
effect” or in similar terms: see e.g. P. PICONE, A. LIGUSTRO, Diritto dell’Organizzazione mondiale del 
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creation of individual rights is not a prerequisite of direct applicability. A norm of 
international law may well be directly applicable by a national court without allowing private 
parties to enforce it against other parties: for example, an individual may only be able to 
invoke the norm defensively during criminal proceedings, or the norm may be actionable only 
by governments and not by individuals.11 For this reason, it seems preferable to treat 
individual enforceability as a subset of direct application. A non-directly applicable norm of 
international law will also be, by necessity, not individually enforceable; but if it is directly 
applicable, it may or may not be individually enforceable.12 
Notwithstanding the above, it is clear that the two concepts are closely interrelated and that 
individual enforceability represents the most prominent form that direct applicability can 
take.13 This is all the more true for the purpose of this chapter, whose main focus is on the 
capacity of private parties to invoke international law against state authorities.14 Moreover, as 
will be seen below, given the close interrelation between the two concepts, the positions of 
commentators and courts over the issue of individual enforceability mirror to a great extent 
the array of viewpoints expressed, more generally, on the nature of direct application. The 
interplay between these two categories will be further explored in the following pages. 
The main argument advanced in this chapter is that direct applicability is fundamentally a 
question of domestic law and ultimately depends on considerations of separation of powers. 
The following pages will try to prove this argument and to untangle the complexities of the 
problems raised by the concept of direct application. Section 2 will briefly expound, in 
general terms, on the role of national organs in the domestic enforcement of international law, 
with a particular focus on the role of national courts in the enforcement of international law 
against state authorities. Sections 3 and 4 will investigate respectively into the role of 
international law and domestic law in the delimitation of the extent of direct application. 
Section 5 will attemp an assessment of the interplay between direct applicability of 
international law and the doctrines favoring judicial abstention in foreign affairs. Finally, the 
chapter will turn to examine the way in which national legal systems put into operation the 
constitutional provisions granting international law supremacy over primary legislation 
(Section 6), and some residual – and mostly extra-legal – factors which may impair the 
application of international law by national organs (Section 7). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
commercio, Padova, 2002, p. 544 (“applicabilità diretta” versus “efficacia diretta”). This terminology was first 
adopted in the context of EU (then EEC) law by J. WINTER, “Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two 
Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law”, Common Market Law Review 1972, p. 425 ff., p. 438. 
11 For example, pursuant to Section 102(c)(1)(A) of the U.S. Uruguay Round Agreement Act 1994, “No 
person other than the United States […] shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements […]” (emphasis added). The WTO treaties can still be invoked by the federal authorities to 
challenge the validity of state laws. 
12 Y. IWASAWA, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 148 (the creation of individual rights is not a condition for 
direct applicability). 
13 As noted by A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects”, cit., p. 146, the relation between direct application (which 
he calls direct effect) and allocation of individual rights is that of a “close connection”. 
14 H.G. SCHERMERS, “The Role of Domestic Courts in Effectuating International Law”, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 1990, p. 77 ff., p. 79 (“if we want questions of international to come before courts, then we 
should allow individuals to raise them”). 
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2. Theoretical foundations: national courts as the primary enforcers of international 
law. 
 
As a rule of thumb, the effectiveness of the de jure status of international law in a domestic 
legal order should be measured against the practice of all state organs:15 this includes, first 
and foremost, executive officials and organs of the administration. Such organs, just as much 
as they are called upon to apply domestic legislation, should also interpret and apply 
international law binding upon the state to the extent it is made part of national law. The 
fulfillment of this function is of paramount importance. If executive officials correctly 
interpret and apply international law, a corrective intervention by national courts may not be 
needed in the first place.16 
The above being said, the general understanding in legal doctrine is that the primary role of 
ensuring the correct application of (domesticated) international law within a country’s legal 
system pertains to national courts. This role is particularly sensitive in the field of vertical 
international obligations (i.e. norms regulating legal relationships between the state and 
private parties) and primarily, although not exclusively, of human rights obligations: here, 
domestic courts may have the power to verify that violations of international law are not 
committed by the executive or even by the legislature, where the national legal system allows. 
Thus, they may play the crucial role of constraining governmental action and ensuring respect 
of international obligations.17 
From the perspective of international law, whether or not national courts embrace and fulfill 
this function has profound implications. Giving shape to what has become a widely accepted 
scholarly adage, multiple commentators have argued that domestic courts may contribute to 
filling the enforcement gap that international law continues to experience and that could mar 
its effectiveness.18 This position originates from the observation of two fundamental features 
of the international legal order. On the one hand, the reach of international law has expanded 
considerably in recent decades and has come to cover an extremely vast range of areas, 
spanning matters of purely domestic concern and – most importantly for the topic of this 
                                                
15 B. CONFORTI, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal Systems, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 
1993, p. 13. 
16 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 392-393. As noted by M. KUMM, “International Law in 
National Courts: The International Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model”, Virginia Journal 
of International Law 2003-2004, p. 19 ff., p. 22, “it is not necessary to assume that political actors, without 
civilizing judicial intervention, are generally inclined to run amok and disregard international legal obligations. 
They are not. It is generally acknowledged that most states obey most tenets of international law almost all of the 
time, without much judicial enforcement”. 
17 Y. IWASAWA, “Domestic Application of International Law”, Recueil des cours 2015, vol. 378, p. 12 ff., 
p. 184 (“Direct application is an effective means to enforce international obligations against the reluctant 
Government and promote the rule of law in the state”). 
18 The body of literature on this point is extensive. See, ex multis, A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts and 
the International Rule of Law, Oxford, 2011, p. 6; S.Y. MAROCHKIN, “Contemporary Approaches of the Russian 
Doctrine to International Law: Identical to Western Ones?”, Baltic Yearbook of International Law 2012, p. 29 
ff., p. 50 (citing Nollkaemper); F. FRANCIONI, “The Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Enforcement: 
Reflections on the Italian Experience”, in B. CONFORTI, F. FRANCIONI (eds.), Enforcing International Human 
Rights in Domestic Courts, The Hague-Boston-London, 1997, p. 15 ff., p. 15-16; R.B. LILLICH, “The Role of 
Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human Rights Norms”, New York Law School Law Review 1978-
1979, p. 153 ff. (advocating a greater role of U.S. courts in the enforcement of human rights treaties); H.G. 
SCHERMERS, cit., particularly p. 78-79. 
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study – legal interactions between public authorities and private individuals; but on the other 
hand, in the face of this substantive expansion, the development of international mechanisms 
of enforcement of international law has not coped with the pace.19 In the words of Benedetto 
Conforti, “international law displays an increasing disparity between its growth of normative 
content and its lack of enforcement mechanism”,20 from which the Italian commentator drew 
the conclusion that a “truly legal function of international law” could only be achieved 
through the action of “domestic legal operators”.21 
Against this backdrop, the view which sees national courts as a (actual or potential) backbone 
of the enforcement of international law can certainly be shared. Indeed, its foundations rest on 
a realistic assessment of the functioning of international law: in lack of international 
mechanisms of coercive enforcement, particularly against state authorities, there normally is 
no real alternative to enforcing international law through domestic courts. This view is further 
supported by two other factors. Firstly, as far as control on national governments is 
concerned, national courts are usually better placed than international tribunals and may even 
enjoy a broader autonomy from national governments.22 And secondly, several norms of 
international law are based on the idea that national courts can be expected to remedy wrongs 
done by national governments to individuals, such as the rule of exhaustion of local remedies 
or the obligations, included in human rights treaties, to establish effective judicial remedies 
against international law violations committed by state authorities.23 
But one should also be careful not to overstate or idealize the role that national courts can 
perform in the enforcement of international law. This chapter builds on the assumption that 
national courts, even where they apply international law against their governments, remain 
subject to the legal constraints set by their domestic legal order and that, therefore, their role 
as enforcers of international law has a limit: they cannot ensure compliance with international 
obligations beyond what is allowed by the national legal system to which they belong. This 
leads to the rejection of the famous theory of dédoublement fonctionnel, or role splitting, first 
expounded by Georges Scelle in 1932, according to which a domestic court enforcing 
international law should be regarded as fulfilling an international function, or even as a 
veritable organ of the international legal order.24 
                                                
19 See also Chapter 1, Section 1. 
20 B. CONFORTI, International Law, cit., p. 7. 
21 Ibid., p. 12.  
22 E. BENVENISTI, G.W. DOWNS, “Court Cooperation, Executive Accountability, and Global Governance”, 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 2008-2009, p. 931 ff., p. 932 (“progress in 
containing executive power via judicial oversight is possible, [and] it is likely to be driven from below and led 
by national courts”) and p. 935 (finding reasons to be skeptical that effective control of executives can be 
attained at the international level). See also E. BENVENISTI, G.W. DOWNS, “National Courts, Domestic 
Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law”, European Journal of International Law 2009, p. 59 ff., p. 
68-69 (“Judges in national courts are relatively more independent than judges in international tribunals”). 
23 E. BENVENISTI, “Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of 
Attitudes of National Courts”, European Journal of International Law 1993, p. 159 ff., p. 160. On this point, see 
generally A. TZANAKOPOULOS, “Domestic Courts as the ‘Natural Judge’ of International Law: A Change in 
Physiognomy”, in J. CRAWFORD, S. NOUWEN (eds.), Select Proceedings of the European Society of International 
Law, Oxford, 2012, p. 155 ff. On the treaty obligations to ensure effective remedies, see Chapter 1, Section 3. 
24 G. SCELLE, Précis de droit des gens: principes et systhèmatique, Paris, 1932-1934, vol. I, p. 43, 54-56 
and 217. See also G. SCELLE, “Règles générales du droit de la paix”, Recueil des cours 1933, vol. 46, p. 327 ff., 
p. 358-359 (terming the dédoublement fonctionnel “la loi essentielle des rapports internationaux”) and 426-427. 
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In order to clarify this point, it is opportune, first of all, to describe the details of this 
theoretical construct and to analyze the most relevant views which have been put forward by 
commentators in this regard. The initial configuration of dédoublement fonctionnel originated 
from Scelle’s belief that any legal system proper must be equipped with organs fulfilling 
legislative, executive and judicial functions. In lack of centralized international organs with 
such roles, the celebrated French author came up with the idea that these three functions of 
the international legal order necessarily had to performed, so to say, in a delocalized form. 
According to this view, despite remaining components of the state from an institutional (or 
formal) point of view, national organs would fulfill a twofold function in practice: they would 
act as national organs when they act within the national legal system, and as international 
organs fulfilling an international function whenever they are active in the international legal 
sphere. This way, they would function as lawmakers, executive organs or judiciary of the 
international legal system.25 
Contemporary proponents of this theory do not usually subscribe to all these theoretical 
premises. Those who embrace this notion confine themselves to generally noting, for 
instance, that “national courts may […] compensate for the lack of international courts as a 
systemic force in the protection of the international rule of law [and] act as agents of the 
international legal order […]”.26 According to another formulation of this concept, national 
courts should be institutionally allowed by their domestic legal orders to operate in the guise 
of international courts, so to overcome the constraints of national law and function as 
effective and impartial enforcers of international law.27 Finally, Yuval Shany has expressed 
the view that, in cases where “national courts render decisions which apply international law 
qua law in a serious and credible manner”, they should be regarded as international law 
adjudicators. In cases where they misapply international law they would, of course, entail the 
international responsibility of the state to which they are institutionally bound; but this 
                                                
25  A. CASSESE, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of ‘Role Splitting’ (dédoublement fonctionnel) in 
International Law”, European Journal of International Law 1990, p. 210 ff., p. 212-214. For a thorough analysis 
of Scelle’s thought, see also generally O. DE FROUVILLE, “On the Theory of the International Constitution”, in D. 
ALLAND, V. CHETAIL, O. DE FROUVILLE, J.E. VIÑUALES (eds.), Unité et diversité du droit international – Unity 
and Diversity of International Law: Ecrits en l’honneur du professeur Pierre-Marie Dupuy – Essays in Honour 
of Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Leiden-Boston, 2014, p. 77 ff. 
26 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 8. This theory is also embraced, ex multis, by Y. SHANY, 
“Dédoublement fonctionnel and the Mixed Loyalties of National and International Judges”, in F. FONTANELLI, G. 
MARTINICO, P. CARROZZA (eds.), Shaping Rule of Law Through Dialogue. International and Supranational 
Experiences, Groningen, 2010, p. 27 ff.; R.A. FALK, “The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal 
Order”, Indiana Law Journal 1964, p. 429 ff., p. 436-437 (speaking of “national courts as international 
institutions, that is, as institutions responsible for upholding international law and for displaying it as a common 
system of law peculiar to no single state”). See also J.H.F VAN PANHUYS, “Relations and Interactions Between 
International and National Scenes of Law”, Recueil des cours 1964, vol. 112, p. 1 ff., p. 8-11 (commenting on 
dédoublement fonctionnel). 
27 In this sense, see the resolution of the Institut de droit international “The Activities of National Judges 
and the International Relations of their State”, Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international 1994, vol. 65(II), p. 
318 ff., Art. 1.2 (national courts should “bas[e] themselves on the methods followed by international tribunals”) 
and Art. 5.3 (they should “mak[e] every effort to interpret it as it would be interpreted by an international 
tribunal and avoid […] interpretations influenced by national interests”). For a criticism, see O. FRISHMAN, E. 
BENVENISTI, “National Courts and Interpretive Approaches to International Law”, in H.P. AUST, G. NOLTE 
(eds.), The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts. Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence, Oxford, 
2016, p. 317 ff. 
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phenomenon is explained by the Israeli author as a dédoublement fonctionnel in reverse, 
whereby “an international actor fulfill[s] a role under national law”.28 
This theory, however, has proven very controversial. Wolfgang Friedmann, for example, 
emphasised that national courts, qua organs of the national legal system, are prone to national 
biases even where they apply – or should apply – international law.29 Antonio Cassese 
criticized Scelle for neglecting the cases in which national organs, although acting within the 
international legal sphere, pursue chiefly national interests instead of “metanational values or 
long-term, communal objectives”.30 More recently, Eyal Benvenisti has similarly affirmed 
that the growing trend of national courts toward the application of international law is being 
driven by “parochial, even selfish concerns”, i.e. that courts instrumentally refer to 
international law as a tool to safeguard the leeway of national governments against “the 
attempts of interest groups and powerful foreign governments to influence them”.31 
Such objections find corroboration in the practice of national legal systems. First of all, 
national courts’ role as enforcers of international law against national political branches is 
fettered, in many legal systems, by their lack of independence.32 Not all legal systems 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary,33 let alone that, as is quite obvious, the formal 
guarantee of independence does not necessarily correspond to an actual independence of 
courts from political influence.34 Where courts are not independent from political oversight, 
ex-post judicial control of the actions of national authorities with respect to private parties has 
no chances of success.35 In such a domestic legal environment, the only international norms 
                                                
28 Y. SHANY, “Dédoublement”, cit., p. 39-41. 
29 W. FRIEDMANN, The Changing Structure of International Law, London, 1964, p. 146-147 (noting 
national courts’ “temptation of modifying doctrine when national passions are aroused”). 
30 A. CASSESE, “Remarks”, cit., p. 219. 
31 E. BENVENISTI, “Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by 
National Courts”, American Journal of International Law 2008, p. 241 ff., p. 244; see also E. BENVENISTI, G.W. 
DOWNS, “National Courts”, cit., p. 61 (arguing that most national courts perceive themselves principally as 
guardians of the domestic legal order, not the international one). 
32 G.M. DANILENKO, “Implementation of International Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice”, European 
Journal of International Law 1999, p. 51 ff., p. 55 (“an independent and professional judiciary is often 
considered to be a crucial element in the effectiveness of constitutional provisions which declare the supremacy 
of international law”). 
33 For express recognitions of the independence of the judiciary, see for example Article 97, para. 1, of the 
German Basic Law; Art. 104, para. 1, of the Italian Constitution; and Art. 120, para. 1, of the Russian 
Constitution. Conversely, the independence of judges is not guaranteed in the Chinese legal system. Art. 126 of 
the Chinese Constitution establishes a pretense of independence of the judiciary, by stating that “[t]he people’s 
courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power independently and are not subject to interference 
by administrative organs, public organizations or individuals.” However, the Constitution also states, at Arts. 3, 
para. 3, and 128, that the courts are created and supervised by the people’s congresses. For example, the 
President of the Supreme People’s Court is elected and removed directly by the National People’s Congress: see 
Art. 11 of the P.R.C. Judges Law of 1 July 1995, amended in 2001. 
34  See e.g. R. TKATOVA, “Russian Spirit, Soviet Heritage and Western Temptation: Un-‘Peaceful 
Coexistence’ in Russia’s International Doctrine and Practice”, Baltic Yearbook of International Law 2012, p. 1 
ff., p. 26 (although judicial independence is enshrined in the Russian constitution, “the separation of powers is 
unbalanced: the executive retains a decisive role, the role of Parliament is limited and the judiciary remains weak 
and subject to political influence”); G.M. DANILENKO, “Implementation”, cit., p. 59, ft. 9 (warning that “in all 
countries politics may undermine judicial independence in various and indirect and subtle ways”). For a more 
radical position, see E. BENVENISTI, “Comments on the Systemic Vision of National Courts as Part of an 
International Rule of Law”, Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 2012, p. 42 ff., p. 45 (arguing that national courts 
“can never be truly ‘independent’ – or more accurately ‘impartial’ […]”). 
35 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 380 (without independence “transnationalism is not a viable 
option because judges lack institutional authority” to constrain governmental action) and p. 380, ft. 118 (citing 
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which can be expected to be effectively applied by the courts are inter-personal horizontal 
provisions of international law, which do not impinge on the powers of the political branches. 
The practice of China, as briefly sketched out in the previous chapter, suffices to prove this 
point. 
Secondly, the guarantee of an actual independence of the judiciary does not necessarily imply 
that courts will exercise effective control over executive (or legislative) actions. Independent 
courts in democratic countries have traditionally maintained very different attitudes in this 
regard and have devised a variety of ways to shield the political branches from judicial 
control.36  
Of course, domestic case law is also replete with cases whereby national courts have 
faithfully applied international law vis-à-vis state authorities, and have done so not with 
parochial motivations, but with the purpose to ensure that international law is actually 
complied with.37 The existence of such cases is undeniable, as acknowledged by Benvenisti 
himself.38 According to the most restrictive formulations of the theory under analysis, only 
these cases should be regarded as cases of role-splitting.39 
However, even when they apply international sources in a credible manner against national 
authorities, national courts remain state organs and to detach them from the forum state of 
which they are a part is a pure fiction.40 Indeed, they operate under institutional and legal 
constraints set forth by national law, which determines the extent of their jurisdiction and the 
content of the applicable law.41 More generally, it has been persuasively noted that conceiving 
national courts as organs occupying a position of otherness to their national legal order 
“overlook[s] that the domestic interpretation of international law is not simply a conveyor belt 
that delivers international law to the people”.42 In other words, national courts interpret and 
                                                                                                                                                   
the study Polity IV Project, according to which “approximately half of the countries in the world have 
independent judiciaries”); E. BENVENISTI, G.W. DOWNS, “Court Cooperation”, cit., p. 942; G.M. DANILENKO, 
“Implementation”, cit., p. 62 (“neo-authoritarian tendencies” in certain CIS states “render constitutional 
provisions on international law irrelevant”). 
36 See generally E. BENVENISTI, “Judicial Misgivings”, cit., and E. BENVENISTI, G.W. DOWNS, “Court 
Cooperation”, cit., p. 942-943. 
37 Y. SHANY, “Dédoublement”, cit., p. 36-39. 
38 E. BENVENISTI, “Reclaiming”, cit., p. 244 (mentioning The Paquete Habana, Hilton v. Guyot and The 
Schooner Exchange). 
39 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 7. 
40 M. IOVANE, “L’influence de la multiplication des juridictions internationales sur l’application du droit 
international”, Recueil des cours 2017, vol. 383, p. 233 ff., p. 320 (noting that “les tribunaux internes […] 
fonctionnent normalement comme des instruments de la justice nationale, même quand ils sont tenus d’appliquer 
des normes internationales”, and adding in ft. 127: “[a] moins d’accepter la thèse du dédoublement fonctionnel 
qui finit par considérer tous les organes internes comme des organes internationaux”); D. AMOROSO, “Judicial 
Abdication in Foreign Affairs and Effectiveness of International Law”, Chinese Journal of International Law 
2015, p. 99 ff., p. 133 (excluding that national courts could be seen as occupying a position of otherness towards 
the forum state to which they belong); E. BENVENISTI, “Comments”, cit., p. 45 (national courts “would betray 
their domestic constituencies if they would regard themselves ‘as if they were [international tribunals]’. Their 
allegiance is first and foremost to their own demoi, and they must remain faithful to the domestic authorities in 
whose name they issue their judgments”). 
41 On these points, see extensively A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 23 ff. and 68 ff. 
42 K. KNOP, “Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts”, New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 1999-2000, p. 501 ff., p. 505.  For similar observations, see A. ROBERTS, 
“Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law”, 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 2011, p. 57 ff., particularly p. 74 ff. 
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apply international norms in a way which is influenced by their legal and cultural 
background.43 This is an inescapable feature of the national judicial function. 
This being said, rejecting the idea of a fictional role splitting of national organs does not mean 
to subscribe to skeptical or realist views and, in particular, does not imply that national courts 
cannot pursue genuinely international goals or “regard themselves as administering a law of a 
unit greater than the state”.44 These phenomenon, however, should be interpreted for what it 
really is, i.e. a manifestation of the national legal system’s reception of international law. 
National courts should apply international law consistently with their domestic legal 
framework; and they should also embrace compliance with international law as a fundamental 
aim to be pursued, to the extent this principle is accepted by the national legal system and, 
particularly, if it is enshrined in the constitution.45 At the same time, they cannot but be 
expected to respect the policy limits and the countervailing values that their legal system sets 
forth. 
The tension between these two factors in domestic case law is not the product of any “double 
bind”.46 Instead, it is the manifestation of potentially competing interests which are equally 
recognized by the domestic legal order and, as is in the essence of the judicial function, 
require to be appraised and balanced. 
 
 
3. International law and assessment of direct applicability. 
 
The key question concerning the direct applicability of international law is eminently 
practical, and concerns the way in which a domestic court should determine whether a norm 
of international law which is part of domestic law should also be subject to direct application. 
The first step to take is to ascertain whether international law dictates workable criteria in this 
regard, which is the object of the present section. The next section will instead look into how 
much of this assessment depends on domestic law. 
 
3.1. Foundations: the PCIJ Advisory Opinion on the Jurisdiction of the Courts of 
Danzig. 
Speaking hypothetically, there are two ways in which international law could influence the 
assessment of direct applicability of its own norms. On the one hand, it could play a positive 
role, i.e. it could mandate direct application of certain norms to national legal systems. Or, on 
the other hand, it could play a negative role, barring direct application in certain situations. 
                                                
43 R. BAHDI, “Truth and Method in the Domestic Application of International Law”, Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence 2002, p. 255 ff., p. 258 (critically observing that “international law’s authority is 
predicated, at least implicitly, upon its ability to produce homogeneous results across cultures”). See e.g. F. 
FRANCIONI, “The Jurisprudence”, cit., p. 16 (arguing that independent judges should act, inter alia, “as la bouche 
de la loi, as instruments of the impartial application of international law”). 
44 H. LAUTERPACHT, International Law: being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht – Vol. 2, 
Cambridge, 1970, p. 567. 
45 D. HALJAN, Separating Powers: International Law Before National Courts, The Hague, 2013, p. 218-
219 (“why and how a court […] may choose to apply international law qua law does not depend on the court’s 
function, but to what extent international law is recognised as legitimate and valid law”). 
46 This expression is used in A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 13-15. 
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The view according to which the direct applicability of international law would stem from 
requisites set forth by international law itself is usually grounded on the Advisory Opinion on 
the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, rendered by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) in 1928.47 On that occasion, the Court stated that an international agreement 
could create rights and obligations upon individuals and be directly enforceable in national 
courts if the parties intended it to have such an effect. 
A brief rundown on the facts and the views expressed by the PCIJ is necessary to 
contextualize Danzig. A treaty (called Beamtenabkommen) had been concluded between 
Poland and the Free City of Danzig in 1921 to regulate the status of certain railway officials 
who, once employed by the Danzig railways, had passed into the service of the Polish state 
railways. When these officials brought an action for pecuniary damages before the courts of 
Danzig based on the terms of the treaty, a dispute arose between the two states as to whether 
the treaty had been intended by the two states parties to form part of the officials’ contract of 
service. Danzig took this view and contended that, for this reason, its courts had jurisdiction. 
Eventually, the Council of the Leage of Nations asked the Court to deliver an advisory 
opinion. 
The Court found that claims arising from the Beamtenabkommen could be brought before the 
courts of Danzig. A passage of the Court’s reasoning is particularly illustrative: “The point in 
dispute amounts therefore to this: Does the Beamtenabkommen, as it stands, form part of the 
series of provisions governing the legal relationship between the Polish Railways 
Administration and the Danzig officials who have passed into its service (contract of service)? 
The answer to this question depends upon the intention of the contracting Parties. It may be 
readily admitted that, according to a well established principle of international law, the 
Beamtenabkommen, being an international agreement, cannot, as such, create direct rights and 
obligations for private individuals. But it cannot be disputed that the very object of an 
international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting Parties, may be the 
adoption by the Parties of some  definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and 
enforceable by the national courts. […] The intention of the Parties, which is to be ascertained 
from the contents of the Agreement, taking into consideration the manner in which the 
Agreement has been applied, is decisive”.48 Thus, based on the wording of certain provisions 
of the agreement and on some subsequent actions by the parties, the Court established that 
“the Beamtenabkommen constitutes part of the provisions of the ‘contract of service’, that is, 
‘the series of provisions which constitute the legal relationship between the Railways 
Administration and its employees’”.49 
Although the Court used the expression “directly applicable” with reference to the 
agreement,50 this short summary of the Opinion suffices to demonstrate that it did not, 
properly speaking, held that the Beamtenabkommen was directly applicable as such by the 
courts of Danzig. Instead, it merely held that the treaty’s terms clarified that it had to be 
considered as incorporated into a contract; it was this contract, in turn, which was applicable 
                                                
47 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 PCIJ (Series B, No. 15). On this advisory 
opinion, see, ex multis, T. BUERGENTHAL, cit., p. 322 ff.; J.H.F VAN PANHUYS, cit., p. 24-28. 
48 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, cit., para. 37. 
49 Ibid., para. 55(2). 
50 Ibid., para. 38. 
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by the national courts. Moreover, as pointed out by Dionisio Anzilotti, who served as the 
PCIJ President when Danzig was given, the reason why the Court found that the treaty could 
create individual rights enforceable in national courts, even though Poland had not enacted 
implementing legislation of said treaty, “c’est parce qu’elle a retenu que la partie qui s’était 
obligée d’adopter les dites règles ne pouvait en aucun cas se prévaloir du fait de ne pas avoir 
exécuté cette obligation pour se soustraire aux devoirs que l’accord lui imposait […]”.51 In 
other words, Anzilotti assigned a purely remedial function to the court’s findings, pursuant to 
the principle of general international law according to which a state cannot justify its non-
compliance with international obligations by pleading a shortcoming of its own legal 
system.52 
 
3.2. The outgrowth of Danzig: determination of direct applicability as a matter of 
international law. 
As is clear from the above analysis, the Danzig Advisory Opinion provides a rather shaky 
foundation to the claim that the direct applicability of international treaties depends on what 
they themselves provide. But be that as it may, the idea that the issue of direct application 
would be positively governed by international law is still widespread among commentators.53 
This view also holds sway in the case law of many domestic courts, which, in order to assess 
the direct applicability of international treaties, have embarked in painstaking searches for the 
exact intent of the parties.54 
This approach to the assessment of direct applicability has taken particularly deep roots in the 
US, where the stance according to which the self-executing character of a treaty would 
depend on the terms of the treaty was expressed by the Supreme Court as early as in the 1829 
Foster v. Neilson case.55 On that occasion, Chief Justice Marshall famously stated that “when 
the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engage to perform a 
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the Political, not the Judicial, Department, and the 
Legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court”. This oft-
cited decision laid the foundations of the US doctrine of self-execution in subsequent case 
                                                
51 D. ANZILOTTI, Cours de droit international, Paris, 1929, p. 408. 
52 On this principle, see Chapter 1, Section 3. 
53 See e.g. J. KLABBERS, International Law, Cambridge, 2013, p. 293; P. DE VISSCHER, “Les tendences 
internationales des constitutions modernes”, Recueil des cours 1952, vol. 80, p. 511 ff., p. 560; H. RUIZ FABRI, 
“Is There a Case – Legally and Politically – for Direct Effect of WTO Obligations?”, European Journal of 
International Law 2014, p. 151 ff., p. 152 (arguing that “[i]t is commonly acknowledged that an international 
treaty can be granted direct effect only in accordance with the intention of the parties”, but that, since this 
intention “usually remains unformulated”, “direct effect [is made] a matter of treaty interpretation”); G. 
ZICCARDI CAPALDO, Diritto globale: il nuovo diritto internazionale, Milano, 2010, p. 379-380 (arguing that 
“[p]er non impedire ‘the due performance’ del trattato di cui è parte, lo Stato deve […] dotare il proprio 
ordinamento di un sistema idoneo ad assicurare che trattati ed atti internazionali self-executing […] possano 
essere invocati direttamente dagli individui davanti ai tribunali interni senza che siano necessarie misure 
attuative”). 
54 It should be noted that some authors and courts believe that only the intent of the forum state’s treaty 
makers should be dispositive, not the collective intent of the parties: see e.g. C.A. BRADLEY, International Law 
in the U.S. Legal System, Oxford, 20152, p. 42. This unilateral intent, as is obvious, would not establish any 
international law obligation of direct application. Thus, these cases will not be dealt with in this section and will 
instead by analyzed in the section concerning the assessment of direct applicability under domestic law. 
55 Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
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law.56 A closer examination reveals that the decisions inspired by Foster v. Neilson have 
expressed at least two conflicting views. 
On the one hand, some courts have looked for express indications by the parties. For example, 
in McKesson v. Iran, the DC Court of Appeals held that a private cause of action should be 
granted only if a treaty unambiguously provides for it itself.57 The court had been called upon 
to decide whether the 1955 US-Iran Treaty of Amity provided the plaintiff company with a 
private cause of action against Iran, which had allegedly expropriated investment without 
compensation. According to the court, Art. IV(2) of the treaty, pursuant to which “property 
shall not be taken except for a public purpose, nor shall it be taken without the prompt 
payment of just compensation”, created no private cause of action, because it did not 
“explicitly called upon the courts for enforcement”. As an example of a treaty expressly 
providing for a cause of action, the court cited the Warsaw Convention’s provisions on air 
carrier liability, which expressly mention the possibility to bring an “action for damages”.58 
Most courts, on the other hand, have embraced a more liberal view concerning the 
determination of the intention of the parties, and have acknowledged that it could be inferred 
from the terms of the treaty even if the latter is not considered explicit. For example, in Fujii 
v. California, the self-executing character of some provisions of the UN Charter was in 
doubt.59 The plaintiff, a Japanese national, contended than a Californian law escheating his 
land was discriminatory by reason of race, thus violating both the US Constitution and a 
purported norm prohibiting racial discrimination set forth by Arts. 55 and 56 of the Charter. 
Pursuant to Art. 55, the UN “shall promote […] universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion”; to which Art. 56 adds the following: “All Members pledge themselves to take 
joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the 
purposes set forth in Article 55”. 
The Supreme Court of California expressed the following principle: “In determining whether 
a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by the 
language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain, recourse may be had to the 
circumstances surrounding its execution”. Based on this view, the court ruled against the self-
executing character of Arts. 55 and 56 of the Charter. Interestingly, by way of example, the 
court also stated that the language of other provisions of the Charter, namely Arts. 104 and 
                                                
56 For a comprehensive analysis, see Y. IWASAWA, “The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United 
States: A Critical Analysis”, Virginia Journal of International Law 1986, p. 627 ff. 
57 McKesson Corporation and ors v. Iran and ors, Appeal judgment, 539 F 3d 485 (DC Cir 2008), ILDC 
1105 (US 2008). 
58 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed in 
Warsaw on 12 October 1929 and amended in 1955 and 1975, 137 LNTS 11. See particularly Arts. 17 ff. For 
example, pursuant to Art. 24, “any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the 
conditions and limits set out in this Convention […]”. On the Warsaw Convention as a treaty establishing a 
private cause of action, see also Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that 
“Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention […] creates a cause of action against an air carrier for loss or damage to a 
passenger's checked baggage.”). 
59 Sei Fujii v. State of California, 38 Cal.2d 718 (1952). On this case, see J. MENZEL, “Sei Fujii v 
California Case”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2008. 
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105, was “clear and definite” in manifesting the intention of the framers of the Charter “to 
make [those] provisions effective without the aid of implementing legislation”.60 
The contextual approach to the search for the intention of the parties, as perfected in Fujii, has 
often been adopted in later US case law.61 The most prominent example in this regard can be 
found in the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Medellín v. Texas,62 which held that the 
ICJ Avena judgment was not self-executing in US courts and thus could not supersede 
inconsistent state law pursuant to the US Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.63 Although the 
Supreme Court had already been confronted with the effects of ICJ decisions in the aftermath 
of the Breard and LaGrand cases, and had already declined to implement them on different 
grounds, Medellín was the first occasion in which the Court dealt with the domestic effects of 
a final ICJ judgment.64 
In order to better grasp the Court’s reasoning on the matter of self-execution, the facts of the 
case ought to be briefly summarized. The Avena case originated from an action in diplomatic 
protection brought by Mexico on behalf of 51 of its nationals who had been sentenced to 
                                                
60 The provisions referred to by the court read as follows. Art. 104: “The Organization shall enjoy in the 
territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the 
fulfillment of its purposes”; Art. 105(1) and (2): “The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its 
Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes” and 
“Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy 
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection 
with the Organization”.  
61 See, inter alia, Diggs and The South West Africa People’s Organization v. Richardson and The Fouke 
Co, Appeal judgment, 555 F 2d 848 (DC Cir 1976), ILDC 2136 (US 1976) (quoting the passage of Fujii reported 
in text); Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981); Columbia Marine 
Services, Inc. v. Reffet, Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir.1988) (“an action arises under a treaty only when the treaty 
expressly or by implication provides for a private right of action”). 
62 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). A second question dealt with by the Supreme Court, which it 
answered in the negative, was whether the President had authority to enforce the ICJ judgment against states in 
lack of a congressional act. For a general account of this case, see M.E. MCGUINNESS, “Medellín v. Texas”, 
American Journal of International Law 2008, p. 622 ff. For negative appraisals, see, ex multis, D. SLOSS, 
“Taming Madison’s Monster: How to Fix Self-Execution Doctrine”, Brigham Young University Law Review 
2015, p. 1691 ff.; J. QUIGLEY, “A Tragi-Comedy of Errors Erodes Self-Execution of Treaties: Medellín v. Texas 
and Beyond”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 2012, p. 403 ff. For positive views, see J.O. 
MCGINNIS, “Medellín and the Future of International Delegation”, Yale Law Journal 2008-2009, p. 1712 ff.; T. 
CRUZ, “Defending U.S. Sovereignty, Separation of Powers, and Federalism in Medellín v. Texas”, Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 2010, p. 25 ff. 
63 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
2004, p. 12. 
64 With regard to the two ICJ cases mentioned in text – both concerning, as Avena, the right to consular 
access of death row inmates – the U.S. Supreme Court refused to give effect to ICJ provisional measures 
ordering the stay of execution. For the ICJ decisions, see Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 9 April 1998, ICJ Reports 
1998, p. 248; LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 
1999, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 9; and LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
2001, p. 466. With regard to the former decision, the Supreme Court denied relief to the Paraguayan national 
Breard by applying procedural default rules: see Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). As to the latter case, 
which Germany sought to enforce before U.S. courts, the Supreme Court declined jurisdiction in Federal 
Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999). In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), 
which ruled over two consolidated consular access cases brought by a Honduran national and a Mexican national 
not listed in Avena, the Supreme Court held that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not prevent 
the application of state procedural default rules. On this saga, see, ex multis, B. SIMMA, C. HOPPE, “From 
LaGrand and Avena to Medellín – A Rocky Road Toward Implementation”, Tulane Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 2005, p. 7 ff.; M.K. ADDO, “Interim Measures of Protection for Rights under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations”, European Journal of International Law 1999, p. 713 ff. 
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death in the US without being informed of their rights under Art. 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). Pursuant to Art. 36(1)(b) VCCR, the authorities 
of a state party must inform “without delay” any foreign national under arrest or detention of 
a right to contact the consular office of the individual’s state of nationality. In Avena, the ICJ 
found that the US had breached its obigations under the VCCR and that “the legal 
consequences of this breach [had] to be examined and taken into account in the course of 
review and reconsideration” of the criminal convictions.65 Medellín, one of the 51 Mexican 
nationals covered by Avena, filed a petition for reconsideration before the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals, but the court held that procedural default rules established by the laws of 
Texas prevented Medellín from raising this type of challenge to his conviction. 
Medellín then lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court, restating his claim that the US 
international obligations resulting from the ICJ judgment superseded state procedural default 
rules under the US Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court 
rested on two ground assumptions: firstly – pursuant to a principle which it traced back to 
Foster v. Neilson – that only self-executing treaties can function as federal law and trump 
state legislation; and secondly, that the domestic legal effects of an ICJ judgment depend on 
the domestic status of the underlying international treaties.66 In accordance with these 
premises, the Court proceeded to ascertain whether the relevant treaties were, in fact, self-
executing, and did so primarily by searching for the intention of the parties (although not 
exclusively, since it occasionally referred to the unilateral intent of the US treaty-makers). 
This is what the Court referred to when it mentioned its “obligation to interpret treaty 
provisions to determine whether they are self-executing”; and indeed, it also held that the 
negotiation and drafting history and the “postratification understanding” of the signatory 
states could be referred to in the assessment of self-execution.67 The ensuing parts of the 
judgment are a compendium of the most prominent techniques devised in US case law to 
assess the intention of the parties in the field of self-execution. 
As regards Art. 94(1) of the UN Charter, pursuant to which “[e]ach Member of the United 
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any 
case to which it is a party”, the Court drew indications of a negative intent of the parties in the 
expression “undertakes to comply”, which it held to constitute – quoting from the Executive 
amicus curiae brief – “a commitment on the part of UN Members to take future action 
through their political branches to comply with an ICJ decision”.68 This part of the judgment 
follows in the footsteps of those decisions which, particularly in the US but also elsewhere, 
including Italy,69 have drawn indications of a purported negative intent of the parties in treaty 
                                                
65 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, cit., para. 140. 
66 Medellín v. Texas, cit., p. 499 and 514-515. It may be to some extent surprising that the court 
acknowledged that the domestic status of international decisions depends on the status of the underlying treaties. 
In order to bar the direct application of the ICJ decision, the court might also have resorted to a literalist 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which mentions treaties but not rulings of 
international tribunals. This literalist argument was one of those listed in C.A. BRADLEY, “Enforcing the Avena 
Decision in U.S. Courts”, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 2006, p. 119 ff., particularly p. 121, which 
for the rest anticipates most of the views later espoused by the majority in Medellín. 
67 Medellín v. Texas, cit., p. 509 and 501. 
68 Ibid., p. 502-503 (emphasis in the original). 
69 T. SCOVAZZI, “The Application by Italian Courts of Human Rights Treaty Law”, in B. CONFORTI, F. 
FRANCIONI (eds.), cit., p. 59 ff., p. 60-61. 
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provisions calling for domestic implementation of the treaty.70 In Tel-Oren v. Libya, for 
example, the court bluntly held that “[i]f the treaty calls for the signatory nations to enact 
legislation implementing the agreement, the treaty is considered executory and no private 
rights are conferred by it”.71 And in United States v. Postal, it was contended that provisions 
beginning with “each party shall take the necessary legislative measures to…” are “uniformly 
declared executory”.72 
Secondly, in order to dismiss the direct applicability of Art. 94(2) of the Charter, which 
provides for the possibility to resort to the UN Security Council in case a party fails to comply 
with an ICJ judgment, the Court in Medellín applied the rule according to which treaty 
provisions establishing implementation mechanisms at the international level would signal an 
implied intention not to make the treaty self-executing. In the view of the majority, referral to 
the Security Council would constitute, in the intention of the parties, “the sole remedy for 
noncompliance”. Rather confusingly, however, the Court immediately conflated this 
argument with a reference to the unilateral intent of the US treaty-makers, in that it held that 
“[i]n light of the UN Charter’s remedial scheme, there is no reason to believe that the 
President and the Senate signed up for such a result”.73 
Thirdly, and finally, besides the textual approach, the Court in Medellín turned to the 
“postratification understanding” of the states parties as a confirmation of the non-self-
executing character of ICJ judgments. Specifically, the Court – by having recourse to the 
plaintiff’s memorial and the amici curiae briefs – could not identify “a single nation that 
treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts”.74 This argument reminds that of the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the aforementioned United States v. Postal decision, where a 
treaty was held non-self-executing in the US because, inter alia, that treaty had been ratified 
by countries where treaties are not generally considered part of domestic law.75 
Also in other countries, domestic courts frequently conceptualize the direct applicability of 
international agreements as a feature which would be regulated by international law.76 
Although in less straightforward terms than in US case law, effects of this conception can be 
                                                
70 See e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966), 999 UNTS 171, Art. 
2, para. 2: “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with 
the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect 
to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” 
71 Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, cit. 
72 United States v. Postal and ors, Appeal judgment, 589 F2d 862 (5th Cir 1979), ILDC 1876 (US 1979). 
73 Medellín v. Texas, cit., p. 504-505. 
74 Ibid., p. 511-512. It should be noted, however, that with an apparent twist of logic the Court did not look 
at the practice of the states parties to the U.N. Charter (whose intent, after all, it had been looking for throughout 
the judgment) but at the practice of the states parties to the VCCR and to its Optional Protocol. 
75 United States v. Postal and ors, cit. The court held that “[t]he Convention [in question] is a multilateral 
treaty which has been ratified by over fifty nations, some of which do not recognize treaties as self-executing. It 
is difficult therefore to ascribe to the language of the treaty any common intent that the treaty should of its own 
force operate as the domestic law of the ratifying nations.” 
76 As noted by D. SHELTON, “Introduction”, cit., p. 11, references to the intention of the parties as 
dispositive in matters of direct application are frequent. For cases from Germany and France, see respectively 
S.A. RIESENFELD, “The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable German Judgment”, 
American Journal of International Law 1971, p. 548 ff. (commenting a judgment of the Tax Court of Hamburg 
holding “that the executory or self-executing character of treaties was to be determined on the basis of the intent 
of the contracting parties, as deduced from the language and the character of the treaty as well as from other 
relevant materials”); E. DECAUX, “France”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 207 ff., p. 233. 
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found also in the case law of Italian courts. It is useful, in particular, to briefly describe the 
approach taken by the Italian courts with regard to the direct applicability of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Starting from the 1980s, the applicability of ECHR provisions as rules of decision in domestic 
proceedings had been relatively uncontroversial in Italian case law. The Court of Cassation 
adopted this approach in a spate of oft-cited judgments which included, for example, its 
decisions in the Iaglietti, Polo Castro and Medrano cases.77 However, in judgment 349/2007, 
the Italian Constitutional Court seemingly steered toward the non direct applicability of the 
ECHR by ordinary judges. The court, in particular, reached this conclusion by referring to the 
text and the aims of the Convention, which, in its view, would not sustain a direct 
applicability of the treaty. In the court’s words, “at present, no elements relating to the 
structure and objectives of the ECHR, or to the characteristics of its specific norms, allow 
[…] to maintain that the legal position of the individuals may be directly and immediately 
beneficiary of it, independently from the traditional legal filter of their respective States, so as 
to entitle the judge not to apply the conflicting national rule”.78 
It should be noted that it is controversial whether the Constitutional Court really intended to 
bar any direct application of ECHR provisions or, instead, it only aimed to direct ordinary 
courts not to apply ECHR provisions in lieu of inconsistent domestic legislation and to refer 
all apparent conflicts to the Constitutional Court itself: in the latter case, the application of the 
ECHR as the governing rule of a case should still be possible when it does not entail any 
conflict with existing legislation.79 Subsequent judgments of the Constitutional Court only 
added fuel to this confusion. In judgment 311/2009, for instance, the court first conceded that 
“it is a matter for the national court, as the ordinary court applying the Convention, to apply 
the relevant provisions”, but added immediately afterwards that “the ordinary courts […] 
cannot proceed to apply the ECHR provision (at present, in contrast to Community law which 
is endowed with direct effect) in place of the contrasting internal provision”.80 In fact, 
although the court apparently conflated the two planes, considering international law directly 
applicable does not necessarily imply that national courts are also entitled to disapply 
domestic legislation inconsistent with international law: they may well be endowed with the 
former power, without possessing the latter.81 
                                                
77 Iaglietti case, Judgment No. 6978 of 14 July 1982; Polo Castro case, Judgment No. 15 of 8 May 1989; 
First Criminal Section, Medrano case, Judgment of 12 May 1993. 
78 On this aspect of the judgment, see G. CATALDI, M. IOVANE, “International Law in Italian Courts 1999-
2009: An Overview of Major Methodological and Substantive Issues”, Italian Yearbook of International Law 
2009, p. 3 ff., p. 22-23. 
79 On this point, see the comment by C. FOCARELLI in EP v Municipality of Avellino, No 349/2007, ILDC 
301 (IT 2007) (“the intent of the Constitutional Court seems clear enough: by stating that the ECHR rules were 
not directly applicable, the court only meant that an ordinary court could not simply abstain from applying a 
national rule conflicting with a ECHR rule, as actually occurs with EC law, but was bound to refer the case to 
the Constitutional Court itself for a constitutionality ruling. However, the words used by the Constitutional 
Court, if taken literally, implied that both the ECHR and the ECtHR’s decisions are only directed to the 
legislature”). 
80 Judgment No. 311 of 16 November 2009, para. 6. 
81 On the difference between the two planes, see e.g. U. VILLANI, “Sull’efficacia della Convenzione 
europea dei diritti dell’uomo nell’ordinamento italiano dopo il Trattato di Lisbona”, Diritti comparati 2012, 
available at <http://www.diritticomparati.it/sullefficacia-della-convenzione-europea-dei-diritti-delluomo-
nellordinamento-italiano-dopo-il-tratt/>. See also Section 7 below.  
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Be that as it may, because the Constitutional Court expressly held that the limitations that it 
set on the domestic effects of the ECHR derived from the structure of the Convention itself, 
most ordinary judges have understandably interpreted the court’s holding in Judgment 349 as 
barring the direct applicability of the ECHR in toto.82 For example, in the 2008 Zullo 
judgment, the Court of Cassation denied the direct applicability of the Convention because it 
held, citing the abovementioned 2007 Constitutional Court judgment, that “the ECHR does 
not create a supranational legal system and therefore does not produce directly applicable 
norms in the contracting states”.83 More recently, in 2015, the Council of State referred to the 
same constitutional judgment and held that the only domestic effects that ECHR provisions 
can produce are the declaration of inconstitutionality of inconsistent legislation by the 
Constitutional Court and the consistent interpretation of domestic law, thus excluding any 
form of direct applicability by ordinary judges (i.e. different from the Constitutional Court).84 
To conclude this paragraph, it is opportune to draw attention to one last point. When courts 
look for a positive intention of the parties (or for any explicit or implicit indication arising 
from the text of an international agreement) to make a treaty directly applicable, they 
obviously do so by assuming that there is a presumption (or a default rule) of non-
applicability, which can only be defeated if the treaty allows or requires the direct 
applicability of its norms. Also this position represents an outgrowth of Jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Danzig, insofar as the PCIJ held that “according to a well established principle of 
international law […] an international agreement cannot, as such, create direct rights and 
obligations for private individuals”. 
Usually, this negative presumption is explicitly or impliedly based on a conception of 
international law as a system of obligations primarily among states. In the most restrictive 
understanding of this presumption, only states should be allowed to enforce international law 
obligations, so that individuals’ reliance on international law should be barred by reason of 
the structure of the international legal order itself.85 For example, in Matta-Ballesteros v. 
Henman, the US Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals argued that “[i]t is well established that 
individuals have no standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence of 
a protest by the sovereigns involved”.86 But such a drastic assertion is as rare as it is blatantly 
untenable, because it is commonplace for contemporary international law to provide for 
                                                
82 Note that not all ordinary judges have conformed to this view. For a recent restatement in favor of the 
direct applicability of ECHR provisions, see for example Court of Cassation, Judgment No. 19985 of 30 
September 2011, para. 2 (“va ribadito l'orientamento di questa Corte circa l'immediata rilevanza nel nostro 
ordinamento delle norme della suddetta Convenzione (art. 6) e circa l'obbligo per il giudice dello Stato di 
applicare direttamente la norma pattizia”). 
83 Judgment No. 14 of 3 January 2008 (translation by the author). 
84 Council of State, Adunanza Plenaria, Order of 4 March 2015, para. 11. 
85 On this point, see generally G. MANNER, “The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law”, 
American Journal of International Law 1952, p. 428 ff. (critiquing, inter alia, the assumption that the individual 
“has no right and duty whatsoever” under international law and that “he cannot invoke it for his protection or 
violate its rules”).  
86 Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990); see also, e.g., United States v. Zabaneh, 837 
F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1988) (arguing, with reference to some international extradition treaties, that “[t]reaties are 
contracts between or among independent nations. The treaty provisions in question were designed to protect the 
sovereign interests of nations, and it is up to the offended nations to determine whether a violation of sovereign 
interests occurred and requires redress. […] Because neither Guatemala nor Belize protested appellant's 
detention and removal to the United States, appellant lacks standing to raise the treaties as basis for challenging 
the court's jurisdiction.”). 
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obligations owed by states towards individuals as well as for interpersonal obligations.87 More 
commonly, the negative presumption is deemed rebuttable by the intent of the states parties, 
as in Medellín,88 or by the objectives and goals of the agreement, as in judgment 349/2007 of 
the Italian Constitutional Court. 
However, not all courts which resort to the intention of the parties as the primary criterion of 
direct application also rely on a background presumption against direct application. The 
Dutch case law provides a relevant alternative. Although the Supreme Court has commonly 
referred to the intention of the parties as a first step in the assessment of direct applicability, it 
has not consider the lack of a positive intent as evidence that the parties meant to exclude 
direct applicability. Instead, it has held that, where a clear intention lacks, “only the content of 
the provision itself [is] decisive”.89 
 
3.3. Assessment: marginal role of international law in the determination of direct 
applicability. 
All the views described above, however, do not withstand closer scrutiny. Specifically, this 
paragraph intends to prove that – save for specific exceptions – the direct applicability of 
international norms is not dependent on any international obligations. This is true both on the 
positive plane (i.e. international law does not require direct application) and on the negative 
plane (i.e. international law does not prohibit it either). 
First of all, let us examine the soundness of purported positive international obligations in the 
field of direct application. To start off by stating the obvious, nothing prevents the parties to a 
treaty from specifically agreeing to make said treaty directly applicable in their national 
courts. No doubt, in such a case the direct applicability might still be barred by domestic law, 
for example by reason of specific constitutional requirements. However, in presence of an 
express treaty provision positively imposing direct application, such domestic law limitations 
would constitute a breach of the treaty. 
But this scenario, although conceivable, is mostly theoretical. Indeed, it has been conclusively 
demonstrated that a specific positive intent of states parties to this regard almost never exists. 
In particular, this has been proven to be the case with all major multilateral human rights 
intruments, most notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights.90 This is not at all surprising, because many countries would 
not agree to ratify a treaty (particularly a human rights treaty) mandating direct application 
against state authorities in domestic courts. Unsurprisingly, all multilateral instruments do not 
deal with this point expressly. In the aforementioned case McKesson v. Iran, the court failed 
to consider that the express language of the Warsaw Convention is obviously influenced by 
                                                
87 See Chapter 1, Section 1. 
88 Medellín v. Texas, cit., p. 500. Note that in ft. 3 the Court referred to an additional presumption against 
individual enforceability of self-executing treaties. 
89 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Netherlands”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 326 ff., p. 341-342; E.A. ALKEMA, 
“Netherlands”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 407 ff., p. 417 (both citing the Dutch Supreme Court judgment of 30 
May 1986, NJ 1986, 688). 
90 For an extensive demonstration of these points, see Y. IWASAWA, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 36-53. 
See also T. BUERGENTHAL, cit., p. 336. 
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the fact that it establishes inter-personal civil obligations, not a cause of action against state 
authorities. 
National courts go astray also when they look for an implied obligation to make a treaty 
directly applicable. In particular, the fact that a treaty establishes vertical relations between a 
state and individuals, thereby creating rights and obligations for the latter, cannot be regarded 
as creating “a presumption of individual standing” in national courts.91 From the perspective 
of international law, such a presumption does not hold. Indeed, a person with treaty rights is 
not necessarily entitled by international law to a particular forum.92 
Conversely, it is equally true that the lack of a positive intent does not imply the existence of 
a negative intent of the parties as regards direct application. In particular, the existence of a 
negative intent should not be fabricated by courts based on treaty provisions whose scope has 
no relation whatsoever with the question of direct application. This is the case of treaty 
clauses calling for domestic implementation, which, as noted by the PCIJ as early as in 
Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, are no more than pleonastic restatements of the 
obvious obligation of states parties to comply with the treaty.93 The same goes for provisions 
establishing international mechanisms of implementation. The argument, put forward by the 
majority in Medellín, that Art. 94(2) of the UN Charter would provide for the only means of 
implementation of ICJ decisions is altogether arbitrary,94 all the more so when considering 
that implementation by the national judiciary is precisely a way to avoid non-compliance on 
the international plane and an ensuing action by the Security Council. 
                                                
91 In the sense that these obligations would create such a presumption, see A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The 
Effects”, cit., p. 137. 
92 For a thorough demonstration of this point, see S.D. MURPHY, “Does International Law Obligate States 
to Open Their National Courts to Persons for the Invocation of Treaty Norms That Protect or Benefit Persons?”, 
in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 61 ff., particularly p. 83-85 (proving that the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium does not 
apply in international law and concluding that “international law has never viewed the entitlement to a remedy as 
entailing a right to compulsory dispute settlement”). See, for example, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99, p. 142-144 (holding that state 
immunity applies even though no effective alternative means of redress are available in domestic legal systems 
to victims of jus cogens violations). In general international law, a very limited exception could be seen in the 
concept of denial of justice. The exact nature and scope of this concept are controversial in scholarship, 
commentators having defined the prohibition of denial of justice as a rule of substantive, merely procedural, or 
intermediate character. Suffice it to say that, however interpreted, the principle only applies to the treatment of 
aliens; moreover, it does not concern only the domestic implementation of international norms, but also the 
application of domestic law to aliens. For these reasons, this norm is of limited interest to this study. On denial 
of justice, see, for a substantive understanding, G. FITZMAURICE, “The Meaning of the Term ‘Denial of Justice’”, 
British Yearbook of International Law 1932, p. 93 ff. (defining denial of justice as any injury against foreigners 
committed by any state authority). For a procedural understanding, see J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice in 
International Law, Oxford, 2005. For a comprehensive analysis of denial of justice and its relationship to the fair 
and equitable treatment standard in international investment law, see F.M. PALOMBINO, Il trattamento «giusto ed 
equo» degli investimenti stranieri, Bologna, 2012, p. 61-99. See also F. FRANCIONI, “Access to Justice, Denial of 
Justice and International Investment Law”, European Journal of International Law 2009, p. 729 ff.; J. 
CRAWFORD, Brownlie’s, cit., p. 619-620. 
93 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion of 21 February 1925 (Series B, No. 10): 
the PCIJ held that a treaty clause of implementation “merely lays stress on a principle which is self-evident, 
according to which a State which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation 
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken”. On this point, 
see Y. IWASAWA, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 163-166; B. CONFORTI, International Law, cit., p. 30-33; T. 
BUERGENTHAL, cit., p. 337-338. 
94 D. SLOSS, “Taming”, cit., p. 1723 (correctly noting that this provision only identifies one option and 
nowhere implies that it is the only one). 
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Equally arbitrary is the argument that relies on the implementation practice of other states. As 
shown in Chapter 2, many countries commonly implement treaties by transfusing their 
content in domestic sources of law. Obviously, these countries would hardly undertake any 
obligation to make a treaty directly applicable in court, because such an obligation would sit 
uneasily with their constitutional setting. When such states are involved, then, one cannot 
expect any express or tacit manifestation of the intent of the parties to make the treaty directly 
applicable.95 But this attitude has nothing to say on the domestic effects of international 
obligations in different constitutional settings. 
Finally, it should be underscored that the intent criterion would only apply to international 
treaties and would not be able to provide any indication as to the direct applicability of other 
sources of international law, such as customary international law, which are also commonly 
applied in the practice of national courts.96 Suffice it to remember the practice of Italian 
courts, which routinely apply norms of general international law pursuant to Art. 10 of the 
Italian Constitution, for example in the fields of state immunity and of fundamental human 
rights.97 
Based on the above, one must conclude that international law does not positively or negatively 
determine whether or not its rules are directly applicable by domestic organs.98 Nothing in a 
treaty’s silence on the point of the direct applicability of its norms allows to interpret that 
silence as either an obligation or a prohibition: it simply indicates that the background 
principle of neutrality applies, so that the point of direct applicability is a matter of domestic 
concern.99 The criterion of the intent of the parties, in particular, is unworkable, because such 
an intent is in fact purely fictitious. In the words of Carlos M. Vázquez, “[a] court that relies 
on the particular wording of a treaty provision as reflecting the parties’ intent to require 
legislative implementation is almost certainly attributing to the parties a nonexistent 
intent”.100 
                                                
95 S.A. RIESENFELD, “The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?”, 
American Journal of International Law 1980, p. 892 ff., p. 898 (noting that “the intent of other state parties is 
irrelevant, and even the treatymaking authorities of the state party whose domestic law is involved may have 
little or no choice according to the governing constitutional provisions”). 
96 But see J. KLABBERS, cit., p. 295 (seemingly ruling out direct applicability of customary international 
law because it would not be possible to identify the intention of the parties in such a case). 
97 For various relevant examples of direct application of customary international law in Italian courts, see 
e.g. the saga concerning compensation proceedings brought against Germany by Italian victims of crimes 
committed by Nazi troops on Italian territory during the Second World War. For example, in its landmark 
judgment in the case of Ferrini v. Repubblica Federale di Germania, No. 5044, of 11 March 2004, the Cassation 
directly applied customary international law on state immunity and fundamental human rights (the latter qua jus 
cogens). On this case, see M. IOVANE, “The Ferrini Judgment of the Italian Supreme Court: Opening Up 
Domestic Courts to Claims of Reparation for Victims of Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights?”, 
Italian Yearbook of International Law 2004, p. 165 ff. 
98 Y. IWASAWA, “The Doctrine”, cit., p. 650 (criticizing what he termed the “given-theory” of direct 
application); A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects”, cit., p. 145 (“[i]nternational law is neutral on the question of 
direct effect”); T. BUERGENTHAL, cit., p. 320; L. REYDAMS, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal 
Legal Perspectives, Oxford, 2003, p. 137, ft. 40 (“Whether an international convention can be directly applicable 
in the domestic legal order is […] purely a matter of national law”). 
99 As rightly noted by J.J. PAUST, “Self-Executing Treaties”, American Journal of International Law 1988, 
p. 760 ff., p. 782, “no treaty is inherently non-self-executing”. 
100 C.M. VÁZQUEZ, “Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of 
Treaties”, Harvard Law Review 2008-2009, p. 599 ff., p. 607. 
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An actual intent of the parties was undoubtedly lacking in the case of Medellín. In the Avena 
Interpretation Judgment, the ICJ declined to render any interpretation on whether the 
obligation to ensure review and reconsideration, as provided for in Avena, was self-executing 
before US courts. The Court had simply no international obligation to interpret on that point: 
as it argued, “[t]he Avena Judgment nowhere lays down or implies that the courts in the 
United States are required to give direct effect to paragraph 153 (9). […] the Judgment leaves 
it to the United States to choose the means of implementation, not excluding the introduction 
within a reasonable time of appropriate legislation, if deemed necessary under domestic 
constituitonal law. Nor moreover does the Avena Judgment prevent direct enforceability of 
the obligation in question, if such an effect is permitted by domestic law”.101 The Supreme 
Court’s findings on the direct applicability of Avena, in conclusion, were based on non-
existing international obligations. This could support the view that the intent criterion served 
as a cover-up for the judges’ policy preferences.102 
In conclusion of this section, one may finally summarize what portion, if any, of the issue of 
direct applicability is determined by international law, by either mandating or barring direct 
application by national courts. This role is very marginal. The parties to a treaty may express 
a positive or a negative intent as regards its direct application, which however is an extremely 
rare occurrence.103 In the case of international law sources different from treaties, such as 
customary international law, international law never regulates this issue. Insofar as 
international law does not determine the extent of its direct applicability in domestic courts, 
this question cannot but become a question of domestic law. 
 
 
4. The domestic law perspective: direct applicability as an issue of separation of powers. 
 
Given that international law does not appear to be the controlling factor of the assessment of 
direct applicability, one cannot but turn to domestic law to determine the criteria relevant in 
this regard.104 This section will demonstrate, first of all, that direct application, as a question 
of domestic law, should be treated as strictly interconnected to the formal status that 
international law is granted in domestic legal orders. Afterwards, the following pages will 
critically address the limits on direct application which may derive from domestic law. The 
argument advanced throughout this section is that the extent of the direct applicability of 
international norms ultimately depends on considerations of domestic separation of powers 
                                                
101 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2009, p. 3, para. 44. 
102 D. SLOSS, “Taming”, cit., p. 1724 and 1734. 
103 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 135 (“the role of intent is most obvious when states express 
a negative intent: that is, an intention not to allow for direct effect”). For an example, see Art. 37(1) of the US-
Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (25 May 1973) 27 UST 2019, according to which 
“the existence of restrictions in this Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any person to take action in 
the United States to suppress or exclude any evidence or to obtain other judicial relief with requests under this 
Treaty”. In Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F. 2d 909, 918 (DC Cir. 1984) this provision was held to bar the direct 
application of the treaty. The insertion of such provisions in treaties is a clear influence of the U.S. domestic 
practice on the treaty-making. 
104 T. BUERGENTHAL, cit., p. 317 (arguing that self-execution is a domestic law question). 
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and, most notably, on the courts’ fear to overstep the boundaries of the legislative or 
executive functions.105 
 
4.1. Direct applicability as a consequence of the incorporation of international law in 
domestic law. 
In principle, domestic legal force, i.e. the incorporation of international law in domestic law, 
and the concept of direct applicability operate on distinct planes. The formal status acquired 
by sources of international law in a domestic legal system does not necessarily imply that 
those sources can be applied by national organs. Were it otherwise, as in the views of certain 
judicial and scholarly doctrines,106 it would be pointless to speak of direct applicability in the 
first place, as the only meaningful issue would be the assessment of domestic validity. 
And yet, even if logically and practically distinct, the two issues are strictly entangled. 
Generally speaking, if a national legal system really equates international law to a source of 
domestic law, one would expect it to be applied domestically on an equal footing with a 
municipal source. If one accepts this premise, the direct applicability of international law by 
domestic organs should be regarded as the most immediate logical consequence of making 
international law formally part of domestic law, as well as the clearest way to make this de 
jure status effective in practice.107 Admittedly, international norms that acquire domestic 
validity may have a number of other domestic effects different from direct applicability, but 
                                                
105 The idea that the issue of direct application is a matter of domestic constitutional setting has been 
expressed by A. VON BOGDANDY, “Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship Between 
International and Domestic Constitutional Law”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2008, p. 397 ff., p. 
403: “The doctrine’s constitutional dimension rests on the fact that it affects various constitutional issues, such 
as the separation of powers between the domestic institutions […]”; J.H. JACKSON, cit., p. 333, 336; A. 
NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects”, cit., p. 144 (noting that limitations on direct application are used by national 
courts to fix issues of separation of powers). 
106 In the US, for example, non-self-executing treaties have sometimes been held “not part of the law of the 
land”: see US Supreme Court, Trans Word Airlines Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 US 243 (1984) (holding that 
“the Convention is a self-executing treaty, [hence] no domestic legislation is required to give it force of law in 
the United States). On this point, see C.M. VÁZQUEZ, “The Four”, cit., p. 702-703. For an example of conflation 
of domestic legal force and direct application outside of the US context, see N. MARIE-SCHWARTZENBERG, 
“Droit russe”, in A. CASSESE, M. DELMAS-MARTY (eds.), Juridictions nationales et crimes internationaux, Paris, 
2002, p. 259 ff., p. 263 (arguing that in Russia all treaties would be directly applicable pursuant to Art. 15 of the 
Russian Constitution). For a critique of this stance, see S. VASILIEV, A. OGORODOVA, “Implementation of the 
Rome Statute in Russia”, Finnish Yearbook of International Law 2005, p. 197 ff., p. 201-202. 
107 The functional equivalence between incorporated international law and domestic law is underscored by 
many authoritative commentators. See, ex multis, B. CONFORTI, “National Courts and the International Law of 
Human Rights”, in B. CONFORTI, F. FRANCIONI (eds.), cit., p. 3 ff., p. 7 (once international law acquires formal 
validity in domestic law, it “must necessarily be applied by the courts”); B. CONFORTI, “Cours général de droit 
international public”, Recueil des cours 1988, vol. 212, p. 9 ff., p. 31 (advocating that international law “soit 
plainement considéré comme un droit à l’intérieur de l’Etat et qu’il y reçoive toutes les garanties qui reviennent 
au droit, en particulier les garanties juridictionnelles”; emphasis in the original); C.M. VÁZQUEZ, “The Four”, 
cit., p. 708 (the Supremacy Clause allocates courts the duty to enforce treaties “as they enforce the Constitution 
and federal statutes”); T. GINSBURG, “Locking In Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International 
Law”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 2005-2006, p. 707 ff., p. 749 (“we assume 
that the domestic judiciary will enforce international legal norms in the manner the constitutional designer 
provides for”); J.I. CHARNEY, “Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations”, American Journal of International Law 
1989, p. 805 ff., p. 808 (“Since rules of international law have been incorporated into the law of the United 
States, they are enforceable by the courts, as is any other applicable law”). 
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none of them seems to be as pervasive and effective.108 Hence, it is safe to state that the lack 
of direct applicability deprives domestic validity of most of its effects. 
The proposition according to which the possibility to apply international law as the rule of 
decision is an immediate logical consequence of domestic validity requires some explanation. 
Firstly, it should not be understood as implying that, once incorporated, international law 
should be applied by national organs no matter what. A large portion of this section will deal 
precisely with the analysis of the factors which bar or limit the direct applicability of 
international law despite it being full-fledged part of domestic law. This in no way contradicts 
the view that direct applicability is fundamentally a matter of domestic law. Indeed, the same 
phenomenon affects the judicial application of domestic legislation: there, too, there can be 
norms which, despite being valid and binding, are deemed non-directly applicable or non-
judicially enforceable.109 For example, in the early years of the Italian Constitution, many 
constitutional provisions were considered “merely aspirational” by the courts, which refused 
to apply them.110 The distinction between directly applicable and non-directly applicable 
constitutional provisions (norme precettive and norme programmatiche) was later discarded 
by the Constitutional Court in 1956.111 A definitely more extreme situation is that of China, 
where the whole constitutional text is considered to be non-justiciable.112 
Secondly, this statement implies that, once a norm of international law is made part of a 
domestic legal system, what should logically follow from the perspective of domestic law is a 
presumption of direct applicability. This involves a paradigm shift compared to the 
presumption against direct applicability which usually underpins the conceptions of direct 
applicability as based on international law. In the present perspective, the existence of 
grounds for non application should be demonstrated in concreto.113 This determination is a 
                                                
108 J.H. JACKSON, cit., p. 313 and 319 (noting that non-directly applicable international norms can have 
“certain ‘internal effects’ other than ‘statutelike direct application’”, such as “influencing the interpretation of 
municipal statutes and laws, operating through a statutory provision that makes reference to ‘international law’ 
or a treaty standard, or influencing an appraisal of public policy”). It should be noted, however, that at least some 
of these effects can be achieved in judicial practice also without formal incorporation of international law: see 
Chapter 4 for a discussion on the use of international sources in the interpretation of domestic law. See also Y. 
IWASAWA, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 191-192 (a non-directly applicable treaty may be subject to judicial 
review, for example by a constitutional court, or in some contexts may be the basis for granting compensation 
for failure to implement). 
109 P. REUTER, “Principes de droit international public”, Recueil des cours 1961, vol. 103, p. 423 ff., p. 472. 
110 B. CONFORTI, International Law, cit., p. 29, ft. 63. 
111 See Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 1 of 5 June 1956. 
112 B. AHL, “Exploring Ways of Implementing International Human Rights Treaties in China”, Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 2010, p. 361 ff., p. 379. Non-justiciability is a common feature of socialist 
constitutions, which are “normally regarded as general guidelines for the actions of State bodies and citizens” 
rather than “strict legal prescriptions”: see A. CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions and International Law”, Recueil 
des cours 1985, vol. 192, p. 342 ff., p. 348. The Chinese Supreme People’s Court has applied the Constitution 
only once in a 2001 case (Qi Yuling v. Chen Xiaoqi et al., 5 SPC Gazette (2001), 158) which has however 
remained an isolated precedent: see R.J. MORRIS, “China’s Marbury: Qi Yuling v. Chen Xiaoqi – The Once and 
Future Trial of Both Education & Constitutionalization”, Tsinghua China Law Review 2012, p. 273 ff. The issue 
of direct applicability of the Chinese constitution is currently the subject of intense (and, to date, inconclusive) 
scholarly discussion: see T.E. KELLOGG, “Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics? Constitutional 
Development and Civil Litigation in China”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2009, p. 215 ff. 
113 Y. IWASAWA, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 161; J.J. PAUST, “Self-Executing”, cit., p. 773-775; 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 1986, §111(3) and (4) (recognizing non-self-
execution as an exception to the courts’ duty to apply international law as law). But see P. DE VISSCHER, “Les 
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matter for the national organ which is called upon to apply international law to a particular 
case. Indeed, both the concept of direct applicability and its limits have been elaborated 
predominantly by national courts, in lack of conclusive indications on this point by domestic 
legislation. 
From what has been said, it follows that, being a subset of direct applicability, also the 
individual enforceability of international norms should be regarded fundamentally as a matter 
of domestic law.114 Once international law is made part of a domestic legal system, courts 
should apply it in a manner equal to statutory rights;115 or, in other words, like direct 
application in general, individual enforceability should be considered from the perspective of 
the normal effects stemming from the domestication of international law.116 This point was 
described by the US Supreme Court in Head Money Cases in the following terms: “A treaty 
[…] is a law of the land, as an act of Congress is whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by 
which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined. And when such rights are 
of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of 
decision for the case before it as it would to a statute”.117 Although the court mischaracterized 
self-execution only in terms of individual enforceability, it addressed the latter issue in a way 
which can be fully shared. 
Indeed, there seems to be no reason why an international source should be treated any 
different from a domestic source as for the derivation of individual rights. Differentiating 
between the two would lead to illogical and inequitable outcomes. One might conclude, for 
example, that the individual enforceability of a treaty which has been incorporated by means 
of a mechanism of automatic standing incorporation or by ad hoc incorporation should be 
different from the individual enforceability of a domestic statute which textually reproduces 
the words of the treaty. In both situations, however, the content of domestic law is the same; 
hence, in both cases “the recognition of individual rights derived from a treaty” should 
equally follow “standard interpretive rules for legislation”.118 
Under the approach proposed here, then, the extent to which private parties can seek judicial 
redress in court for international law violations will depend on the contours of the power of 
judicial review in every particular national legal system, i.e., ultimately, on grounds of 
separation of powers. In countries where the right of access to court is conceived broadly, a 
presumption of individual enforceability should be in place. This is the case, for instance, of 
                                                                                                                                                   
tendences internationales des constitutions modernes”, Recueil des cours 1952, p. 511 ff., p. 560 (espousing the 
opposite presumption of non-self-execution). 
114 M.P. VAN ALSTINE, cit., p. 604. 
115 See “Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State Governments” (Note), 
Harvard Law Review 1990-1991, p. 1269 ff., p. 1283; C.M. VÁZQUEZ, “The Four”, cit., p. 719-720 (arguing that 
“[i]t is a mistake […] to assume that a treaty may be enforced in court by private parties only if it confers a 
private right of action itself. Many treaties, like most constitutional provisions and many federal statutes, do not 
themselves purport to confer private rights of action. […] A treaty that does not itself address private 
enforcement is no less judicially enforceable by individuals than constitutional or statutory provisions that do not 
themselves address private enforcement. The ‘private right of action’ to enforce a treaty may have its source in 
laws other than the treaty itself.”). 
116 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 109-110 (noting that the recognition of standing to 
individuals in domestic law has no connection with whether international law relies that individual to rely on it). 
117 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
118 M.P. VAN ALSTINE, cit., p. 607 (the passage quoted in text is referred by the author to the approach of 
“traditionalist dualist states” to treaty obligations once they have been implemented through legislation). 
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Germany, where Art. 19(4) of the Basic Law generally provides: “Should any person’s rights 
be violated by public authority, he may have recourse to the courts”.119 Similarly, pursuant to 
Art. 24 of the Italian Constitution, “Anyone may bring cases before a court of law in order to 
protect their rights under civil and administrative law”. 
A presumption of individual enforceability should also be the natural effect of the US 
Supremacy Clause with regard to international treaties.120 The early jurisprudence of the US 
courts relied consistently on this premise, then termed “canon of liberal interpretation” of 
treaties.121 Such a presumption has also been formulated in more recent Supreme Court case 
law, including e.g. United States v. Alvarez-Machain.122 However, the current posture of US 
courts seems to have steered towards an opposite presumption against the individual 
enforceability of international agreements. Notably, this position was expressed in an obiter 
by the Supreme Court in Medellín v. Texas, which seemingly presented the presumption 
against the creation of individually enforceable rights as one distinct from – and additional to 
– the aforementioned presumption against self-execution.123 The US courts are the only ones 
to have adopted this approach, at least among Western countries.124 On the basis of the 
arguments made above, this approach is deeply unpersuasive: indeed, it sits uneasily with the 
                                                
119 B. SIMMA, D.E. KHAN, M. ZÖCKLER, R. GEIGER, “The Role of German Courts in the Enforcement of 
International Human Rights”, in B. CONFORTI, F. FRANCIONI (eds.), Enforcing International Human Rights in 
Domestic Courts, The Hague-Boston-London, 1997, p. 71 ff., p. 71. 
120 C.M. VÁZQUEZ, “The Four”, cit., p. 700 (arguing that “[b]y virtue of the Supremacy Clause […] the 
judicial mechanisms available generally to enforce laws in the United States are available to enforce treaties” 
and that the Supremacy Clause “gives treaties the character of municipal law enforceable in domestic courts at 
the behest of private individuals”); T.M. FRANCK, A.K. THIRUVENGADAM, “International Law and Constitution-
Making”, Chinese Journal of International Law 2003, p. 467 ff., p. 472-473. 
121 See the U.S. Supreme Court judgment Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242 (1830) (holding that “[i]f the 
treaty admits of two interpretations and one is limited and the other liberal, one which will further, and the other 
exclude private rights, why should not the most liberal exposition be adopted?”). On this point see D. SLOSS, 
“United States”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 504 ff., p. 525-526 (describing the “canon of liberal interpretation” as 
expressing the idea that “treaties should be interpreted in a way that promotes broader protection for the rights of 
private parties”; however, in more recent times the canon has been invoked “as a rule that promotes more liberal 
use of extratextual sources”, often with the practical effect of compressing private rights: see ibid. p. 537). 
122 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), in which the Supreme Court held: “The 
Extradition Treaty has the force of law, and if […] it is self-executing, it would appear that a court must enforce 
it on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the other nation”; 
consequently, the Court held that the private individual could invoke treaty provisions also in lack of a formal 
protest of the offended government. See also United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir. 1995) and 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, cit. (Breyer J., dissenting, quoting from the U.S. government’s amicus brief that 
alleged that “there is a long-established presumption that treaties […] do not create judicially enforceable 
individual rights” and affirming that “no such presumption exists”). 
123 Medellín v. Texas, cit., p. 506, ft. 3: citing in part from Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, cit., §907, Comment a, p. 395, the Court held that “[e]ven when treaties are self-executing in 
the sense that they create federal law, the background presumption is that ‘[i]nternational agreements, even those 
directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action 
in domestic courts’”. For applications of a negative presumption against direct application, see also United States 
v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990), p. 1533: in this case, the plaintiff had invoked treaty provisions 
defensively during criminal proceedings, but the court held that “individuals lack standing to assert violations of 
international treaties in the absence of a protest from the offended government”; Cardenas v. Dretke, 405 F.3d 
244 (5th Cir. 2005), denying defensive reliance on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; United States 
v. Rashed, 83 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 1999), barring defensive invocation of the Convention on Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. 
124 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 384. 
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Supreme Court’s long-lasting stance according to which, “when possible, courts should 
fashion remedies to give contents to rights”.125 
This has inevitably led US courts to adopt double standards in inferring private causes of 
action from treaties and from domestic legal texts, which has brought about incongruous 
results. Again with reference to McKesson v. Iran, which espoused a negative presumption of 
direct applicability, the court also dismissed the argument that an implied cause of action 
could be recognized, as a matter of federal common law, based on the text of the Treaty of 
Amity. The plaintiff’s position, however, appeared persuasive. Indeed, it had been contended 
that Art. IV(2) of the treaty was practically identical to a passage of the US Constitution’s 
Fifth Amendment (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”) whose enforceability by private individuals had never been put in doubt.126 
 
4.2. Constitutional limits on the direct applicability of international norms. 
Having determined the rule, one should now look for the exceptions. The inquiry should 
commence with an analysis of national constitutions. 
Constitutions usually do not deal explicitly with the issue of direct application of international 
law. References to the concept of direct applicability or self-execution have sometimes been 
inserted in legislative acts, including some recent constitutions, but the wording of such 
references is so vague that all they end up doing is to furnish a circular definition of the 
concept of direct application which is of little or no practical use. For example, Art. 4 of the 
Constitution of Kazakhstan provides that treaties “are directly implemented except in cases 
when the application of an international treaty shall require the promulgation of a law”. Art. 
231(4) of the South African Constitution states that “any international agreement becomes 
law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing 
provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic […]”. 
Finally, Art. 5(3) of the Russian Law of International Treaties (which, despite not being of 
formally constitutional nature, regulates the making and the domestic application of treaties in 
general terms) states that “the provisions of officially published international treaties of the 
Russian Federation, which do not require the promulgation of domestic acts of application, 
shall operate in the Russian Federation directly”. These provisions do nothing more than to 
acknowledge the existence of treaty provisions which are not directly applicable.127 The 
identification in concreto of such cases is left entirely to the judiciary or to subsequent 
intervention by the political branches. 
By contrast, it is certainly possible to draw implied limitations on direct application from the 
provisions of a constitution, but this conclusion should not be reached lightly. The preferable 
approach is to rule out direct application only in cases where, according to the constitution, a 
formal act of the legislature is required to regulate the subject-matter of the international norm 
at issue. In such cases, indeed, there are inescapable reasons of separation of powers. 
                                                
125 “Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State Governments” (Note), cit., p. 
1282. 
126 McKesson v. Iran, cit., paras. 11-12. 
127 I.I. LUKASHUK, “Treaties in the Legal System of Russia”, German Yearbook of International Law 1997, 
p. 141 ff., p. 161 (the Russian law on treaties “does no more than confirm the well-known separation of treaties 
into self-executing and non-self-executing ones”). 
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Examples of such limitations abound in the practice of states. The most obvious field where 
this is the case is that of substantive criminal law:128 the constitutional settings of many 
countries do not allow for the creation of new criminal offences by means of direct 
application of international law and require a specific act of parliament. 
In Russia, for example, the direct application of international norms in the field of substantive 
criminal law is considered to be barred pursuant to the principle of legality, which is protected 
under art. 54(2) of the Constitution and art. 3(1) of the Criminal Code.129 Art. 25(2) of the 
Italian Constitution (“No punishment may be inflicted except by virtue of a law in force at the 
time the offence was committed”), has identical implications.130 In R v. Jones, the House of 
Lords held that customary international law cannot have the effect of creating new offences in 
the law of England.131 Finally, US courts have considered treaty norms to be non-self-
executing in certain subject-matters deemed to be within exclusive congressional power by 
reason of Art. I of the US Constitution. These matters include, besides criminalization of 
conducts, appropriation of money and declaration of war.132 It should be underscored, 
however, that most Art. I congressional powers are not considered exclusive and cannot 
sustain a claim for non-self-execution.133 
It is noteworthy that the prohibition of the direct application of international criminal law as 
for the creation of new offences may not prevent courts from drawing other types of direct 
effects from the relevant international norms, for example in the field of procedural law. In 
the Scilingo case, the Supreme Court of Spain refused to convict the defendant for crimes 
against humanity based on the constitutional principle of legality and instead convicted him 
for murder. Significantly, however, the Court did apply the customary international law 
norms on the prohibition of core crimes to justify the exercise of universal jurisdiction.134  
 
4.3. Limitations on direct applicability mandated by the political branches. 
A second category of limitations on direct application includes those which are required by 
the political authorities. Such prescriptive restrictions are usually given on an ad hoc basis.135 
A relevant example can be found in the US practice to attach declarations to the instruments 
of ratification of human rights treaties with a view to making those treaties non-self-
executing. These declarations are usually adopted by agreement of the Senate and the 
Executive.136 For example, when ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the US declared that “the provisions of articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not 
self-executing”. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court seemingly considered this 
                                                
128 For a detailed analysis of this topic, see W.N. FERDINANDUSSE, Direct Application of International 
Criminal Law in National Courts, The Hague, 2006. 
129 S. VASILIEV, A. OGORODOVA, cit., p. 202-203. For a different view, see W.N. FERDINANDUSSE, cit., p. 
37-38. 
130 B. CONFORTI, Diritto internazionale, Napoli, 201410, p. 339. 
131 R v. Jones (Margaret) (2007) 1 AC 136. See S.C. NEFF, cit., p. 627. 
132 E.T. SWAINE, cit., p. 354; C.M. VÁZQUEZ, “The Four”, cit., p. 718. 
133 C.A. BRADLEY, International Law, cit., p. 49-50. 
134 Scilingo Manzorro (Adolfo Francisco) v. Spain, Appeal judgment, No 798, ILDC 1430 (ES 2007). 
135 E.T. SWAINE, cit., p. 353. 
136 For a survey of the U.S. practice in this field see C.A. BRADLEY, J.L. GOLDSMITH, “Treaties, Human 
Rights, and Conditional Consent”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2000, p. 399 ff., particularly p. 446 
ff. For a documented historical analysis of the U.S. Senate’s hostility to human rights treaties, see N.H. 
KAUFMAN, Human Rights Treaties and the Senate: A History of Opposition, Chapel Hill-London, 1990. 
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declaration as dispositive, in that it argued that “the United States ratified the Covenant on the 
express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations 
enforceable in the federal courts”.137 In other contexts, limitations on the direct applicability 
of international agreements by US courts have also been mandated by statutes. For example, 
pursuant to Section 102(c)(1)(A) of the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement Act, “No person 
other than the United States […] shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements […]”. This provision, then, is devised to prevent the invocation 
of the WTO agreements by private parties, while the federal authorities remain free to rely on 
such agreements to challenge the validity of state laws and to support the legitimacy of their 
acts. 
Similarly to the US, it had for some time been the practice of Germany to attach treaty 
declarations to preclude direct applicability. For example, upon ratification of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, Germany declared, inter alia, “that domestically the Convention 
does not apply directly. It establishes state obligations under international law that the Federal 
Republic of Germany fulfils in accordance with its national law, which conforms with the 
Convention”. This declaration was later withdrawn in 2010. These manifestations of intent 
have usually been treated as binding by German courts.138 
As far as the legal effects of these limitations are concerned, one may wonder if they are 
sufficient to deprive tout court international law of all forms of domestic applicability. 
Although this question may, of course, receive different answers depending on the national 
legal environment, it is nonetheless possible to make some general remarks on the role of 
political authorities in delimiting the extent of direct application. 
As regards declarations of non-self-execution and like acts, it should be first of all 
underscored that, differently from what some scholars have claimed, they do not produce any 
international obligation not to make the treaty applicable in court. It is mistaken to argue that 
“non-self-execution declarations are […] part of the terms of the treaties. They are included 
within the US instrument of ratification that defines the nature of the US obligations to other 
countries”.139 This argument neglects that these declarations are by no means equivalent to 
reservations: since human rights treaties are neutral toward questions of direct application, 
non-self-execution declarations do not impinge on the scope of the treaty obligations.140 For 
the very same reason, it is also true that such declarations are certainly not prohibited in terms 
of international law.141 
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138 B. SIMMA, D.E. KHAN, M. ZÖCKLER, R. GEIGER, cit., p. 79-80. 
139 C.A. BRADLEY, J.L. GOLDSMITH, “Treaties”, cit., p. 448. 
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As is usually the case with issues of direct application, then, the prescriptive limitations at 
hand should be analyzed within the framework of domestic law. The argument advanced here 
is that the national constitutional framework on the domestic status of international law is 
decisive in the assessment of the legitimacy of the limitations under scrutiny. Specifically, in 
countries where international law is incorporated with a status higher than ordinary 
legislation, limiting the domestic effect of international law should simply be outside the 
powers of the political branches. Chapter 2 has demonstrated that these kinds of constitutional 
mechanisms of international law incorporation are intended precisely to curb the lawmaking 
power. The purpose of the constitutional provisions would be defeated by the reintroduction 
of political leeway through the back door of non-self-execution declarations or of statutes 
limiting direct applicability, which would deprive incorporated international norms of a 
significant portion of their ordinary effects qua domestic law. 
Conversely, the conclusion is necessarily different with regard to implementation mechanisms 
which do not grant international sources any primacy over domestic legislation. Again with 
reference to Chapter 2, it has been shown that the policy rationale of such provisions is to 
leave to the legislature the possibility to breach international law, as a safety valve protecting 
the democratic decision-making process. If the legislature is constitutionally entitled to 
exercise this option by removing international norms from the realm of domestic law, then it 
should a fortiori be able to rule out the direct applicability of international sources. 
This raises, however, certain problems as regards who and how can exercise this power. In 
principle, if international law is automatically incorporated with a status equal to ordinary 
legislation, this authority is vested by the constitution in the legislature and should also be 
exercised through legislation, i.e. a genuine embodiment of democratic will. This option 
should not be presumed, because it runs counter to the background principle favoring 
compliance with international obligations which underpins any constitutional mechanism of 
automatic standing incorporation. 
In this regard, another perplexing feature of Medellín is that, by resorting to a negative 
presumption of self-execution, the US Supreme Court in fact interpreted the inaction of 
Congress and the ICJ judgments in favor of non-compliance – or, in other words, the Court 
looked for positive actions by the Congress showing the latter’s intent to comply with 
international law. That inaction, however, provided no indication that the Congress intended 
to breach international law.142 This way, the Court caused the violation of treaty obligations 
even if “no national political authority ever decided to violate the treaty”.143 This outcome is 
in tension with the US constitutional setting, which does allow for international law violations 
but entrusts this power to the federal legislature. In practice, the US Supreme Court arrogated 
this authority to itself, despite being an organ which lacks political accountability.144 
                                                
142 O.A. HATHAWAY, S. MCELROY, S.A. SOLOW, “International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. 
Courts”, Yale Journal of International Law 2012, p. 51 ff., p. 53 (“the Court reasoned that the treaties granting 
jurisdiction to the ICJ were non-self-executing and thus not enforceable unless implemented into law by 
Congress. They were, in other words, among those treaties the legislature must execute. Congress, of course, had 
not passed implementing legislation – probably because nearly everyone had long assumed that the treaties at 
issue were legally binding, making implementing legislation unnecessary”). 
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Similar considerations lead to reject the view according to which the determinant factor in the 
assessment of direct applicability should be the unilateral intent of (any) state authorities, 
thereby including the Executive, in that one of the main goals of automatic standing 
incorporation of international law is precisely to constrain executive action.145 
With this in mind, while it is clear that limitations on direct application mandated by law – 
like in the case of Section 102 of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act – are wholly admissible 
in terms of national constitutional setting, some doubts may arise with regard to non-self-
execution declarations. It should be noted, in particular, that their approval can be triggered 
by a minority of the US Senate,146 that the Executive has played, in practice, a decisive role in 
their drafting and approval,147 and that, in any event, they may often be hardly justified by the 
substantive content of the treaty provisions at issue.148 These factors sit uneasily with the 
policy rationale underlying the relevant constitutional mechanisms of international law 
implementation. 
Although it is outside the scope of this work to conclusively determine whether, in light of 
these factors, these declarations are legitimate as a matter of US constitutional law, it is 
nonetheless possible to share the view of those who believe that they should be interpreted in 
a restrictive manner, in order to limit their effects on the ordinary constitutional setting. 
Notably, David Sloss has put forward the view that non-self-execution declarations should be 
interpreted only as limiting the individual enforceability of treaties, not all forms of direct 
application: for example, individuals should be able to invoke human rights treaties 
defensively in the course of criminal proceedings.149 This restrictive interpretation would be 
acceptable not only in cases where prescriptive limitations, which may be included in statutes, 
leave a broader margin for interpretation (a relevant example is the text of the US Military 
Commission Act, which bars invocation of the Geneva Conventions by individuals)150 but, 
more broadly, in all cases where the express intent of the Senate is not to bar in toto the 
domestic effects of international treaties.151 
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A few remarks are needed also on the requirement of publication, when it is established by 
law as a precondition for the domestic operation of international treaties.152 This requirement 
may be used by national authorities as a tool to prevent the direct application of international 
law and, for this reason, can be analyzed in this paragraph. 
In France, for example, treaties must be published before they can affect the rights and duties 
of individuals. This, in practice, gives authority to the executive to decide whether or not a 
treaty should be applied in domestic courts.153 Conferring such an authority to the executive, 
as is obvious, gives rise to particularly alarming consequences in authoritarian contexts. 
Judgment No. 24128/1984 of the Supreme Court of Chile, rendered under Pinochet’s rule, is 
emblematic. On that occasion, the applicant had invoked some provisions of ICCPR, which 
had been ratified by Chile and promulgated by presidential decree. The court, however, held 
the Covenant non judicially enforceable because it had not been formally published.154 
As a matter of fact, the rationale of the requirement of publication of treaties lies in the 
necessity to “let […] the persons concerned know the rules they must observe”. 155 
Accordingly, the most correct way to construe this limitation on the operation of international 
law is that unpublished treaties should not be invokable to the detriment of individuals, but 
may well have the effect to constrain the actions of public authorities. Consistently with this 
rationale, for example, the Russian Constitutional Court ruled that the direct application of 
provisional treaties impinging on human rights without prior publication was contrary to the 
constitutional principle of legal certainty.156 This approach has also been adopted by the 
Dutch courts. Art. 93 of the Constitution of the Netherlands says that only published treaties 
may have direct application; however, courts have held that treaties have nonetheless binding 
effect on state organs, which must comply with them even though they have not been 
published.157 
 
4.4. Limitations on direct applicability based on the content of the international norms. 
The third and last category of limitations on direct application groups the restrictions which 
derive from the substantive content of international law. Unlike the two cases analyzed above, 
these limitations are exclusively judicial constructs. For example, national courts in a great 
many jurisdictions refuse to apply international law which they deem too vague, 
undetermined or incomplete, or which they consider as exclusively directed at regulating 
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relations between states. The broadness of these criteria and their inconsistent application in 
case law raise particularly intricate issues. 
 
4.4.1. An interpretive process governed by domestic law. 
To start off, a clarification is necessary. Because these limitations are grounded in the content 
of the international norms, they might seem to contradict the view that direct application is 
fundamentally a matter of domestic law: it has been argued, for example, that “standing and 
completeness […] are questions of international and national law” and that “the question of 
whether an international obligation does accord a right, or is complete, is a matter of treaty 
interpretation”.158 This opinion cannot be fully shared. Indeed, the interpretive process by 
which national courts assess whether an international norm can be directly applied or further 
legislative measures are required is inherently different from what is usually referred to as 
treaty interpretation. As pointed out by Enzo Cannizzaro, “[t]he identification of the self-
executing character of a treaty provision is not aimed at determining the international 
obligations flowing from it, but rather the effect which this provision is likely to produce in 
the municipal legal order, in the absence of implementing legislation. This, in turn, depends 
on a number of factors which can vary considerably in the municipal legal order of different 
States”.159 
It should be noted that this opinion does not second the view according to which national 
courts should interpret international law in the same way as domestic legislation.160 To the 
contrary, it is compatible with the view that the ascertainment of the content of international 
obligations should be performed through international law’s own canons of interpretation, and 
particularly through Arts. 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.161 In the 
assessment of the specific issue of direct applicability, however, the canons of interpretation 
of international law would usually lead to inconclusive outcomes because of the neutrality of 
international law on that point. 
To be more explicit, a national court might resort to international law’s own canons of 
interpretation to establish, for example, that a treaty obliges the state to behave in a certain 
                                                
158 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effect”, cit., p. 192. 
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NOLLKAEMPER, “Grounds for the Application of International Rules of Interpretation in National Courts”, in 
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way vis-à-vis its own nationals, i.e. grants them a right under international law. Still, this 
assessment would not provide the national court with conclusive indications as to the direct 
applicability of that international norm in national law, and this for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, international law does not require courts to directly apply a treaty establishing 
obligations of states toward individuals. Secondly, for that matter, it also does not prohibit 
them from drawing individually enforceable legal rules from norms regulating inter-state 
horizontal relations (i.e. which do not create individual rights in the international legal order), 
just as much as it does not prohibit the application of vague or uncertain international norms. 
If international law does not furnish conclusive indications on these point, one can only 
conclude, again, that these matters are governed by factors and principles set forth in domestic 
law. 
In line with the above, the following pages attempt to further demonstrate that, although 
domestic courts, in their reasonings, anchor limitations on direct application to the content of 
the norm to apply, the standards they elaborate are by and large reflections of purely domestic 
concerns. As a rule of thumb, courts tend to consider as non directly applicable those 
international norms from which the derivation of justiciable rights would require a higher 
degree of judicial creativity. If that is the case, then the decisive factor again seems to be the 
domestic separation of powers.162 
Such boundaries, however, vary greatly between different legal systems. For this reason, the 
present analysis cannot aim to provide rules universally valid in all legal systems.  Instead, it 
will attempt to sketch out some general guidelines with regard to three individual standards 
often referred to by national courts to deny direct application: (i) incompleteness of the norm 
or equivalent standards, such as imprecision, vagueness, and the like; (ii) inter-state character 
of the international norm; and (iii) norms conferring rights or faculties to states. 
 
4.4.2. International norms considered incomplete or vague. 
The requirement of completeness is by far the criterion most widely referred to by national 
courts in the assessment of direct applicability.163 In the aforementioned Polo Castro case, for 
example, the Italian Court of Cassation held that the provisions of the ECHR were directly 
applicable if they contained “the model of a national act complete in its essential elements”. 
In that particular case, Art. 5(4) ECHR was considered complete enough to sustain direct 
application.164 
The popularity of this standard is not surprising, completeness being a catch-all term that 
courts can dish out in all sorts of circumstances. At close scrutiny, its exact meaning is 
unclear. National courts, for example, have sometimes considered “incomplete” international 
norms which are undoubtedly “complete” in their own nature, such as, for example, norms 
purportedly not conferring rights upon individuals, or norms not laying down obligations but 
                                                
162 A. VON BOGDANDY, cit., p. 403: “[m]any authors argue that direct effect hinges largely on the 
determinedness of the international provision in question. This understanding is not convincing […] [T]he 
approach does not do justice to the coupling role and the constitutional function of the doctrine of direct effect”. 
163 As noted by D. SHELTON, “Introduction”, cit., p. 12, completeness is usually the decisive criterion. 
164 Pursuant to Art. 5(4), “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release 
ordered if the detention is not lawful”. 
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only providing authority.165 These two cases will be addressed individually below. Here, the 
focus will be on norms which might be deemed “incomplete” according to an (arguably) more 
proper understanding of the term, i.e. norms establishing broad principles and general 
standards. 
As a matter of principle, there seems to be no reason why national courts should not be able to 
draw legal effects from vague or programmatic norms of international law, when considering 
that they routinely do so with broad principles and standards set forth by domestic law.166 US 
courts, for example, have shown reluctance in applying principles enshrined in international 
intruments, but they have not had any difficulty in fashioning the content of broad 
constitutional clauses, such as those referring to due process, equal protection or 
uncompensated takings.167 
Of course, deriving manageble rules of decision from broad and general principles entails a 
degree of judicial discretion,168 and may require to construe the international norm in 
connection with other norms of the domestic legal order which provide for individual 
enforceability.169 Each legal system determines how much judicial discretion is admissible 
according to its own understanding of the separation of powers:170 the same standards, 
however, should be applied to international and national norms. 
In this regard, considering that vagueness and determinedness are more a matter of degree 
than precise legal yardsticks,171 it would be advisable for the courts to adopt a case-by-case 
approach, having regard not just to the content of the norm to apply but also to the domestic 
law context in which it must be applied.172 For example, it may be assumed that the courts 
require higher standards of precision to sustain a positive application of international law, i.e. 
when a private party enforces international norms against public authorities, because in such 
situations separation of power concerns would be particularly intense;173 but the standards 
should logically be more lax when a private party is resisting against government action, or in 
a criminal case when international law is invoked in favor of the accused.174 
 
4.4.3. International norms having an inter-state character. 
Let us now turn to the second category, i.e. the purported non direct applicability of 
international norms having an inter-state character. As argued above, the idea that the 
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provisions of international law only regulate relations between states is fundamentally flawed, 
but contemporary international law certainly does include also this type of norms: take, for 
example, the prohibition of the use of armed force.175 Based on this distinction, Lea Brilmayer 
has proposed as a possible solution to the conundrums of self-execution that individuals 
should have a right of action before national courts only in case of “vertical” international law 
norms, i.e. norms granting rights to individuals vis-à-vis a state.176 
Still, this criterion is far from definitive. On the one hand, it is certainly true that a norm of 
international law deemed to grant a right to an individual on the international plane (a 
“vertical” norm, so to say) is most likely to be applied by a national court.177 The reason lies 
in the fact that the structure of this norm – in case of a treaty provision, its wording – is likely 
to closely resemble the structure of domestic norms. For this reason, the derivation of 
domestic individual rights from such norms should not create pervasive issues of separation 
of powers, because their application is rightly perceived to be within the full domain of the 
judiciary’s functions. This is evident from the words of Brilmayer herself: “[c]ourts should be 
less reluctant to adjudicate vertical international cases because these cases are more consistent 
with traditional conceptions of judicial protection of individual rights”.178 
On the other hand, the inter-state character of the norm on the international plane does not 
necessarily prevent direct applicability before national courts. Notwithstanding the non-
existence of an individual right to peace in international law, it is perfectly conceivable for a 
national judge to construe this norm so as to draw a private cause of action in national law; 
for this purpose, also this kind of international norms may be construed in connection with 
other norms of the domestic legal order which provide for individual enforceability. The 
contruction of meaningful judicial standards to the benefit of individuals falls squarely within 
the domain of national judiciaries.179 The Institut de droit international’s 1993 Final Report 
on the Activities of National Judges and the International Relations of their State explicitly 
seconds this view, by noting that “one can reasonably propose that the courts have the power 
to decide on compensation for damages caused to private persons as a consequence of a war 
or of a use of force contrary to international law”.180 
Of course, speaking hypothetically, there is an upper limit beyond which national courts 
cannot derive any standard applicable to or invocable by individuals. This limit, however, 
does not depend on whether individuals are granted a right under international law, but on 
whether individuals have an interest in the international norm being properly applied. 
Consequently, domestic legal systems may well craft individually enforceable rights from 
inter-state horizontal international law norms, as long as individuals have a legally 
                                                
175 See D. AMOROSO, “Judicial Abdication”, cit., p. 126-127. B. CONFORTI, International Law, cit., p. 28-
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176 L. BRILMAYER, “International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal”, Yale Law Journal 1990-
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177 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 136. 
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179 “Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State Governments” (Note), cit., p. 
1280. 
180 For the Final Report, see Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international 1994, vol. 65(II), p. 437 ff. 
 101 
meaningful interest.181 The examples provided in the next sub-paragraph, concerning the 
(inter-state) international norm on diplomatic protection, can help clarify this point.  
Putting theory into practice, this process requires an amount of judicial discretion which may 
or may not be considered acceptable. Whether the derivation of such standards can be 
performed by the courts or is a matter for the legislature depends, again, on the contours of 
the principle of separation of powers in a specific legal system. 
Going back to the example of the prohibition of the use of armed force, the general tendency 
in domestic case law appears to be in the direction of denying the individual enforceability of 
this norm.182 For example, in the 2004 case Association of Lawyers for Peace v. Netherlands, 
the Dutch Supreme Court held that individuals could not invoke the international norm 
prohibiting the use of armed force to challenge the Dutch government’s support for the US 
military intervention in Afghanistan. 183  Notably, however, the German Federal 
Administrative Court allowed for a defensive invocation of the same rule in the Attorney of 
the Federal Armed Forces v. Pfaff case. On that occasion, a member of the armed forces had 
been convicted for refusal to obey an order. The court held that the soldier’s refusal was 
justified for reasons of freedom of conscience given his fear that his actions could contribute 
to further Germany’s involvement in the Iraq war, which was held to be in violation of 
international law.184 
 
4.4.4. International norms conferring rights or faculties to states. 
The third and last category to examine is that of norms which do not establish any obligations 
upon states but instead grant them rights or faculties. This category of norms is commonly 
considered to be non directly applicable.185 The reason lies once again in the domestic 
separation of powers, which may pose unavoidable limitations to the direct applicability of 
these rules.186 
An example would be the two options which the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) confers on states as for the drawing of the territorial sea baselines. Art. 5 provides 
that the low-water line is the normal baseline, but Art. 7 (following the 1951 ICJ ruling in the 
Fisheries Case) also allows states to draw straight baselines provided that the coast has the 
required features.187 Pursuant to Art. 3 UNCLOS, “[e]very State has the right to establish the 
breadth of its territorial sea […] measured from baselines determined in accordance with this 
                                                
181 Not every international norm which concerns individuals should be regarded as granting them a right. 
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Convention”. It can be argued that the intrinsic nature of national courts, which rule on 
concrete cases, would make them not institutionally suited to exercise the definitive choice 
under Art. 3. Normally, then, this choice will be exercised by the executive – although, 
incidentally, an intervention by a supreme or constitutional court with the power to render 
pronouncements with erga omnes effects cannot be hypothetically ruled out. 
Also in this case, however, the content of the international norms does not necessitate to 
exclude in toto every form of direct applicability. Indeed, these norms can be construed by 
domestic courts in a way that allows the derivation of certain individual rights. Relevant 
examples can be found in the field of diplomatic protection. Although international law 
provides for no individual right to diplomatic protection from one’s state of nationality,188 this 
does not rule out that the government’s refusal to intervene may be subject to judicial review 
before national courts. This point was explicitly discussed by the ICJ in a passage of 
Barcelona Traction which deserves to be quoted in full: “within the limits prescribed by 
international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to 
whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural 
or legal persons on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately 
protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is to resort to municipal 
law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. The 
municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and 
may also confer upon the national a right to demand the performance of that obligation, and 
clothe the right with corresponding sanctions. However, all these questions remain within the 
province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally”.189 
Clearly, then, the interstate character of diplomatic protection in the international legal order 
does not prevent domestic law from fashioning this norm in the form of a justiciable right. 
Domestic separation of powers, in turn, governs whether national courts may have the 
authority to construe such a right by interpretive means, often in combination with other 
norms of the national legal order, or, to the contrary, whether this right can only be created by 
means of a specific intervention by the national legislature. In several countries, national 
courts have proved rather assertive in reviewing governmental refusals to exercise diplomatic 
protection, but – in lack of legislation on this point – have generally confined themselves to 
perform a purely procedural review of the exercise of executive discretion.190 
The Abbasi case before the Court of Appeal of England and Wales provides a prominent 
example.191 One of the issues was whether the British government had an obligation to 
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of Abbasi, a UK national detained by US authorities 
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in Guantanamo. On the one hand, the court correctly dismissed the claimants’ contention that 
the UK was under an international customary obligation to exercise diplomatic protection. On 
the other hand, however, the court found that the claimant had a right to have his petition for 
diplomatic assistance properly taken into account by the Foreign Office, and dismissed the 
claim because it found that the government had in fact given due consideration to Abbasi’s 
request. This case clearly shows how a court can blend international norms with domestic 
norms so to craft judicially manageable standards:192 the Court of Appeal, in particular, 
created a norm suitable for direct application by referring to the English administrative law 
doctrine of legitimate expectations (which, incidentally, had not been invoked by the 
claimants). No doubt, this exercise of judicial creativity left separation of powers unharmed 
by reason of the purely procedural nature of the review. 
Italian courts, by contrast, have generally taken a different approach and have never explicitly 
held that the international norms on diplomatic protection may give rise – in combination 
with domestic legislation and, particularly, with administrative law – to directly applicable 
standards of review of executive action. Nonetheless, they have sometimes reached similar 
outcomes in practice. The traditional position was reaffirmed by the Council of State in the 
2009 Il Mio Viaggio judgment, which arose from an Italian shipping company’s claim that the 
Italian government was obliged to exercise diplomatic protection on its behalf.193 Notably, 
however, in the final appeal phase, the Court of Cassation reversed the administrative court’s 
decision and held that the company had in fact a legitimate interest in governmental action. 
The Court reached this conclusion by considering the issue only as a matter of domestic law 
and by (mistakenly) holding that such a governmental intervention would not have constituted 
an exercise of diplomatic protection on the international plane.194 
 
4.5. Concluding assessment: direct application and protection of the prerogatives of the 
political branches. 
By way of conclusion of the present discussion, it is opportune to note that, given its 
intertwinement with considerations related to the separation of powers, the assessment of 
direct applicability has been construed by some commentators and courts as essentially 
discretional in nature, insofar as it is based on political considerations.195 The idea that the 
assessment of direct applicability would have an inherently political character has surfaced in 
the views expressed by authoritative commentators. In blunt terms, Andre Nollkaemper has 
written that “the concept of direct effect shifts [political decisions to moderate the influence of 
international law in national legal orders] from the political branches to the court. Hence, the 
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practice of direct effect of international law exposes the political function of domestic courts 
at the intersection of legal orders”.196 
Whether or not one subscribes to this view may have significant implications as regards the 
method of assessment of direct applicability. The more the courts’ function in the field of 
international law application is conceived as political, the less it appears to be governed by 
clear legal yardsticks. For this reason, this view, in its most extreme form, lends itself to a 
distrust of the role of judges in crafting a legally sound doctrine of direct applicability, 
because most choices in this field would be legal in form but discretionary in substance. If 
one believes that no truly legal standards govern the matter, it would seem legitimate to 
suggest that, as a rule, courts should abstain from getting involved in the application of 
international law. Paul de Visscher (who, it should be noted, believed that the intent of the 
parties governed the issue of direct application of treaties) argued that “engager le juge à 
renverser la présomption [i.e. the background presumption against direct applicability] et à 
consacrer le principe de l'applicabilité directe des traités dans les rapports internes, c’est […] 
risquer un conflit interne entre le pouvoir judiciaire et le pouvoir législatif”.197 
This view helps illuminate some distinctive features of the US practice concerning non-self-
execution, which has been analyzed in detail in the previous paragraphs. A quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of judicial decisions has proven that the doctrine of self-execution is used 
by courts as a tool not to get engaged in political conflict with the executive and the 
legislative branches. Indeed, in practice, limitations on the direct applicability of international 
law or on its individual enforceability have regularly been used by courts to “shield 
government actors from judicial review of government compliance” with international law.198 
Moreover, regardless of the multitude of legal criteria invoked by US courts to deny direct 
application (i.e. the intent of the parties or the vagueness of the norm), it has been maintained 
that ultimately what seems to matter the most to the courts is the unilateral intent of the US as 
expressed by the political branches.199 
It appears, however, that a different approach to the nature of direct application is preferable. 
As a matter of fact, the courts’ assessment in this field is governed by legal rules, and should 
consequently be conceived first and foremost as a legal problem. More specifically, it is a non 
sequitur to equate considerations of separation of powers to political considerations. The 
separation of powers is not a hazy prudentialist principle which can be invoked at will to 
disentangle the functions of the judiciary and the political branches. To the contrary, it is a 
legal principle which informs the whole constitutional setting, including the legislative 
process and the reception of international norms, and which is implicitly embedded in the 
constitutional and legislative processes which grant domestic validity to international norms. 
Hence, in order not to meddle in the domestic separation of powers, courts should confine 
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themselves to comply with the constitutional setting and to apply international norms in 
accordance with their status in the domestic legal order. 
In this perspective, it should be kept in mind that the incorporation of international law in 
domestic law by whatever means – be it by constitutional standing incorporation or by ad hoc 
statutory provisions – is the result of a choice by the constitutional drafters or the legislature. 
Hence, broadly speaking, to the extent national courts apply incorporated international law 
qua law, they are executing, not making, a political choice. By putting the brakes on the 
effects of international law which is domestically valid, national judges might aim to protect 
the political branches’ prerogatives and the proper lawmaking process, but they might 
actually end up avoiding the constitutional setting and the proper process of lawmaking 
themselves.200 
Of course, to say that, when they apply international law having domestic legal force, courts 
do not make any political choice does not mean that the judicial application of international 
law does not pursue policy goals. Ultimately, it has the policy function of ensuring that a state 
complies with its international law obligations. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, this 
is the rationale of the choice to grant domestic validity to international law from the outset. In 
giving effect to the formal incorporation of international law, it is in no way surprising that 
direct applicability also effectuates its underlying policy goals. 
In conclusion, this supports the view that national courts should limit to a minimum the 
instances in which the presumption of direct applicability of incorporated international norms 
is reversed by reasons of separation of powers, and in any event they should reach such a 
conclusion by resorting to the same criteria which would limit the judicial applicability of 
domestic norms. Specifically, the goal of protecting the separation of powers is ingrained in 
the constitutional and prescriptive limitations on direct applicability of international law 
which have been described in the previous section of this chapter. Outside of these relevant 
but exceptional cases, limitations on direct applicability would seem to be an improper means 
to pursue the safeguard of the prerogatives of the political branches. 
Other judicial doctrines should be used to these ends. The prerogatives of the legislature, in 
particular, should be protected by national judges by resorting to the ordinary rules of legal 
interpretation as for the derivation of individual rights and applicable standards. As for the 
powers of the executive, they should be safeguarded through a balanced consideration of 
governmental discretionary powers,201 which should lead courts to limit their review to an 
assessment of the reasonableness and proportionality of government measures when 
appropriate circumstances occur, irrespective of whether the norm to apply originates in 
international law or domestic law.202 
 
 
5. Direct applicability of international law and judicial abstention in foreign affairs. 
 
                                                
200 “Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State Governments” (Note), cit., p. 
1285. 
201 B. CONFORTI, International Law, cit., p. 17 (noting that some international prerogatives of the executive 
branch lie outside judicial scrutiny, such as the agrément of foreign diplomats). 
202 See generally E. BENVENISTI, “United”, cit. (analyzing different degrees of review of executive action 
as alternatives to refusals of direct application or invocation of political question). 
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A problematic point which needs to be clarified is the one concerning the interaction between 
direct applicability of international law and the set of judicial constructs commonly referred to 
as non-justiciability or abstention doctrines.203  
From an initial impression, there would appear to be remarkable coicidences between these 
two legal phenomena. Firstly, as has long been acknowledged in legal doctrine, the theories 
favoring judicial abstentionism, in so far as they are applied in the realm of foreign affairs, 
may have the practical effect to impair the application of international law vis-à-vis state 
authorities.204 Secondly, judicial abstention doctrines are generally based on the courts’ 
interest in preserving the prerogatives of the national political authorities; but, as has been 
proved in the previous section, also the limitations on direct applicability of incorporated 
international norms can be traced back to this rationale. The question then arises as to the 
relationship between direct applicability and judicial abstentionism in foreign affairs, and in 
particular as to whether the considerations previously expressed with reference to the former 
can also apply to the latter, in whole or in part. 
Doctrines favoring judicial abdication in foreign affairs are applied by courts both in common 
law and in civil law countries. In the US legal system, but also in the UK, they are generally 
labeled as “political question doctrine”, while in countries of civil law a different terminology 
is adopted (e.g. atto politico, in Italian, or acte de gouvernement, in French).205 Whatever the 
terminology, judicial abstentionism derives from the idea that certain choices and decisions 
should pertain to the political branches only, and not to the courts.206 In the Markovic case, for 
example, the Italian Court of Cassation held that the Italian courts had no jurisdiction over a 
claim for compensation brought against Italy by Serbian nationals whose relatives had been 
killed or injured in the 1993 NATO bombing of Belgrade. The Court held that the conduct of 
hostilities by the executive branch constituted a political question and was thus outstide the 
reach of judicial review.207 As for the US legal system, the classic definition of political 
question was formulated – in rather broad and all-encompassing terms – by the Supreme 
Court in Baker v. Carr.208 
                                                
203 The terminology is not always used consistently. For a survey of divergent usages of the terms, and 
particularly of the concept of non-justiciability, see D. AMOROSO, “Judicial Abdication”, cit., p. 102-103 (noting 
that, although “the notion of ‘non-justiciability’ is generally viewed as all-encompassing” in common law 
countries, it would be more appropriate to limit it to cases where judges abstain by reason of an alleged 
“technical impossibility to resolve a case”). 
204 B. CONFORTI, International Law, cit., p. 13-17. In passing, it should also be recalled that comparable 
effects may be achieved, as regards the judicial review of acts of foreign states, by means of the “act of state” 
doctrine, notably applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US 398 
(1963), p. 423. This doctrine lies outside the scope of this chapter, which focuses on the judicial curbs on the 
authorities of the state of the forum. According to the classic definition of the act of state doctrine, “[e]very 
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country 
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory”: see Underhill v. 
Hernandez, 168 US 250 (1897). For a general overview of the act of state doctrine, see ex multis J.W. 
DELLAPENNA, “Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine”, Villanova Law Review 1990, p. 1 ff. 
205 J. CRAWFORD, Brownlie’s, cit., p. 83-87 and 103-110. 
206 L. HENKIN, “Is There a ‘Political Question’ Doctrine?”, Yale Law Journal 1976, p. 597 ff., p. 597. 
207 Presidency of the Council of Ministers v. Markovic and ors., Order No. 8157 of 8 February 2002, ILDC 
293 (IT 2002). 
208 Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962). In the court’s words: “Prominent on the surface of any case held to 
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion; 
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The observation that the doctrine of non-justiciability may lead to the same practical 
outcomes as the denial of direct application, i.e. to the non-application of international law to 
governmental action, has led some scholars to conflate the two categories outright. Quincy 
Wright, for example, once held that “the doctrine of self-executing treaties in American 
constitutional law is an aspect of the doctrine of ‘political questions’”.209 It should be 
underscored, however, that the two doctrines differ on several levels. 
Firstly, the doctrine of direct applicability (or self-execution) has its roots in the fact that the 
norm to apply originates in the international legal order, and thus only applies to international 
norms. Conversely, resort to abstention doctrines does not depend on the nature or content of 
the norm to apply but on the party against which the norm should be applied, i.e. the 
government, so that – as it was once commonly the case – also governmental acts relating to 
the handling of purely domestic matters may be held non-justiciable. Admittedly, this 
difference between the two doctrines has been partially made up because of the shrinking of 
the contours of non-justiciability, at least in contexts where domestic rule of law is 
guaranteed:210 today, they are commonly invoked exclusively with reference to the executive 
handling of foreign affairs.211 Still, also in this case non-justiciability does not necessarily 
influence the application of international law. Frequently, it may impinge on the application 
of domestic law to foreign affairs. For example, in Lowry v. Reagan, where a US court 
applied the political question doctrine, the issue was whether the President’s conduct of 
hostilities abroad conformed with a domestic act, the 1973 War Powers Resolution.212 These 
cases, as such, do not fall within the scope of this work. 
Secondly, the application of the two doctrines produces different outcomes. While the 
exemption of political power from judicial review makes claims against the government fail 
on procedural grounds, the issue of direct application usually relates to the law to apply to the 
merits of the claim. If the international norm is considered not to be individually enforceable, 
the claim may also fail on procedural grounds because of the plaintiff’s lack of standing or of 
cause of action; however, also this outcome is different from a non-justiciability argument, 
where the plaintiff may well have standing and the claim is rejected because of the identity of 
the defendant. 
In sum, a court may deny to adjudicate a claim which it deems non-justiciable, even if said 
claim is based on a norm which is deemed both directly applicable and individually 
                                                                                                                                                   
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments 
on one question”. 
209 Q. WRIGHT, “National Courts and Human Rights – The Fujii Case”, American Journal of International 
Law 1951, p. 62 ff., p. 64. 
210 “Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State Governments” (Note), cit., p. 
1284 (differentiating the domestic and the foreign aspects of the political question doctrine). 
211 C.M. VÁZQUEZ, “The Four”, cit., p. 717; D. AMOROSO, “Judicial Abdication”, cit., p. 100 (arguing that 
“[a]lthough the affirmation of the (national) rule of law principle has gradually eroded the scope of these 
doctrines with regard to purely domestic issues, they are still consistently applied in the fields of defence and 
foreign affairs, with the result that the notion of “political” in fact overlaps with that of ‘international’”). 
212 U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.Supp. 333 (1987). For other cases of 
invocation of the political question without impinging on the application of international law, see M.J. 
GLENNON, “Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine”, American Journal of International Law 1989, 
p. 814 ff.; F.A. MANN, Foreign Affairs in English Courts, Oxford, 1986, particularly p. 67 ff. 
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enforceable. Clearly, it cannot be denied that the two doctrines operate on profoundly 
different levels. 
The analysis, however, may yield partially different outcomes moving into the level of 
underlying policy rationales. The policy bases of judicial abstention in foreign affairs have 
been convincingly assessed in legal doctrine. In particular, it has been demonstrated that they 
may be grouped in three categories, according to whether a court abstains by reason, first, of a 
perceived lack of jurisdiction attributable to the constitutional setting; second, of a lack of 
adequate applicable standards; and third, of a prudential self-limitation based on reasons of 
opportunity.213 A closer look at these rationales may clarify to what extent the doctrines of 
non-justiciability and of direct applicability substantially – although not formally – overlap. 
To start off, the coincidence stands out in cases where courts decline jurisdiction because they 
hold that international law provisions are vague or indeterminate and thus cannot give rise to 
any manageable legal standard.214 The reasons of separation of powers driving judicial 
abstentionism in such cases relate to the protection of the legislature’s law-making functions. 
This ground of non-justiciability is functionally equivalent to denials of direct applicability of 
international norms deemed vague or incomplete. As a matter of fact, in these cases US courts 
have resorted indifferently to either the doctrine of self-executing treaties or the political 
question doctrine, reaching identical outcomes.215 This judicial practice, then, can be subject 
to criticism identical to the one previously addressed to the alleged non applicability of vague 
or incomplete international norms. One may only add that, if a matter really turns out not to 
be regulated by any legal standard, be it international or domestic, it seems more correct for a 
court to reject the claim against the government on the merits. 
The connection between the two doctrines is less evident in cases whereby a national court 
perceives to lack jurisdiction to review governmental action by reason of an express or 
implied constitutional limitation.216 Such was the case, for example, of the aforementioned 
Markovic case, where the Cassation held the conduct of hostilities to be “the manifestation of 
a political function with regard to which the Constitution requires attribution to a 
constitutional body”. 
In these cases, non-justiciability is a by-product of the extent of judicial review of executive 
action, which is a matter for each legal system to determine. For these reasons, the analysis of 
these limitations is first and foremost a matter of domestic constitutionalism, which falls 
outside the scope of the present work. Indeed, in principle, a constitutional exclusion of any 
form of judicial checks on governmental acts relating to foreign affairs (or, for that matter, on 
governmental acts tout court) cannot be ruled out, and it is in fact a rare but not unknown 
occurrence.217 It is here sufficient to remark, however, that (where no express constitutional 
                                                
213 D. AMOROSO, “Judicial Abdication”, cit. See also D. AMOROSO, “A Fresh Look at the Issue of Non-
justiciability of Defence and Foreign Affairs”, Leiden Journal of International Law 2010, p. 933 ff. 
214 D. AMOROSO, “Judicial Abdication”, cit., p. 114-119. 
215 “Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State Governments” (Note), cit., p. 
1276; T. BUERGENTHAL, cit., p. 380 (arguing that in Foster and Fujii “the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties 
serves the same purpose as the ‘political question’ doctrine”). 
216 D. AMOROSO, “Judicial Abdication”, cit., p. 103-109. 
217 See Art. 19(3) of the Hong Kong Basic Law: “The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs. The courts of the Region 
shall obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive on questions of fact concerning acts of state such as defence 
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provision governs the matter) judicial abstentionism has been persuasively contested also on 
grounds of domestic constitutional law. 218  Generally speaking, the idea that national 
constitutions would entrust all matters relating to foreign affairs exclusively to the political 
branches, and thus that the judiciary should play no role whatsoever in this realm, is far from 
being a truism.219 
Also in this case, as has been argued above in more general terms, the extent of national 
courts’s review of executive action should be based on an appraisal of the ladder of executive 
discretionary powers. Accordingly, while it is obvious that courts cannot conduct foreign 
relations,220 the exercise of judicial functions in the field of foreign affairs should be expected 
to follow the ordinary principles which govern judicial review of governmental acts in a given 
legal system. By way of example, one may again refer to the Markovic case before the Italian 
Court of Cassation. It has been accurately noted, on the one hand, that the Italian Constitution 
undoubtedly entrusts decisions to engage in military operations to the parliament, which also 
confers upon the executive the necessary authority in this field, and that as a consequence 
such political decisions should not be subject to judicial scrutiny. On the other hand, however, 
specific military actions “are not to be considered as political decisions, but rather as 
executive activities undertaken in the implementation of a previous political decision” and 
should thus be amenable to judicial review.221 
As for the third and last type of judicial abstention, i.e. the one grounded on prudential 
reasons, its rationale is usually traced back by the courts to the need to avoid divergent 
pronoucements on the same issue from the judiciary and the executive (the so-called speak 
with one voice principle) and to avoid irredeemable conflicts between the two. It is doubtful, 
however, that judicial abstention constitutes an appropriate means to pursue this legitimate 
policy aim. Firstly, at least in some cases, an authoritative judicial decision may serve 
precisely to put an end to conflicts between different branches of government.222 Secondly, 
these aims had better be pursued through a reasonable coordination between the courts and 
the executive within the realm of the exercise of judicial review, without going so far as 
entailing a decline of jurisdiction. This coordination may assume different forms which vary 
considerably according to the features of each legal system.223 
                                                                                                                                                   
and foreign affairs whenever such questions arise in the adjudication of cases. This certificate shall be binding 
on the courts”. 
218 L. HENKIN, cit., passim. 
219 J.I. CHARNEY, cit., p. 806 (arguing that “[t]raditional separation of powers analysis cannot therefore be 
easily invoked to decide the distribution of foreign affairs authority” and the U.S. Constitution provides “no 
textual basis for excluding, limiting or altering the role of the courts when the cases or controversies they are 
called upon to decide relate to U.S. foreign relations”). 
220 J.I. CHARNEY, cit., p. 807. 
221 M. FRULLI, “When Are States Liable Towards Individuals for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law? 
The Markovic Case”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 2003, p. 406 ff., p. 411-412. 
222 M.J. GLENNON, cit., p. 821. 
223 For some relevant examples, see D. AMOROSO, “Judicial Abdication”, cit., p. 129-132 (naming, inter 
alia, staying the proceedings or delaying the declaration of invalidity of domestic measures implementing 
international law to allow for governmental reconsideration). See also M. KUMM, cit., p. 28-30 (national courts 
should coordinate with the executive when reciprocity and flexibility are at stake). 
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It could be argued that this coordination may also take the form of reasonable deference to the 
executive in matters of interpretation of the law or of ascertainment of relevant facts.224 On 
the one hand, forms of total deference, whereby courts take executive interpretation as final 
and binding, should certainly be avoided, in that they would account for judicial 
abstentionism in disguise. Notably, the French practice to reserve treaty interpretation to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs was found by the European Court of Human Rights to be 
illegitimate, because in violation of the right to access to an independent and impartial 
tribunal.225 
On the other hand, however, it does not seem possible to condemn altogether the practice of 
courts of certain countries to attach presumptive weight to the indications of the executive in 
matters of international law interpretation, as long as courts are not bound to follow executive 
directions.226 The stance usually adopted by US courts is described by the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States in the sense that the judges retain final 
authority on matters of interpretation, but “give great weight to an interpretation made by the 
executive branch”.227 The soundness of this approach’s constitutional foundations are outside 
the scope of this work. Be that as it may, it is sufficient to recall that US courts are free to 
disregard executive interpretation whenever they think appropriate. In BG Group PLC v. 
Argentina and in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, for example, the Supreme Court openly discarded the 
executive’s interpretation of the relevant treaties.228 
                                                
224 The term judicial deference is generally used to describe all situations where national courts, “out of 
respect for the legislature or the executive […] decline to make their own judgment on a particular issue”: see R. 
CLAYTON, “Principles for Judicial Deference”, Judicial Review 2006, p. 109 ff., p. 109. 
225 Beaumartin and ors. v. France, Merits and just satisfaction, App. No. 15287/89, 24 November 1994. 
226 In this sense, see J. ARATO, “Deference to the Executive. The US Debate in Global Perspective”, in H.P. 
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“Conclusion”, in F.G. JACOBS, S. ROBERTS (eds.), The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, London, 1987, p. 273 
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California Law Review 2002, p. 1305 ff. (arguing that courts should take executive interpretation as dispositive 
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interpretation by drawing an analogy with the deference to interpretations by administrative agencies); for a 
critical view of Bradley’s approach to deference, see E. CRIDDLE, “Chevron Deference and Treaty 
Interpretation”, Yale Law Journal 2002-2003, p. 1927 ff. 
227 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, cit., §326(2). 
228 See BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198 (2014), where the Court held, with 
reference to the interpretation of the U.K.-Argentina BIT, that “while we respect the Government’s views about 
the proper interpretation of treaties, […] we have been unable to find any other authority or precedent […]”; 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (calling the government interpretation “erroneous”). For a comment 
on a case of total deference to executive interpretation, see D. WIDEN, “Judicial Deference to Executive Foreign 
Policy Authority”, Chicago-Kent Law Review 1981, p. 345 ff. On the progressive erosion of deference in the 
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, see H.G. COHEN, “The Death of Deference and the Domestication of 
Treaty Law”, Brigham Young University Law Review 2015, p. 1467 ff. For a critical view of Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, favoring total deference to the executive on purported grounds of separation of powers, see J. KU, J. 
YOO, “Hamdan v Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch”, 
Constitutional Commentary 2006, p. 179 ff. 
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As a matter of fact, a cooperation between courts and executives may well help the courts to 
reach more correct results in matters of international law application, considering that the 
courts may lack technical information and expertise to correctly interpret certain international 
instruments. Also in the assessment of the existence of international customary law, courts 
may choose to rely on the executive’s expertise.229 Striking the rightful balance would be a 
matter for judicial determination. 
In conclusion, it appears that there is a partial functional equivalence between (some) cases of 
judicial abstention in foreign affairs and denials of direct applicability. This partial overlap 
does not depend only on the fact that the practical outcome could be the same (i.e. the non-
application of international law to a concrete case) but also on the observation that the two 
doctrines share, to some extent, the same policy foundations. This correlation has been 
captured by those scholars who have collectively described these doctrines as “avoidance 
techniques”, i.e. as judicial means which “relieve national courts of the duty to enforce norms 
of international law in some politically sensitive situations”.230 Hence, it seems legitimate to 
search for common solutions to the underlying policy problems. And to the extent the 
doctrines of judicial abstention do not withstand scrutiny, these solutions should be realized 
through a sound combination of direct applicability of international law and of the ordinary 
domestic principles regulating judicial review of governmental action. 
 
 
6. Direct applicability and international law supremacy in domestic law. 
 
The previous chapter has shown that a great number of national constitutions prioritize 
general international law, international agreements or both sources over domestic acts of 
parliament. These constitutional provisions raise distinctive issues, because they set forth a 
limit on the activities of all political authorities, including the legislature. In order for them to 
be effective, it is not sufficient that international norms are applied qua domestic legislation. 
They also require that some form of control should be exercised over the acts of the 
legislature in order to ensure their consistency with international law. It is necessary, in other 
words, to devise ways to achieve the prevalence of international norms over conflicting 
domestic legislation. 
It goes without saying that this form of control cannot be exercised by any state organ 
possessing legislative powers, because it is precisely the exercise of these powers that needs 
to be restrained. Besides, executives are generally not institutionally suited to exercising 
control over legislatures. Accordingly, domestic courts are the only state organs which may 
be institutionally capable to exercise this form of control over legislation. 
                                                
229 J.I. CHARNEY, cit., p. 809 (courts may prefer to rely on the executive due to its expertise, but the role of 
courts in this field is no different that in other fields of law: courts are equipped to ascertain custom). Note that 
an interesting alternative to compensate for the courts’ lack of expertise is provided by the German so-called 
norm verification procedure, whereby the Constitutional Court has the power to ascertain whether “a rule of 
[general] international law is an integral part of federal law and whether it creates rights and duties for the 
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Municipal Law”, Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1987, p. 238 ff., p. 255. 
230 E. BENVENISTI, “Judicial Misgivings”, cit., p. 169; A. TZANAKOPOULOS, “Final Report. Mapping the 
Engagement of Domestic Courts with International Law”, presented at the International Law Association 
Johannesburg Conference, 2016, p. 9-10. 
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There are essentially two ways in which courts can ensure the conformity of legislation to 
international law: firstly, they can be empowered to perform an abstract review of legislation 
in the form of a constitutionality control; or, secondly, they can prioritize international law on 
a case-by-case basis. The former technique constitutes a subset of direct application lato 
sensu. In this case, depending on the characteristics of a legal system, international law is not 
used by the courts as the governing rule of a case in a strict sense, but as a parameter of an 
abstract review of legislation.231 The latter technique, to the contrary, presupposes that the 
international norm is considered to be directly applicable by national courts in the sense 
described in the previous paragraphs, i.e. as the only or principal rule of decision. The 
international norm, however, must be deemed to possess also an additional feature, i.e. the 
capability to displace inconsistent domestic legislation. 
Because both techniques constitute peculiar forms of direct applicability of international 
norms, the capability of national courts to exercise this type of review may be impaired, 
generally speaking, by the same factors which limit the direct applicability of international 
law. For example, in a context where a constitution is considered more as a political 
manifesto than as an applicable or justiciable legal text, it would obviously be impossible for 
courts to give effect to constitutional provisions prioritizing international law over domestic 
law.232 Furthermore, the lack of independence of the judiciary would most likely also 
prejudice any control of legality of legislation. 
Let us analyze more in detail the former technique, i.e. granting municipal courts with the 
power to strike down legislation inconsistent with international obligations possessing a 
supra-statutory rank in domestic law. The 1931 Spanish Contitution, in placing treaties for the 
first time on a higher footing than domestic legislation, was also the first to provide the 
Constitutional Court with the effective power to invalidate statutes inconsistent with 
international agreements.233 This solution is now adopted in a number of legal systems. Some 
constitutions expressly allow for relevant international law to be used as primary or exclusive 
parameter of review of legislation.234 For example, the 1991 Constitution of Bulgaria declares 
in Art. 149 that the Constitutional Court has the power to verify “the compatibility of 
domestic laws with the universally recognized norms of international law and the 
international treaties to which Bulgaria is a party”. 
Other legal systems, on the other hand, simply resort to the normal mechanism of 
constitutional review of legislation, even if this is not expressly provided for by the 
constitution. This is the case, for example, of Italy. Since judgments 348 and 349 of 2007, the 
                                                
231 Y. IWASAWA, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 187-190 (arguing that abstract review of legislation in 
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SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 55 ff., p. 70-71. 
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Constitutional Court has treated international agreements as parameters of constitutional 
review of legislation, even though treaty provisions are themselves subject to review of 
constitutionality: consequently, domestic legislation which cannot be interpreted consistently 
with the provisions of a treaty should be referred by ordinary judges to the Constitutional 
Court, which has the authority to invalidate it.235 Also general international law, pursuant to 
Art. 10 of the Constitution, can work as a parameter of control of constitutionality. For 
example, in judgment 131/2001, the Constitutional Court quashed a statutory provision which 
did not exempt former citizens who renounced Italian nationality from compulsory military 
service, because it found it to be in violation of customary international law.236 
The boundaries and modalities of this form of review of legislation necessarily depend on 
how the control of constitutionality works in every specific legal system. It is then the task of 
national constitutional or supreme courts to determine the degree of specificity that the 
international norm should have to justify the setting aside of a statute. This evaluation, which 
is chiefly domestic in nature, should nonetheless take account of two competing factors. On 
the one hand, since this form of control is performed by the courts in abstract terms, courts 
may apply international norms even if such norms, by reason of their content, are deemed not 
to confer an individually enforceable right in a specific legal system.237 On the other hand, 
however, the discretionary power of courts would appear to dilate indefinitely if they could 
set aside a statute based on too vaguely worded international  norms. National constitutional 
and supreme courts, being regularly confronted with similar issues when dealing with 
constitutional challenges to legislation, are fully competent to strike an adequate balance 
between these two competing considerations. 
As noted before, however, the prevalence of international law over inconsistent legislation 
can be realized in different forms than the centralized control of constitutionality. The judicial 
practice of several legal systems shows that the courts have devised an array of judicial 
techniques with a view to ensure the prioritization of international law over inconsistent 
legislation in concrete cases, without however invalidating the inconsistent domestic 
provision. This has happened both in countries which do not have a centralized control of 
constitutionality at all and in countries where this kind of control exists but international law 
is not considered amenable to being used as a parameter of constitutional control of 
legislation. 
A prominent example is that of the Netherlands, where Art. 120 of the Constitution 
establishes that courts cannot review the constitutionality of any parliamentary acts. The 
courts, however, in giving application to Art. 94 (which establishes the priority of treaties 
over inconsistent legislation), commonly verify the compatibility of legislation with 
international treaties and, when necessary, prioritize the latter.238  
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A different situation is that occurring in legal systems where the judiciary does not review the 
legitimacy of laws in respect to international law even though, first, the constitution provides 
for the de jure supremacy of international law, and second, there is a judicial organ tasked 
with control of constitutionality of legislation. The cases of France and Russia are revealing. 
The French Conseil constitutionnel, which performs a chiefly preventive constitutionality 
review of legislative acts, has consistently denied to have competence over the control of 
conformity of statutes to treaties (contrôle de conventionnalité).239 Ordinary courts, for their 
part, generally used to hold that allowing earlier treaties to supersede later statutes would have 
amounted to a constitutionality control, which they do not have the power to perform. Under 
these circumstances, the implementation of Art. 55 of the Constitution remained defective 
until the 1980s, as the relationship between treaties and statutes was regulated in practice by 
the later in time rule.240 More recent trends signal that French courts have embraced the task 
to disapply acts of parliament when they conflict with treaty provisions and they have also 
devised other peculiar ways of giving effect to Art. 55 in the field of state liability.241 In the 
Gardedieu case, for example, the Conseil d’Etat awarded compensation for damages caused 
by legislation held in contravention with the European Convention of Human Rights.242 
The situation is somewhat similar as far as the Russian legal system is concerned. The 
Russian Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of all kinds of federal normative 
acts, irrespective of whether they are issued by the Parliament, the President or the 
government.243 The Court also has the power to review the constitutionality of treaties prior to 
their entry into force,244 to regulate conflicts of competence among state powers on the treaty-
making process,245 and – according to a recent judgment of the Constitutional Court – to bar 
the domestic implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights if they are 
deemed to violate the Constitution.246 All this notwithstanding, it does not seem to possess the 
power to verify the conformity of domestic laws with international law.247 This view was 
endorsed by the Constitutional Court in judgment 2531-O of 2014, in which the Court 
                                                
239 See e.g. Conseil constitutionnel, Interruption volontaire de grossesse (conformity to the European 
Convention on Human Rights), DC n° 74–54, 15 January 1975. On this point, see T. BUERGENTHAL, cit., p. 346-
347. 
240 A. PETERS, “The Globalization of State Constitutions”, in J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), cit., p. 
251 ff., p. 264-265; E. BENVENISTI, “Judicial Misgivings”, cit., p. 167 (noting that French courts also refused to 
review the legitimacy of administrative acts with respect to international treaties). 
241 On this evolution, see V. KRONENBERGER, “A New Approach to the Interpretation of the French 
Constitution in Respect to International Conventions: From Hierarchy of Norms to Conflict of Competence”, 
Netherlands International Law Review 2000, p. 323 ff., p. 328-333. 
242 Gardedieu v. France, Cassation Appeal Judgment, ILDC 738 (FR 2007). On the evolution on the 
French case law, see more thoroughly E. DECAUX, cit., p. 223-226. 
243 B.R. TUZMUKHAMEDOV, “International Law in the Russian Constitutional Court”, American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 2000, p. 166 ff., p. 166-167. 
244 I.I. LUKASHUK, cit., p. 154 and 158. For a recent case of prior constitutional revision of treaties see 
Russian Constitutional Court, Members of the State Duma, Final decision, N 17-∏, ILDC 1940 (RU 2012). 
245 B.R. TUZMUKHAMEDOV, cit., p. 168. 
246 A. CALIGIURI, “La recente giurisprudenza costituzionale russa sui rapporti tra Convenzione europea dei 
diritti umani e ordinamento interno”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 2016, p. 703 ff., commenting on the 
judgment On resolving the matter of the possibility of implementing the Judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights of 4 July 2013 in the Anchugov and Gladkov v Russian Federation case in accordance with the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation, Constitutional proceedings, No 12-P, ILDC 2590 (RU 2016). 
247 I.I. LUKASHUK, cit., p. 157. 
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contended in general terms that it was not within its competences to assess whether a statute 
conflicted with international treaties.248 
Admittedly, there have been cases in Russia in which a national law was struck down because 
it was held in violation of the Constitution and international law;249 however, in these cases 
international law was cited alongside constitutional provisions for interpretive purposes or 
merely in support of findings which were entirely based on domestic law. These cases of 
consistent interpretation should not be conflated with an actual control of legality directly 
based on international law.250 
This brief survey of state practice prompts some more general comments on the status of 
international law in countries where courts do not conduct abstract review of legislation vis-à-
vis international norms which the constitution proclaims supreme. In the cases scrutinized 
above, although the constitutional provisions may appear to confer upon international law a 
hierarchical status superior to domestic legislation, the mechanism of prioritization operates 
in the same way as the principle of speciality.251 Put differently, the constitutional provisions 
on international law supremacy operate in practice as rules of conflict: their actual effect is 
that international norms should be prioritized over inconsistent statutes on an individual case 
basis.252 A domestic law provision remains part of the national legal order even if it clashes 
with international law. 
These two techniques of prioritization of international law over domestic legislation have 
differing policy implications. Prioritizing international law in the concrete case is more 
protective of legislative prerogatives, because inconsistent legislation is not struck down once 
and for all. Instead, it remains theoretically applicable to future cases. To the contrary, the 
former technique, i.e. the constitutional control of legality of legislation based on international 
norms, is much more intrusive in legislative prerogatives, because it can obliterate all 
competences of national legislatures in the subject-matters regulated by supra-statutory 
international norms. 
Which one of the two techniques is preferred in practice and whether they can coexist in 
application largely depends on the features of each national legal system. More specifically, if 
a legal system does not provide for any constitutionality control, the control of legality of 
legislation in light of international law will not be institutionally feasible and the only way to 
prioritize international law will be to empower courts to disapply inconsistent legislation in 
concrete cases. However, in countries where a constitutionality control is in place and can be 
used to ensure the conformity of legislation to international law, the question arises as to 
                                                
248 On the Constitutionality of Part 3 of Article 1244 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, 
Constitutional proceedings, No 2531-O, ILDC 2448 (RU 2014). 
249 G.M. DANILENKO, “International Law in the Russian Legal System”, American Society of International 
Law Proceedings 1997, p. 295 ff., p. 298. 
250 For an analysis of the issues raised by the usage of international law to interpret national constitutions, 
see Chapter 4, Sections 2.3 and 3.3. 
251 See, in the context of Russia, I.I. LUKASHUK, cit., p. 146-147 (arguing that treaties are not superior to 
domestic laws, but have only priority of application in the specific case, and reconnecting this priority not to 
hierarchical supremacy but to the principle of speciality). For a similar view on the legal system of Mexico, see 
D.B. HOLLIS, cit., p. 48 (“Mexican treaties and federal statutes operate as different types of legal instruments that 
cannot abrogate each other; however, in the event they both regulate the same subject, the treaty will prevail as 
the more specific rule”). 
252 B.R. TUZMUKHAMEDOV, cit., p. 170-171. 
 116 
whether the courts can be also empowered to prioritize international norms on a case-by-case 
basis or whether the constitutionality control should be considered the only legitimate means 
to prioritize international law. 
In order to fully understand the policy implications underpinning this choice, it is useful to 
briefly return to the controversies over the domestic legal effects of the ECHR in the Italian 
legal system. As seen above in Section 3.2, the Constitutional Court has directed ordinary 
courts to refer all presumed incompatibilities between primary legislation and international 
treaties, including the ECHR, to the centralized constitutionality control. Most ordinary 
judges have interpreted the dictum of the Constitutional Court in the sense that it would 
prohibit them from applying treaty provisions where such an application requires at the same 
time to disapply an incompatible domestic norm of primary legislation. Generally, courts 
have also refrained from performing any type of direct application of conventional provisions, 
even where such an applicability does not involve the displacement of inconsistent primary 
legislation. It would appear, therefore, that in the Italian legal order the two abovementioned 
techniques of prioritization of international law cannot coexist, and that it is the exclusive task 
of a centralized control of constitutionality to perform the conventionality control of 
legislation and to strike down inconsistent provisions of domestic law. 
Scholars of international law and constitutional law have expressed a variety of views with 
regard to the approach taken by the Constitutional Court. Commentators who have positively 
appraised this approach have underscored that this choice helps preserve the centralized 
control of constitutionality of legislation established by the Italian Constitution. It has been 
contended, in particular, that, because of the material content of the ECHR, most 
constitutional challenges to statutes can also be construed as contrasts between the statutes 
and the ECHR: if the ordinary courts were able to directly apply conventional provisions in 
lieu of inconsistent legislation, most of the incompatibilities between legislation and the 
Constitution would probably be construed in the latter way by the parties and, therefore, 
would never be brought before the Constitutional Court. 253  The view that the direct 
applicability of conventional provisions would produce the disruption of the centralized 
control of constitutionality, however, is not unanimous. Other commentators have maintained 
that considering the Convention direct applicable does not necessarily entail that ordinary 
courts should have the authority to prioritize international law in concrete cases;254 or that the 
two techniques of prioritization can coexist, a centralized control of conventionality being 
necessary only in cases of “systemic conflicts” between national law and international law.255 
In fact, both views have certainly a point. On the one hand, where the content of a treaty 
substantially overlaps with the content of constitutional texts, as is the case with all major 
human rights instruments, the assessment of the consistency between national statutes and the 
treaty may take the form of a de facto control of constitutionality, which entails a skilful 
consideration of the scope of the treaty rights in question and a balance of competing interests 
                                                
253 This is the view expressed by E. LAMARQUE, “Le relazioni tra l’ordinamento nazionale, sovranazionale 
e internazionale nella tutela dei diritti”, Diritto pubblico 2013, p. 727 ff., p. 751. 
254 U. VILLANI, cit. 
255 G. CATALDI, “La natura self-executing delle norme della Convenzione europea dei diritti umani e 
l’applicazione delle sentenze della Corte europea negli ordinamenti nazionali”, in A. CALIGIURI, G. CATALDI, N. 
NAPOLETANO (eds.), La tutela dei diritti umani in Europa: tra sovranità statale e ordinamenti sovranazionali, 
Padova, 2010, p. 565 ff., p. 573. 
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and values. Some doubts might legitimately arise as to the institutional and technical 
capability of ordinary judges to perform such a task. 
On the other hand, however, the argument of the material equivalence between constitutional 
and treaty rights does not appear sufficient to prohibit ordinary courts from applying 
international law in lieu of domestic legislation in all cases. Firstly, the Italian Constitutional 
Court generally referred to all international treaties; however, only a handful of multilateral 
instruments can be deemed to possess a materially constitutional content. Where a treaty does 
not possess these characteristics, there seems to be no good reason to refer all apparent 
contrasts to a centralized constitutionality control. Furthermore, even where – as for the 
ECHR – a treaty has a materially constitutional content, a centralized and a diffused control of 
compatibility of legislation can coexist. In Italian case law, for example, it is generally 
recognized that, notwithstanding the existence of a court tasked with a centralized control of 
constitutionality, the constitutional text can be applied directly by ordinary courts as the 
governing rule of a case in a range of circumstances. For example, courts have applied the 
Constitution as lex posterior in cases of clear conflict with prior legislation; or have resorted 
to constitutional provisions to craft norms directly applicable to cases which were prima facie 
not governed by any primary legislation.256 If the constitutionality control and the direct 
applicability of the Constitution can coexist, there seems to be no reason not to apply the 
same logic also to the prioritization of international law in a national legal system. 
 
 
7. Extra-legal factors impairing direct applicability of international law. 
 
To conclude this survey of national practice in the field of direct applicability of international 
law, one last point should be made concerning some problematic extra-legal factors which 
may impair the application of international law in practice and thus produce a gap between 
the de jure and the de facto status of international law in a domestic legal system. In a number 
of countries, the discrepancy between the position of international law on paper and the 
practice of state organs appears to be so intense that it cannot be sufficiently explained by 
referring to the factors analyzed above in this chapter. More specifically, such limitations on 
the judicial application of international norms certainly do not stem from international law, 
constitutional law, explicit directions by the political authorities, or judicial doctrines. Insofar 
as this is the case, the reasons for such a discrepancy must necessarily lie outside of the realm 
of positive law. 
A cursory analysis of a number of legal systems may suffice to prove this point. Frequently, 
constitutional provisions theoretically incorporating international law may be considered, de 
facto, as a dead letter.257 Examples of this abound. In some Eastern European and Central 
Asian countries, although the Constitution sets forth a mechanism of automatic standing 
incorporation of international law, there is no available judicial practice on the 
                                                
256 See on this point F. MANNELLA, “Giudice comune e Costituzione: il problema dell’applicazione diretta 
del testo costituzionale”, Federalismi.it n. 24/2010. 
257 G.M. DANILENKO, “International Law”, cit., p. 297. 
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implementation of international sources.258 A similar situation applies to several African 
countries whose technique of reception of international law is modeled after Art. 55 of the 
French Constitution: also in these cases, so broad an openness to international law at the 
formal level is not reflected in the practice of state organs.259 In Iran, Art. 9 of the Civil Code 
formally grants domestic validity to international agreements with a rank equal to ordinary 
laws,260 but treaties are not applied in judicial practice.261 
Also in Russia, it would seem that the attitude of ordinary courts towards the application of 
international law does not live up to the expectations raised by Art. 15 of the Constitution.262 
This situation, however, is rather complex and multifaceted, because international law is far 
from absent from the case law of Russian courts. International law, in particular, has been 
widely referred to as a parameter of interpretation of constitutional provisions concerning 
human rights;263 moreover, the arbitrazh (i.e. commercial) courts have developed an extensive 
case law on the application of private international law treaties.264 What seems to be sporadic, 
by contrast, is case law in which international law has been directly invoked by private 
individuals against the actions of public authorities.265 As contended by David Sloss, “the 
available evidence suggests that Russian courts do not regularly apply human rights or 
humanitarian treaties as a constraint on government action”.266 
                                                
258 G.M. DANILENKO, “Implementation”, cit., p. 61. This is the case, for example, of Azerbaijan. Although 
Art. 148(II) of the Constitution provides that “International treaties, to which the Azerbaijan Republic is a party, 
are an inalienable substantive part of the legislative system of Azerbaijan” and Art. 151 establishes treaty 
priority over inconsistent legislation, it appears that the courts of Azerbaijan have never applied international 
law. 
259 See generally M. KILLANDER, H. ADJOLOHOUN, “International Law and Domestic Human Rights 
Litigation in Africa: An Introduction”, in M. KILLANDER (ed.), International Law and Domestic Human Rights 
Litigation in Africa, Pretoria, 2010, p. 3 ff., in particular p. 10 (“African civil law countries have a monist 
constitutional framework but their judicial cultures create dualism in practice”). 
260 R. MOSCHTAGHI, “The Relation between International Law, Islamic Law and Constitutional Law of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran – A Multilayer System of Conflict?”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
2009, p. 375 ff., p. 386-387 (claiming that, pursuant to Art. 9, “Iranian law also provides for the possibility to 
invoke provisions of international treaties before domestic courts”); H. MOVASSAGH, “International Law and 
Domestic Law Project – Country Report: Islamic Republic of Iran”, 2016, available at 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2813006>, paras. B(1) and (2) (arguing that the legal effect of treaties in Iran is not 
limited by the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties, so that “the treaty provisions have the force of law and 
must be implemented by all branches of government”). 
261 See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Replies of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the 
list of issues, 13 January 2017, CRDP/C/IRN/Q/1/Add.1, para. 1 (“According to Article 9 of the Civil Code, the 
treaties which were acceded in accordance with the constitution are considered as domestic law. […] Although 
the judges could invoke provisions of international conventions, they tend to judge according to domestic laws 
[…]. Invoking the provisions of international legal documents is not ordinary yet.”). 
262 G.M. DANILENKO, “International Law”, cit., p. 297 (criticizing a 1994 Council of Europe report arguing 
that the domestic effects of Art. 15 are “more theory than practice”). 
263 On this point see I.I. LUKASHUK, cit., p. 162 (arguing that “for the most part, treaties are being applied 
in cases relating to human rights violations”). This form of indirect application of international law sources had 
better be regarded as a phenomenon detached from the de jure formalization of the status of international law: on 
this point, see Chapter 4, Section 4. 
264 G.M. DANILENKO, “Implementation”, cit., p. 58-59. 
265 D. SLOSS, “Treaty Enforcement”, cit., p. 8 (arguing that “domestic courts in […] Russia routinely apply 
treaties to help resolve transnational disputes between private actors. However, [they] rarely grant judicial 
remedies to private parties who are the victims of treaty violations committed by the host government”). But see 
S.Y. MAROCHKIN, “International Law”, cit., p. 344 (contending that international law application is “a reality in 
the activities of the courts of all levels and of all types”). 
266 D. SLOSS, “Treaty Enforcement”, cit., p. 42, also reporting two Supreme Arbitrazh Court cases in which 
international law was invoked against government action in the field of economic law (specifically, concerning 
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In assessing the reasons behind these circumstances, extra-legal factors should not be 
underestimated. As a matter of fact, to think that the judicial application of international law 
depends exclusively on a country’s legislative framework as combined with carefully crafted 
judicial doctrines would run the risk of being unrealistic and disconnected from the everyday 
practice of national courts. 
Specifically, a country may lack a sophisticated state apparatus capable of effectively 
applying international law.267 In a context of neo-authoritarian tendencies, national courts 
may be (expressly or indirectly) influenced into not applying international law vis-à-vis 
public authorities.268 International law may also not be applied simply because of the lack of 
familiarity of judges and lawyers with it, or because of the national courts’ penchant for 
applying domestic law.269 
The solutions to these problems lie mostly outside the scope of this work. Just by way of 
example, legal systems address these issues by promoting better legal training and 
information,270 by adopting legislation implementing or reproducing international norms 
which would be already part of national law,271 of by empowering supreme courts to guide 
the application of international law by lower courts, sometimes – as in Russia – through the 
issuance of binding directives.272 Most importantly for the subject of this chapter, these 
factors underscore that, in many legal environments, the involvement of national courts with 
international norms – even though these have been incorporated in national law – may depend 
also on some form of approval or support from the other state authorities. It is inconceivable 
that national courts, so to say, could survive alone on an island. Ensuring the effectiveness of 
the status of international law in domestic legal systems requires an effort which pertains to 
the state machinery as a whole.273 
 
 
8. Conclusions. 
 
After the analysis of the formal interactions between international law and national law 
performed in Chapter 2, this chapter has turned its focus to the practice of state organs and, 
                                                                                                                                                   
tax law and customs duties). On these cases, see also W.E. BUTLER, “Russian Federation”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., 
p. 410 ff., p. 422. 
267 A. CASSESE, “Modern Constitutions”, cit., p. 441-442. 
268 D. SLOSS, “Treaty Enforcement”, cit., p. 41 (on Russia); G.M. DANILENKO, “Implementation”, cit., p. 
61. 
269 A.A. ASOUZU, “African States and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Some Key Issues”, Arbitration 
International 1999, p. 1 ff., p. 18-19; S. VASILIEV, A. OGORODOVA, cit., p. 204, ft. 41; E. DE WET, “South 
Africa”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 567 ff., p. 593; G.M. DANILENKO, “Implementation”, cit., p. 69 (referring to 
lack of training and translations); B.R. TUZMUKHAMEDOV, cit., p. 170 (citing as hearsay the case of a U.S. judge 
who refused to apply the ICCPR “because he had never heard of it”); H.H. KOH, “Why the President (Almost) 
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs – Lessons on Iran-Contra Affair”, Yale Law Journal 1988, p. 1255 ff., p. 1315-
1316 (noting the importance of the background and personality of judges). 
270 M. KILLANDER, H. ADJOLOHOUN, cit., p. 18; G.M. DANILENKO, “Implementation”, cit., p. 56 (on 
judges’ professionalism). 
271 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 375-376 (noting that national courts tend to prefer indirect 
rather than direct application of international law). 
272 W.E. BUTLER, cit., p. 415-425. 
273 J. D’ASPREMONT, “The Systemic”, cit., p. 145 (correctly arguing that “[t]he growing place of 
international law in domestic legal orders is thus not solely an accomplishment of domestic judges”). 
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above all, of national courts. In particular, it has analyzed in detail the concept of direct 
applicability of international law, with special emphasis on the issues raised by the judicial 
application of international norms against public authorities. It has tried to systematize the 
techniques elaborated by national courts to give effect to incorporated international norms 
through direct application, as well as the domestic law impediments to this application. 
Some interim conclusions can be inferred. The analysis supports the view that the contours of 
direct application in a given legal system are always explicitly or implicitly influenced by 
considerations relating to the domestic separation of powers. This appears to be true even 
when domestic courts justify their recourse to international law by invoking international 
norms purportedly imposing to apply – or not to apply – international law. As seen in the 
previous pages, there are simply no such norms in the international legal system. International 
law neither imposes nor prohibits its direct application by national courts. Similarly, also the 
content and structure of the international norms do not provide conclusive indications as to 
whether such norms can be directly applied by national judges. One should conclude that, 
when courts purport to rely on international law itself to determine if an international norm is 
directly applicable, what they are in fact doing is to rely – however tacitly, and perhaps even 
unknowingly – on considerations of domestic law. 
To summarize, the extent of the direct applicability of international law by domestic courts is 
shaped by two main factors. 
The first one is the formal status of international law in the national legal system. On the one 
hand, this status is the foundation of the judicial application of international law, because the 
incorporation of international law in domestic law empowers courts to apply international law 
on an equal footing with domestic legal sources. On the other hand, the formal status is also a 
limit: international law cannot be applied as a rule of decision by domestic judges unless it is 
made part of domestic law. Against this backdrop, the direct applicability of international law 
in a national legal system should be neither extensive nor restrictive. Instead, in principle, it 
should simply be expected to be in line with the status that international law has in the 
domestic hierarchy of norms. 
The second factor influencing the assessment of direct applicability of international norms is 
the domestic separation of powers. This relates, in particular, to the role of national courts vis-
à-vis political authorities. Domestic law may bar the application of international norms 
regulating certain areas of law, without some form of authorization from the legislature. Or, 
more generally, courts may be reluctant to directly apply norms setting forth international 
standards that they perceive as vague or incomplete, if they believe that the institutional 
competence to define the content of such norms should belong to the political branches. 
Although these limitations should be interpreted restrictively, as this chapter has argued, they 
cannot be nullified by the courts. National courts always operate within the web of limitations 
set forth by the domestic legal system and cannot be expected to act at variance with their 
institutional position. 
There is, however, one way for national courts to draw domestic effects from international 
norms beyond the limits of their direct applicability and – so to say – to pierce the veil of the 
de jure status of international law in national law. This can happen by relying on international 
sources in the interpretation of domestic law. The practice of using international norms in 
interpretation will be the object of Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Consistent Interpretation of Domestic Law with International Law 
and Constraints on Political Authorities 
 
 
 CONTENT: 1. Introduction. – 2. The techniques of consistent interpretation in the practice of national 
courts. – 2.1. Consistent interpretation of primary legislation with incorporated international law. – 2.2. 
Consistent interpretation of primary legislation with unincorporated international law. – 2.3. Consistent 
interpretation of national constitutions. – 3. Consistent interpretation and the prerogatives of the political 
authorities. – 3.1. Consistent interpretation and legislative intent. – 3.2. Consistent interpretation and textual 
ambiguity. – 3.3. Consistent interpretation and domestic hierarchy of norms. – 4. An assessment: consistent 
interpretation as a policy-based canon of construction. – 4.1. Policy rationale of consistent interpretation. – 4.2. 
Separation of powers function of consistent interpretation. – 5. Conclusions. 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
The analysis performed in the previous chapter does not exhaust all ways in which national 
courts can interact with international norms. Instead of applying international law directly as 
the only, or principal, rule of decision, domestic judges can interpret and apply domestic 
norms in ways which conform to the relevant international obligations. In such cases, 
although it is a norm of domestic law which furnishes the rule of decision, international law 
can play a defining role in informing the substantive content of the relevant domestic norm. 
This usage of international norms in domestic proceedings is commonly referred to as 
consistent interpretation of domestic law with international law. Other expressions, such as 
“presumption of conformity”, “presumption of compatibility”,1 or “indirect application of 
international law”,2 are also commonly used in practice and will be treated as synonyms for 
the purposes of this chapter. 
Consistent interpretation is widely practiced by national courts across jurisdictions. By reason 
of its diffusion, some commentators have considered this technique to be to a great extent 
unproblematic.3 It has also been argued that the interpretive presumption that domestic law 
conforms to international law should be regarded as a general principle of law in the sense of 
Art. 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ.4 These views, however, neglect that the application of 
                                                
1 D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application of Treaties”, in D.B. HOLLIS (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties, 
Oxford, 2012, p. 367 ff., p. 380. 
2 See e.g. D. SLOSS, M. VAN ALSTINE, “International Law in Domestic Courts”, in W. SANDHOLTZ, C.A. 
WHYTOCK (eds.), Research Handbook on the Politics of International Law, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2017, p. 
79 ff. 
3 See for example D. SHELTON, “Introduction”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), International Law and Domestic 
Legal Systems. Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion, Oxford, 2011, p. 1 ff., p. 12 (“[a]s a matter of 
statutory construction, the presumption of conformity between international and domestic law has not proven 
particularly controversial”). 
4 W.N. FERDINANDUSSE, Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts, The Hague, 
2006, p. 147. See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 9: 
The domestic application of the Covenant, 3 December 1998, E/C.12/1998/24, para. 15: “It is generally accepted 
that domestic law should be interpreted as far as possible in a way which conforms to a State’s international 
legal obligations. Thus, when a domestic decision maker is faced with a choice between an interpretation of 
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this principle of interpretation encounters wide disparities between legal systems and that its 
foundations and extent are often a matter of controversy.5 In fact, the “apparent simplicity” of 
this interpretive technique has been very aptly described as “hid[ing] a deep and characteristic 
complexity that goes to the heart of how international law should be applied” in a national 
legal system.6 
Much of the cause of this complexity can ultimately be traced back to the way consistent 
interpretation interacts with and impinges on the prerogatives of the national political 
branches. In a sense, consistent interpretation of domestic legislation may prove more 
problematic than direct application of international law from the viewpoints of democratic 
legitimacy and separation of powers. This could seem counter-intuitive to some extent. After 
all, when it is applied indirectly, international law cannot displace national law and its content 
is filtered through domestic legislation. However, while direct application is always grounded 
on the domestic status of international norms, and is thus bound to comply with their 
domestic validity and hierarchy, consistent interpretation can potentially extend the domestic 
effects of international law beyond the status which is formally granted to it in a national legal 
order. Moreover, the degree to which the meaning of domestic law provisions can be moulded 
to make them conform to international law is also exclusively controlled by the courts. 
Compared to direct application, then, the boundaries of this form of international law 
application are defined much more loosely – if at all – by positive law and seem to 
fundamentally depend on the approach taken by the courts. This setting makes indirect 
application a particularly interesting field to explore for the present research, because legal 
scholarship can play a defining role in guiding and influencing the practice of national judges. 
Against this backdrop, the main goal of this chapter is to develop a theory of consistent 
interpretation which may allow national courts to clearly determine its proper extent, 
boundaries and objectives. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 is chiefly descriptive in nature and 
contains a general overview of the techniques of consistent interpretation. In particular, it 
classifies the relevant case law into three broad categories which raise distinctively different 
issues in practice. Section 3 explores the ways in which the courts’ preoccupation with the 
safeguard of executive or legislative prerogatives impacts (expressly or tacitly) on the extent 
of the interpretive usage of international norms, and identifies a number of relevant problems 
with the approaches taken by the courts. Finally, Section 4 aims to solve these issues by 
attempting a general assessment of the foundations, functions and limits of consistent 
interpretation. 
                                                                                                                                                   
domestic law that would place the state in breach of the Covenant and one that would enable the State to comply 
with the Covenant, international law requires the choice of the latter”. 
5 As noted by A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts and the International Rule of Law, Oxford, 2011, p. 150-
151, the view according to which consistent interpretation constitutes a general principle of law does not find 
adequate support in practice and is, all things considered, rather useless, because courts resorting to consistent 
interpretation never claim to do so out of a sense of (international) legal obligation. 
6 R.G. STEINHARDT, “The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction”, 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1990, p. 1103 ff., p. 1113. See also E. CANNIZZARO, “Interpretazione conforme fra 
tecniche ermeneutiche ed effetti normativi”, in A. BERNARDI (ed.), L'interpretazione conforme al diritto 
dell'Unione europea. Profili e limiti di un vincolo problematico, Naples, 2015, p. 3 ff., p. 3 (“nonostante il 
successo di tale strumento, esso rimane ancora misterioso nel suo fondamento, nel suo contenuto, nel suo ambito 
di applicazione, nella sua natura giuridica”). 
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2. The techniques of consistent interpretation in the practice of national courts. 
 
As noted in the Introduction, the national case law in the field of indirect application of 
international law is extremely diverse. For the sake of the current analysis, it is therefore 
necessary to bring some order in the relevant practice and to single out the main species 
which compose the broader genus. It is also opportune to better clarify the relationship 
between direct application and consistent interpretation, in order to define the object of this 
chapter as compared to Chapter 3. 
Several systems of classification could be employed. One could look, in particular, at any of 
the following characteristics: the types of international sources employed as interpretive 
parameters; the types of domestic sources which form the object of the interpretive process; 
the way in which courts motivate their resort to international law for interpretation; or the 
goals that the courts intend to pursue. At this preliminary stage, a classification based on a 
combination of the first two elements (i.e. the types of sources involved in the interpretive 
process, either as objects or as parameters) appears most illustrative. The legal foundations 
and the objectives of consistent interpretation will be dealt with in greater detail in the 
following sections. 
Based on the above, the following paragraphs divide consistent interpretation into three 
categories, according to whether (i) acts of parliament are interpreted consistently with 
international norms which are part of the national legal system; (ii) acts of parliament are 
interpreted in light of unincorporated international law; and (iii) international law is resorted 
to in the interpretation of the national constitution. 
  
2.1. Consistent interpretation of primary legislation with incorporated international law. 
The first case to be examined is a situation where national courts resort to international norms 
which form part of domestic law to interpret acts of parliament or hierarchically equivalent 
domestic sources. 
This approach is epitomized by the so-called Charming Betsy canon employed in statutory 
construction by the courts of the United States. In an early Supreme Court decision, Murray v. 
The Schooner Charming Betsy, Chief Justice Marshall held that “an act of Congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains”.7 Despite its initial formulation, which only referred to the law of nations, this 
principle of interpretation is commonly applied with regard to both general international law 
and international agreements.8 
                                                
7 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804), p. 118. On this canon, see 
generally P.R. DUBINSKY, “United States”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 631 ff., p. 642. For extensive surveys of 
the application of the Charming Betsy canon by the U.S. Supreme Court, see T.H. LEE, D.L. SLOSS, 
“International Law as an Interpretive Tool in the Supreme Court, 1861–1900”, in D.L. SLOSS, M.D. RAMSEY, 
W.S. DODGE (eds.), International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court. Continuity and Change, Cambridge-New 
York, 2011, p. 124 ff.; R.P. ALFORD, “International Law as an Interpretive Tool in the Supreme Court, 1901–
1945”, ibid., p. 257 ff.; M.A. WATERS, “International Law as an Interpretive Tool in the Supreme Court, 1946–
2000”, ibid., p. 380 ff. 
8 D. SLOSS, “United States”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement. A 
Comparative Study, Cambridge, 2009, p. 504 ff., p. 526-527. 
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The rule of consistent interpretation is codified in the UK Human Rights Act 1998, which 
incorporates large portions of the European Convention on Human Rights in UK law.9 
Pursuant to Section 3(1) of the Act, “[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights”.10 
The main issue with this prong of consistent interpretation is to set its boundaries with the 
direct applicability of international law. Indeed, depending on the circumstances, the 
international norms used as interpretive parameters might also have the potential to be 
directly applied, in consequence of their validity in the national legal system. In fact, as will 
be seen, the reach of consistent interpretation is generally wider than direct applicability, so 
that indirect application may allow courts to give effect to international law in situations 
where it would not be viable to use international law directly as the rule of decision. However, 
the two judicial techniques may nonetheless sometimes overlap in application. 
First of all, consistent interpretation can apply to situations where it is undisputed that 
domestic law should be the governing rule, because there is no international norm which 
could govern the substance of the claim. For example, international law could be relied on to 
determine the extent of territorial application of domestic norms,11 or to inform the content of 
governmental discretionary powers where the direct applicability of international law is not an 
issue before the court at all.12 
A particularly illustrative example of the former usage is the R. v. Hape case before the 
Canadian Supreme Court. Called upon to decide whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms could apply to acts of the Canadian police conducted abroad, the Court resorted 
extensively to the norms of customary international law regulating the jurisdictional 
competence of states. As shown in Chapter 2, general international law is incorporated in 
Canada following the Westminster approach.13 Also in Murray v. The Schooner Charming 
Betsy, the issue was whether a US act prohibiting commerce with France, with which the US 
was at war, was applicable to a Danish national who was born as a US citizen and never 
renounced his nationality. The latter argued that applying the act to himself would violate the 
international norms concerning neutrality. This view was espoused by the Supreme Court.14 
Later case law shows that US courts have occasionally taken the stance that the principle 
would only apply to restrict extraterritorial application of statutes to avoid foreign policy 
disputes,15 but this position seems disproven by the broader approach taken by the majority of 
courts. 
                                                
9 See Chapter 2, Section 5. 
10  On this provision see A. KAVANAGH, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act, 
Cambridge, 2009, particularly p. 17-117. 
11 J. TURLEY, “Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence”, Hastings Law Journal 1993, p. 
195 ff., p. 238 (arguing that the Charming Betsy canon has been applied “largely to avoid jurisdiction or, more 
recently, to avoid an international conflict by following the least controversial course available under 
international law”); A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 150. 
12 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Netherlands”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 326 ff., p. 351. 
13 R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292. On this case, see generally J.H. CURRIE, “Weaving a Tangled Web: 
Hape and the Obfuscation of Canadian Reception Law”, Canadian Yearbook of International Law 2007, p. 55 ff. 
14 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, cit. 
15 See, for example, ARC Ecology and ors v United States Department of the Air Force and ors, Appeal 
Judgment, 411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005), ILDC 901 (US 2005). 
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In other situations, the dividing line between direct and indirect application of international 
law might be less clear-cut. It could be the case, for instance, that a norm of international law, 
although part of the domestic legal system and hypothetically able to be the governing rule of 
a case, is considered – whatever the reason – non directly applicable in that legal system.16 In 
such a case, national courts could still be able to extract some effects from the international 
norm at the level of statutory interpretation. In the case of Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, for 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Charming Betsy canon in order to 
interpret a statute in a manner consistent with the ICCPR, a treaty which has been deemed to 
be non self-executing by the US Congress.17 
It should be added that, although the difference between the application of international law 
as the governing rule and its use as an interpretive parameter might seem well-defined in 
theory, the two techniques might sometimes yield barely distinguishable outcomes.18 More 
specifically, there are cases where national courts present their usage of international law as 
ancillary to the application of domestic law as the rule governing the case, but, in fact, the rule 
that they apply is in practice entirely derived from international law. In such cases, the 
reference to the interpretation of domestic law might appear as no more than a formality to 
justify a more assertive application of international norms. 
As an example, consider a 2007 judgment of the Tribunal of Milan.19 In the course of a 
criminal trial, a witness had gone missing immediately after testifying against the defendant, 
so that the defence did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The issue 
before the court was whether that testimony had to be considered as legally obtained: while 
the Italian criminal code allows to receive evidence whose gathering is not repeatable, the 
defence invoked Art. 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
guarantees the right of the accused to examine witnesses against him. Having affirmed that 
the provisions of the criminal code had to be construed consistently with the Convention, as 
interpreted by the Strasbourg court, the Tribunal ultimately held that the testimony in question 
could not amount to a proof beyond any reasonable doubt. Despite the court’s invocation of 
the canon of consistent interpretation, however, the supposedly interpretive use of the 
international norm led in fact to the non-application of the domestic norm. Strictly speaking, 
the governing rule applied to the case was a legal principle that the court extracted exclusively 
from the ECHR and the ECtHR case law. 
Finally, national courts frequently resort to consistent interpretation in lieu of direct 
application for reasons of opportunity. Such a preference for indirect rather than direct 
application of international norms could be interpreted, following Mattias Kumm, as part of 
                                                
16 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 145 (“the practice of consistent interpretation is not 
contingent on the question of whether a rule of international law can be given direct effect, and thus may allow a 
court to circumvent the shield that the concept of direct effect may set up”). 
17 Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). The view that non self-executing treaties can be 
used for statutory construction is not unanimous. For the opposite view, see Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United 
States, 472 F.3d 1347, (Fed. Cir. 2006), p. 1360. For a critique of the reasons for the non direct applicability of 
human rights treaties in the US, see Chapter 3, Sections 3 and 4. 
18 For a similar viewpoint, see M. CARTABIA, “Le sentenze «gemelle»: diritti fondamentali, fonti, giudici”, 
Giurisprudenza costituzionale 2007, p. 3564 ff., p. 3567. 
19 Tribunal of Milan, Judgment of 31 October 2007. For a more detailed analysis of this judgment, see I. 
CARLOTTO, “I giudici comuni e gli obblighi internazionali dopo le sentenze n. 348 e n. 349 del 2007 della Corte 
costituzionale: un’analisi sul seguito giurisprudenziale (Parte I)”, Politica del diritto 2010, p. 41 ff., p. 63-64. 
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“a shift from rules of conflict to rules of engagement” in the attitude of national courts toward 
international law,20 i.e. as a sign that courts may prefer to downplay substantive clashes 
between international and national sources and to look instead for a “conciliatory solution”.21 
However, this tendency requires a cautious and case-by-case evaluation. A preference for 
consistent interpretation might also be an indication of a general misuse of or distrust for 
direct application. In the US, for example, the scholarly interest in consistent interpretation 
has developed in parallel with the progressive erosion and demise of the self-execution 
doctrine in judicial practice.22 
 
2.2. Consistent interpretation of primary legislation with unincorporated international 
law. 
In other contexts, domestic statutes may be construed in accordance with international sources 
which are not formally incorporated in the domestic legal sphere. This may happen either 
because the political branches have chosen not to incorporate the source in question, or 
because that source cannot be possibly incorporated for external reasons, e.g. because it does 
not bind the state internationally.23 
Questions concerning the legal value of unincorporated international law have typically 
presented themselves in common law countries with regard to international agreements. 
Under the Westminster approach to the reception of international law, treaties are not subject 
to automatic incorporation in domestic law. 24  National courts, though, have perfected 
doctrines allowing them to interpret domestic law in light of unincorporated international 
treaties.25 These doctrines are commonly based on the presumed intent of the parliament, 
                                                
20 M. KUMM, “Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement”, in S. 
CHOUDHRY (ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge, 2007, p. 256 ff., p. 292 (noting “a shift 
from rules of conflict to rules of engagement. These rules of engagement characteristically take the forms of a 
duty to engage, the duty to take into account as a consideration of some weight, or presumptions of some sort”). 
21 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Netherlands”, cit., p. 349 (referring to Dutch courts, but in terms susceptible of 
being generalized). See also D. SLOSS, “Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis”, in 
D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 1 ff., p. 14. 
22 C.A. BRADLEY, “The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role 
of International Law”, Georgetown Law Journal 1997, p. 479 ff., p. 483 (arguing that lawyers and commentators 
who have been frustrated by the lack of direct effect given by U.S. courts to international law have to some 
extent rested their hopes on international law’s interpretive role). On the demise of self-execution in the U.S., see 
e.g. “Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State Governments” (Note), Harvard 
Law Review 1990-1991, p. 1269 ff., p. 1269 (contending that “litigants and judges have long been reluctant to 
accord international law the same status as other sources of federal law. Litigants generally invoke international 
law only for illustrative purposes – to inform the statutory […] commands that provide the real basis for the 
action – rather than as a full-fledged source of law in its own right”). 
23 See, for example, Abagninin and ors v AMVAC Chemical Corporation and ors, Appeal Judgment, 545 
F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2008), ILDC 1106 (US 2008) (resorting to the Rome Statute, not binding on the U.S., to 
define the crime of genocide). See also S. BEAULAC, J.H. CURRIE, “Canada”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 116 ff., 
p. 125 (noting that “Canadian judges rarely, if ever, consider international law sources by taking into account 
whether they have a legally binding effect on Canada. Instead, they tend to consider all sources of international 
human rights law as ‘relevant and persuasive’”; emphasis in the original). For similar considerations with regard 
to the European Court of Justice’s use of international sources in interpreting European Union law, see F. 
CASOLARI, “Giving Indirect Effect to International Law within the EU Legal Order: The Doctrine of Consistent 
Interpretation”, in E. CANNIZZARO, P. PALCHETTI, R.A. WESSEL (eds.), International Law as Law of the 
European Union, Leiden-Boston, 2012, p. 395 ff. 
24 See Chapter 2, Section 5. 
25 For a concise overview of judicial practice, see M.P. VAN ALSTINE, “The Role of Domestic Courts in 
Treaty Enforcement. Summary and Conclusions”, D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 555 ff., p. 593-595. It should be noted 
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textual ambiguity, or a combination thereof. Such legal foundations will be more thoroughly 
analyzed in the next section. 
A typical restatement of the principle in question can be found in Higgs v. Minister of 
National Security, a case decided by the Privy Council. After recalling the default rule 
according to which “the corollary of […] unrestricted treaty-making power is that treaties 
form no part of domestic law unless enacted by the legislature” and “unincorporated treaties 
cannot change the law of the land”, Lord Hoffmann added that such treaties “may have an 
indirect effect upon the construction of statutes as a result of the presumption that Parliament 
does not intend to pass legislation which would put the Crown in breach of its international 
obligations”.26 
This presumption may allow courts to avert a defective application of international law as a 
result of a lack of formal incorporation. A presumption of compatibility can even yield results 
similar in practice to a direct application of international law as the rule of decision: what has 
been said above with regard to international norms incorporated in domestic law can equally 
apply to unincorporated international law.27 Clearly, however, the substantial difference is 
that in the present case the effects of international norms come close to an application qua 
domestic law, even though such norms do not formally possess a status equal to domestic 
legislation. 
Consider, for example, the use of the 1997 Oviedo Convention by the Italian Court of 
Cassation in its 2007 judgment in the Englaro case.28 Italy had not (and, to date, has not) 
ratified the Convention, even though the legislature, with the same act (Law No. 145/2001), 
authorized its ratification and set forth an ordine di esecuzione, i.e. a provison making the 
Convention part of domestic law as soon as it enters into force on the international plane. In 
its judgment, the Cassation argued that the Convention could have “an auxiliary function 
from the interpretative point of view: it will have to give way to a contrary national rule, but 
can and must be used in interpreting domestic norms consistently with it”. This premise 
notwithstanding, the court in practice simply proceeded to extract a legal principle from Art. 6 
                                                                                                                                                   
that, although the common law principle of consistent interpretation is a judicial creation, it has sometimes been 
transposed in legislation. It is enshrined, for example, in Section 233 of the South African Constitution in the 
following terms: “when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law”. On this provision, see J. DUGARD, “South Africa”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 448 ff., p. 457-
463. 
26 Higgs and Mitchell v. The Minister of National Security and others [2000] 2 AC 228, Privy Council 
Appeal No. 45 of 1999. For another illustrative example, see, ex multis, Salomon v. Customs and Excise 
Commissioners [1967] QB 116, where Lord Justice Diplock held that “if the terms of the legislation are not clear 
but are reasonably capable of more than one meaning, the treaty itself becomes relevant, for there is a prima 
facie presumption that Parliament does not intend to act in breach of international law, including therein specific 
treaty obligations; and if one of the meanings which can reasonably be ascribed to the legislation is consonant 
with the treaty obligations and another or others are not, the meaning which is consonant is to be preferred”. 
27 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 139-140 (consistent interpretation can constitute “a powerful 
alternative” that national courts may employ to give effect to international obligations in situations where direct 
application is not allowed for by domestic law; an alternative whose result “may look similar to that of direct 
effect”). 
28 Judgment No. 21748 of 16 October 2007. See the comment by F. PALOMBINO in Italian Yearbook of 
International Law 2008, p. 356 ff. On the use of the Oviedo Convention by the Italian courts, see generally F.M. 
PALOMBINO, “La rilevanza della Convenzione di Oviedo secondo il giudice italiano”, Giurisprudenza 
costituzionale 2011, p. 4811 ff.; V. TONINI, “La rilevanza della Convenzione di Oviedo sulla biomedicina 
secondo la giurisprudenza italiana”, Rivista di diritto internazionale 2009, p. 116 ff. 
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(on the protection of persons not able to give consent to medical treatment) and to apply it to 
the case at hand. The court did not even mention which norm of domestic law it meant to 
interpret in conformity to the Convention. 
Similarly, the effects of consistent interpretation in common law legal systems have 
sometimes proved so pervasive that the traditional rule on the non automatic incorporation of 
treaties has become unable to describe the actual weight given to treaties in such systems.29 
Notably, before the adoption of the 1998 Human Rights Act, Rosalyn Higgins argued that the 
non-incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights “seemed to have become an 
irrelevance” to certain domestic judges in the UK.30 And Melissa Waters, in yet more general 
terms, has famously written of a tendency of common law courts towards a “creeping 
monism”.31 
Unincorporated international law has also been resorted to in order to ensure compliance on 
the part of administrative authorities.32 The usage of international law as a standard of review 
of administrative action should be regarded as a form of consistent interpretation, because 
international law is used to inform the content and extent of a discretion which is conferred 
upon the government by an act of parliament.33 The above is true even though, in certain 
common law jurisdictions, this usage has rather been traced back to the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations in administrative law.34 
The New Zealand case law provides one of the earliest and most influential examples of this 
trend. In Tavita v Minister of Immigration, the Court of Appeal was confronted with the 
                                                
29 See generally M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation 
of Human Rights Treaties”, Columbia Law Review 2007, p. 628 ff. This trend has taken roots across common 
law jurisdictions. See e.g. M. KILLANDER, H. ADJOLOHOUN, “International Law and Domestic Human Rights 
Litigation in Africa: An Introduction”, in M. KILLANDER (ed.), International Law and Domestic Human Rights 
Litigation in Africa, Pretoria, 2010, p. 3 ff., p. 4 (noting that “African civil law countries have traditionally been 
seen as monist and common law countries as dualist. However, […] courts in many traditionally dualist 
countries in Africa use international law to a larger degree than explicitly monist countries such as those of 
Francophone Africa”); W.J. HOPKINS, “New Zealand”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 429 ff., p. 446 (noting “a 
convergence between these two ideal types [i.e. monism and dualism as constitutional set-ups], with the national 
courts operating as a filter between the international and the domestic legal systems, whatever the source of the 
international obligation”). 
30 R. HIGGINS, “The Role of Domestic Courts in the Enforcement of International Human Rights: The 
United Kingdom”, B. CONFORTI, F. FRANCIONI (eds.), Enforcing International Human Rights in Domestic 
Courts, The Hague-Boston-London, 1997, p. 37 ff., p. 48-49. 
31 M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 633 and 652. 
32 See generally D. DYZENHAUS, M. HUNT, M. TAGGART, “The Principle of Legality in Administrative 
Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation”, Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 2001, p. 5 
ff., p. 5 (“Courts throughout the common law world have, for some time, given effect to international legal 
obligations (especially human rights norms) by way of administrative law doctrines and techniques”); W. 
LACEY, “The Judicial Use of Unincorporated International Conventions in Administrative Law: Back-Doors, 
Platitudes and Window Dressing”, in H. CHARLESWORTH, M. CHIAM, D. HOVELL, G. WILLIAMS (eds.), The Fluid 
State: International Law and National Legal Systems, Sidney, 2005, p. 82 ff. 
33 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects of Treaties in Domestic Law”, in C.J. TAMS, A. TZANAKOPOULOS, A. 
ZIMMERMANN (eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2014, p. 123 ff., p. 
148 (considering it a form of consistent interpretation). 
34 It is noteworthy that in Higgs v. Minister of National Security, cit., para. 12, Lord Hoffmann, writing for 
the majority, appeared to describe this form of international law application as different from consistent 
interpretation. In particular, he wrote that unincorporated treaties could have two kinds of effects in domestic law: 
firstly, an interpretive effect on the construction of statutes; and secondly, “the existence of a treaty may give rise 
to a legitimate expectation on the part of citizens that the government, in its acts affecting them, will observe the 
terms of the treaty”. “In this respect – he added – there is nothing special about a treaty. Such legitimate 
expectations may arise from any course of conduct which the executive has made it known that it will follow”. 
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question whether the Minister was required to consider three relevant international human 
rights conventions (which New Zealand had ratified but not incorporated in domestic law) in 
issuing an order of deportation. The court held that the argument that the Minister was 
entitled to ignore such conventions was “an unattractive [one], apparently implying that New 
Zealand’s adherence to the international instruments has been at least partly a window-
dressing”.35 This decision exercised strong influence on subsequent case law in countries of 
common law. Most notably, one may refer to the Australian High Court judgment in the case 
of Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh.36 Here again, the issue was whether the 
Minister had to take consideration of a human rights convention when issuing a deportation 
order. In particular, Teoh – a Malaysian national with seven children of Australian nationality 
– contended that, pursuant to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Minister had to 
afford primary consideration to the principle of the best interest of his children when 
considering whether to order his deportation and cause the separation of his family. The 
judges argued that the Convention’s ratification did in fact create a legitimate expectation that 
the Executive would act in conformity with it.37 
This judicial approach, however, operates under the constraints of each country’s 
administrative law. This has usually limited judicial review of administrative action to a 
merely procedural plane.38 In Tavita, for example, the court merely adjourned the appeal sine 
die in order to give the Minister an “opportunity of reconsideration” of a new application 
from the appellant; and the same principle was upheld by the Privy Council in the above-cited 
decision Higgs v. Minister of National Security, where it was held that “the legal effect of 
creating such a legitimate expectation is purely procedural. The executive cannot depart from 
the expected course of conduct unless it has given notice that intends to do so and has given 
the person affected an opportunity to make representations”. 
Furthermore, it should be underlined that this approach is not uniformly adopted across 
common law jurisdictions. By way of example, even though the UK administrative law is 
quite unique among common law countries for having developed a (however quite restrictive) 
notion of substantive expectations, 39  review of administrative discretion in light of 
unincorporated international law “has not gained wide traction” in the UK, save for sporadic 
exceptions.40 In the Venables case before the House of Lords, one Lord Justice relied on a 
presumption “that Parliament has not maintained on the statute book a power capable of being 
                                                
35 Tavita v Minister of Immigration, [1994] 2 NZLR 257. On this judgment, see W. LACEY, “The Judicial 
Use”, cit., p. 100-102; W.J. HOPKINS, cit., p. 438-440; M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 662. 
36 Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, [1995] HCA 20, ILDC 779 (AU 1995). On the 
influence of Tavita on Teoh and the following case law, see M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 666 ft. 
178-179 and p. 691. 
37 Interestingly, a number of executive and legislative initiatives have since attempted to overcome the 
legitimate expectations doctrine developed in Teoh. It appears, however, that only the state of South Australia 
has effectively adopted legislation barring the extension of the doctrine to unincorporated international treaties. 
On the the political reactions to Teoh, see A. DE JONGE, “Australia”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 23 ff., p. 38-39. 
38 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects”, cit., p. 148-149. 
39 R v North and East Devon Health Authority; Ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213. In R (Bibi) v Newham 
London Borough Council [2002] 1 WLR 237, the scope of the substantive legitimate expectations was clarified 
in the following terms: the administration needs to explain and justify the refusal to give effect to the legitimate 
expectation, and the court can review the reasonableness of the government’s explanation. On this evolution in 
U.K. case law, see W. LACEY, “The Judicial Use”, cit., p. 95-96. 
40 D. SLOSS, “Treaty Enforcement”, cit., p. 22. 
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exercised in a manner inconsistent with the treaty obligations of this country” and held that 
the Secretary of State should have taken into account the (unincorporated) Convention on the 
Rights of the Child in the exercise of statutory discretion. But this appears to have remained 
an isolated precedent.41 
 
2.3. Consistent interpretation of national constitutions. 
Initially devised with regard to the interpretation of statutes, the judicial tools of consistent 
interpretation have been later in time extended to the interpretation of national constitutions.42 
Sometimes, such an extention has been driven by national constitutions themselves. For 
example, Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of South Africa sets forth an obligation upon 
courts to consider international law in the interpretation of the domestic Bill of Rights. 
Similar obligations are enshrined in the constitutions of Portugal, Spain and Romania.43 
This widening in the scope of interpretive usage of international law can be explained on 
several levels. The most obvious reason is that virtually all constitutions include explicit or 
implicit references to some international legal standards or international institutions. In these 
cases, it seems obvious to resort to international law to clarify the meaning of such 
expressions.44 The use of international law in constitutional interpretation, however, has much 
wider implications. Constitutional provisions often set forth broad standards and principles, 
thus leaving much room for judicial interpretation. Since some areas of international law (e.g. 
international human rights law) are inherently connected to, and substantially overlapping 
with, the rights protected under domestic constitutionalism, 45  they represent a natural 
reference point in the interpretive process of giving content to domestic human rights.46 
                                                
41 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Venables [1998] AC 407, p. 499 (speech of 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson). On this decision, see S.C. NEFF, “United Kingdom”, in D. SHELTON (ed.), cit., p. 620 
ff., p. 625; A. AUST, “United Kingdom”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 476 ff., p. 492-493. 
42 A. PETERS, “The Globalization of State Constitutions”, in J. NIJMAN, A. NOLLKAEMPER (eds.), New 
Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law, Oxford, 2007, p. 251 ff., p. 300; M. KUMM, 
“Democratic”, cit., p. 278; M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 679 ff. (terming this usage of 
international law “constitutional Charming Betsy canon”); N. STROSSEN, “Recent U.S. and International Judicial 
Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis”, Hastings Law 
Journal 1990, p. 805 ff. (advocating a greater use of international sources in statutory and constitutional 
interpretation); R.J. MARTINEAU, “Interpreting the Constitution: The Use of International Human Rights 
Norms”, Human Rights Quarterly 1983, p. 87 ff.; H.A. BLACKMUN, “The Supreme Court and the Law of 
Nations”, Yale Law Journal 1994-1995, p. 39 ff., p. 45 (contending that “International law can and should 
inform the interpretation of various clauses of the Constitution”. The author was judge at the US Supreme Court 
from 1970 to 1994). 
43 See 1976 Constitution of Portugal, Art. 16(2): “The provisions of the Constitution and laws relating to 
fundamental rights are to be read and interpreted in harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”; 
1978 Constitution of Spain, Art. 10(2): “The norms relative to basic rights and liberties which are recognized by 
the Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
international treaties and agreements on those matters ratified by Spain”; 1991 Constitution of Romania, Art. 
20(1): “Constitutional provisions concerning the citizens’ rights and liberties shall be interpreted and enforced in 
conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the covenants and other treaties Romania is a 
party to”. 
44 G.L. NEUMAN, “International Law as a Resource in Constitutional Interpretation”, Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 2006-2007, p. 177 ff., p. 183. 
45 See e.g. A. PETERS, cit., p. 268-270 (noting the ECHR’s resemblance to national constitutional 
instruments). 
46 G.L. NEUMAN, “The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation”, American Journal of 
International Law 2004, p. 82 ff., p. 84-85 (“[t]he postwar development of international human rights law has 
widened the field for interaction between international law and constitutional interpretation […] Juxtaposing the 
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This point was clearly illustrated in the dissenting opinion rendered by Dickson CJ of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the case Re Public Service Employee Relations Act.47 The issue 
was whether unincorporated international law could be relevant in the interpretation of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a statute entrenched in the Canadian 
Constitution.48 In the words of the Chief Justice, “[t]he Charter […] incorporates many of the 
policies and prescriptions of the various international documents pertaining to human rights. The 
various sources of international human rights law – declarations, covenants, conventions, judicial 
and quasi‑judicial decisions of international tribunals, customary norms – must, in my opinion, 
be relevant and persuasive sources for interpretation of the Charter’s provisions”. This dissent 
has proved very influential on later Canadian case law, which has usually subscribed to this 
approach.49 
Furthermore, although ensuring conformity of the constitution with international law may be 
indispensable to guarantee that the state complies with international obligations,50 amending a 
constitution to harmonize it with international law is often made impossible by the complex 
procedures for constitutional revision or by a country’s political environment. When this is 
the case, the only way to make constitutional provisions compatible with international law is 
by means of judicial interpretation.51 
This form of constitutional interpretation may be conceptualized as closer in nature to the 
second type of consistent interpretation analyzed above, i.e. the one based on unincorporated 
international law. Indeed, domestic case law across jurisdictions demonstrates that 
international sources are generally used in constitutional interpretation regardless of their 
status in the national legal order. 
In particular, the domestic validity of the international source in question is in most cases 
immaterial. This approach to constitutional interpretation is adopted both in countries where 
international law is formally incorporated and in countries where it is not;52 most notably, it is 
now relatively widespread also in common law legal systems.53 Even where constitutional 
texts include a specific obligation to interpret their provisions in light of international law, it 
does not necessarily mean that the international law which should be used for constitutional 
interpretation is also domestically valid.54 
                                                                                                                                                   
constitutional and international systems with regard to a right that they both protect (such as freedom of 
expression, or fair trial) multiplies the possibilities for competing influences on the interpretation of the right”). 
47 Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, Dickinson CJ dissent. 
48 W. LACEY, “The Judicial Use”, cit., p. 105. 
49 S. BEAULAC, J.H. CURRIE, cit., p. 123-124. 
50 Y. SHANY, “How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative Analysis of the Influence of 
International Human Rights Treaties upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts by Domestic Courts”, 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2006, p. 341 ff., particularly p. 355. 
51 See e.g. A.I. PARK, “Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to 
Inform Constitutional Interpretation”, UCLA Law Review 1987, p. 1195 ff. (arguing that the lack of a right to the 
fulfillment of basic human needs in the US Constitution is at variance with international human rights 
obligations and advocating to bridge this gap by means of constitutional interpretation). 
52 See D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 384 (“Courts in both monist and dualist states apply 
treaties to help elucidate the meaning of constitutional provisions”). 
53 M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 680 and 690.  
54 For example, in South Africa, where Art. 39 of the Constitution sets forth a general obligation to 
consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights, treaties are only incorporated if they are deemed 
self-executing and, in any event, have a sub-constitutional status. On the hybrid regime of treaty incorporation in 
South Africa, see Chapter 2, Section 4.1. 
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Moreover, consistent interpretation of constitutions is often based on a variety of international 
instruments which do not bind the state internationally, either because the state concerned has 
not ratified them or because they belong to the so-called soft law.55 In Roper v. Simmons, for 
example, the US Supreme Court struck down legislation on execution of juvenile offenders 
(i.e. between fifteen and eighteen years old) because it found it in violation of the Eight 
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment”. Justice Kennedy, who 
authored the majority opinion, wrote that a number of unincorporated or non self-executing 
human rights instruments had been considered by the Court as “instructive” for the 
construction of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition.56 The Russian Constitutional Court has 
relied on multiple occasions on non-binding international instruments, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, treaties to which Russia is not a party or resolutions of 
organizations to which Russia is not a member.57 And in South Africa, the Constitutional 
Court explicitly held that international instruments and decisions which are not binding on the 
country could be used to “evaluate and understand” the content of the Bill of Rights.58 
Even where national courts interpret constitutional provisions by relying on incorporated 
international sources, the technique under scrutiny appears disengaged from the hierarchical 
status of such sources in the domestic legal order. Indeed, international norms with a sub-
constitutional rank in the domestic hierarchy of norms are commonly used for interpretive 
purposes. 
The case law of Russian courts is particularly revealing. As seen in Chapter 2, “generally 
recognized principles and norms of international law” are automatically incorporated in the 
Russian legal system by virtue of Art. 15(4) of the Constitution, but do not enjoy a status 
higher than ordinary laws; moreover, similar considerations may be extended to treaties, 
which – differently from what the letter of the Constitution would suggest – cannot invalidate 
inconsistent legislation but can only be prioritized over it in concrete cases.59 Despite this, 
both general international law and treaties – chiefly in the field of human rights – are 
commonly referred to by the Russian Constitutional Court while interpreting constitutional 
provisions.60 
                                                
55 However, as noted by M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 631, ratified treaties “may be a more 
authoritative source than unratified ones” in constitutional interpretation. 
56 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Notably, the majority opinion also referred to comparative law 
materials, specifically to the fact that the U.S. was arguably the only country in the world to allow for the 
execution of juvenile offenders. For an analysis of this judgment, see C.B. BUYS, “Burying Our Constitution in 
the Sand? Evaluating the Ostrich Response to the Use of International and Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional 
Interpretation”, Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 2007, p. 1 ff. 
57 B.R. TUZMUKHAMEDOV, “International Law in the Russian Constitutional Court”, American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 2000, p. 166 ff., p. 171; S.Y. MAROCHKIN, “International Law in the Courts of 
the Russian Federation: Practice of Application”, Chinese Journal of International Law 2007, p. 329 ff., p. 334. 
See e.g. Refusal to accept a complaint by Kulanov regarding the infringement of his constitutional rights by 
Article 14, Part 1, Paragraph 9 of the Federal Municipal Service Law, VG Kulanov, Constitutional proceedings, 
Determination no 1818-O, ILDC 2278 (RU 2014), where the Russian Constitutional Court construed the right of 
freedom of expression under Art. 53(3) of the Constitution by referring also to Art. 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Art. 10 of the ECHR. 
58 S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), cited in J. DUGARD, cit., p. 458. 
59 See Chapter 2, Section 3. 
60 G.M. DANILENKO, “Implementation of International Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice”, European 
Journal of International Law 1999, p. 51 ff., p. 62-63. 
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As an example, one may cite the 2009 judgment in the case of Lashmankin and others. The 
appellants argued that the provisions of a Russian statute de facto prohibiting assemblies if 
local authorities did not agree on the proposed time and place were in violation of the 
constitutional right of assembly, enshrined in Art. 31. In order to assess whether the 
limitations on the right were legal, the Constitutional Court recalled the various 
understandings of the same right in a number of international instruments, including the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the ICCPR and the ECHR. It concluded that the 
limitations under scrutiny were legitimate under all said instruments and, thus, did not violate 
the Constitution.61 
Similarly, international agreements have been used for constitutional interpretation also by 
the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, despite the fact that their domestic status is equal to 
ordinary legislation. Reference should be made, in particular, of the Görgülü case. A higher 
court had held that, because of its sub-constitutional rank in domestic law, the European 
Convention on Human Rights could not have any role in constitutional interpretation. The 
German Constitutional Court rejected this reasoning outright and held that the courts must 
take account of the Convention when interpreting the Constitution, under the condition that 
constitutionally protected rights are not decreased.62 The same disparity between the formal 
status of international law and its role in constitutional interpretation can be found in the use 
of international sources in the interpretation of the US Constitution63 and, in the case of 
treaties, of the Italian Constitution.64 In both legal systems, such international sources have 
sub-constitutional rank. 
In conclusion, the role of international law in constitutional interpretation is generally much 
more influential than its formal status in domestic law would suggest. This gap is the 
principal root of the controversies which surround this practice and that will be analyzed in 
detail in the next section. 
 
 
3. Consistent interpretation and the prerogatives of the political authorities. 
 
                                                
61 Lashmankin and ors, Constitutional Review, N 484-O-P, ILDC 1480 (RU 2009). 
62 BVerfG, Görgülü v. Germany, 2 BvR 1481/04 (2004). On this decision, see M. KUMM, “Democratic”, 
cit., p. 280-281; G.L. NEUMAN, “The Uses”, p. 86; S.D. MURPHY, “Does International Law Obligate States to 
Open Their National Courts to Persons for the Invocation of Treaty Norms That Protect or Benefit Persons?”, in 
D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 61 ff., p. 82. 
63 J.J. PAUST, International Law as Law of the United States, Durham, 20032, p. 134 (arguing that 
“although a treaty could not prevail in the case of an unavoidable clash with constitutional norms, a treaty can be 
incorporated indirectly in aid of interpreting constitutional precepts, and, of course, in aid of reinterpreting those 
precepts. In this sense, the domestic status of a treaty norm can be enhanced by incorporation into the 
Constitution, however indirectly”). 
64 See, for a notable precedent, the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court No. 388/1999, where the 
Court held that the Constitution and international human rights instruments “si integrano reciprocamente nella 
interpretazione”. At the time the judgment was rendered, the domestic status of international treaties was 
generally held to be equal to ordinary statutes: see Chapter 2, Section 3. The use of international law in 
constitutional interpretation, however, has had changing fortunes in Italy and has never conclusively taken root 
in case law. 
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This section intends to explore the main contentious issues that underlie the consistent 
interpretation of domestic law with international law and the way in which such issues 
influence the practice of national courts. 
This interpretive technique could be perceived to raise serious problems of separation of 
powers. 65  The matter of contention is generally the protection of the constitutional 
prerogatives of the legislature. More specifically, the judiciary could be seen as as 
overstepping its functions and as encroaching upon those of the legislature in a number of 
cases: for instance, when it refers for interpretation to international norms not having 
domestic legal force; when it uses international sources in manners inconsistent with their 
domestic hierarchical status; or, more generally, when consistent interpretation leads to 
outcomes which contradict the content of domestic legislation. For these reasons, the extent to 
which international norms are used in domestic law interpretation fundamentally depends on 
how much weight is given by national courts to the prerogatives of the political authorities. 
Unsurprisingly, the fundamental character of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in 
many legal systems has led courts to assume a deferential attitude towards legislative 
prerogatives. In the UK and in other countries of common law following the UK approach, 
for example, “the judiciary has been extremely sensitive not to usurp the rights of the 
legislature” by applying unincorporated international law in domestic law interpretation,66 for 
fear of producing an incorporation of international obligations “through the back door” of 
judicial intervention, in violation of parliamentary sovereignty.67 However, as will be seen 
below, similar issues have presented themselves also in countries where consistent 
interpretation is usually based on incorporated international law, as with regard to the 
Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction. A protective attitude toward the legislature, 
however, is not necessarily conditional on a strong domestic principle of parliamentary 
supremacy. Rather, it can be considered a byproduct of one’s global vision of the relationship 
between state powers and of the role of the judiciary. 
The attempts to safeguard the prerogatives of the legislature in the context of consistent 
interpretation of domestic law with international law have taken mainly three forms. Each of 
the following three paragraphs analyzes one of these judicial and doctrinal trends. Paragraphs 
3.1 and 3.2, in particular, respectively deal with the reflections of intentionalist and textualist 
interpretive theories on the application of the canon of consistent interpretation. 
Intentionalism (i.e. reliance on legislative intent) and textualism (i.e. reliance on the plain 
meaning of the text of legislation) are the two typical manifestations of the principle 
                                                
65 D. SHELTON, “Introduction”, cit., p. 5. 
66 R. HIGGINS, cit., p. 37. 
67 See, for example, D. DYZENHAUS, M. HUNT, M. TAGGART, cit., p. 5 (“When the source of the 
international obligations constraining executive discretion is a convention ratified by the executive, but not 
incorporated by parliament into legislation, traditional alarm bells ring. Such ‘backdoor’ incorporation seems to 
amount to executive usurpation of the legislature’s monopoly of law-making authority, or to judicial usurpation 
of the same, or a combination of both”). In Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh, cit., the 
Australian High Court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectations only generated procedural remedies 
because there is a “difference between a legitimate expectation and a binding rule of law. To regard a legitimate 
expectation as requiring the decision-maker to act in a particular way is tantamount to treating it as a rule of law. 
It incorporates the provisions of the unincorporated convention into our municipal law by the back door”. 
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according to which courts must act as “faithful agents” of the legislature.68 This principle, in 
turn, is usually justified as a form of respect for domestic democratic processes and for the 
separation of powers.69 Paragraph 3.3 analyzes another protective trend which is grounded on 
the domestic hierarchy of norms. Arguments based on hierarchy have been relied upon in 
particular to question the legitimacy of the use of international law in constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
3.1. Consistent interpretation and legislative intent. 
In order to overcome the perceived difficulties arising from the principle of separation of 
powers, national courts frequently conceptualize consistent interpretation with international 
law as a way to further legislative intent. More specifically, courts may justify the use of 
international law in statutory interpretation by invoking a parliament’s presumed intention 
that national legislation should be interpreted in compliance with international obligations.70 
The theoretical foundations of this approach are not novel, in that the search for legislative 
intent is probably the most classical approach to statutory interpretation.71 Needless to say, it 
is well outside the scope of the present research to critique intentionalism in general terms. 
This paragraph adopts a much narrower perspective and aims to analyze the diverging 
outcomes that the intentionalist paradigm has produced in national case law in the field of 
consistent interpretation with international law. 
In its most restrictive form, this approach only allows for an interpretive use of international 
law when the parliamentary intent can be drawn from clear legislative indications, particularly 
when a statute is expressly aimed to implement specific norms of international law or, at the 
least, explicitly refers to such norms.72 In Yager v. R, for example, the High Court of Australia 
                                                
68 A.C. BARRETT, “Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency”, Boston University Law Review 2010, p. 109 
ff., particularly p. 112-113. A popular variant of intentionalism, purposivism, aims to interpret legislation in light 
of the presumed objectives pursued by the legislator. For a critique of these three approaches, see generally W.N. 
ESKRIDGE, P.J. FRICKEY, “Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning”, Stanford Law Review 1990, p. 321 ff. 
69 See e.g. A. SCALIA, A Matter of Interpretation. Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton, 1997, p. 9-10 
and 22-23; F.E. EASTERBROOK, “The Supreme Court 1983 Term. Foreword: The Court and the Economic 
System”, Harvard Law Review 1985-1985, p. 4 ff., p. 60 (contending that judges should behave as the “honest 
agents of the political branches” in order to respect democracy and the separation of powers). 
70 C.A. BRADLEY, “The Charming Betsy”, cit., p. 495-497 (describing views seeing Charming Betsy as 
based on congressional intent, without subscribing to such views). See also, more generally, M.A. WATERS, 
“Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 701-702 (suggesting that the concerns surrounding the use of international law in 
interpretation can be resolved if courts take due consideration of the policymakers’ opinions). 
71 A.C. BARRETT, cit., p. 112 (describing the search for legislative intent as “the classical approach to 
statutory interpretation, [which] claims that a judge should be faithful to Congress’s presumed intent rather than 
to the statutory text when the two appear to diverge); M.P. HEALY, “Legislative Intent and Statutory 
Interpretation in England and the United States: An Assessment of the Impact of Pepper v. Hart”, Stanford 
Journal of International Law 1999, p. 231 ff. Among the proponents of this approach see, most notably, R.A. 
POSNER, “Statutory Interpretation – In the Classroom and in the Courtroom”, University of Chicago Law Review 
1983, p. 800 ff., p. 817 (suggesting that “[t]he judge should try to think his way as best he can into the minds of 
the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar”). On this 
view W.N. ESKRIDGE, P.J. FRICKEY, cit., p. 329 (criticizing Posner’s “imaginative reconstruction”). 
72 See R. JENNINGS, A. WATTS, Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, London-New York, 1992, p. 62. A 
similarly restrictive but less drastic stance on consistent interpretation has been taken by J.F. COYLE, 
“Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule”, Virginia Journal of International Law 2010, p. 655 ff. 
(arguing that a presumption of conformity proper should only apply to legislation incorporating – “borrowing” – 
international treaties, and proposing a more restrictive understanding of the Charming Betsy canon to be applied 
to statutes which do not incorporate international law). 
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held that statutory ambiguities could be addressed by resorting to an international treaty only 
if a statute had been introduced with the purpose to implement said treaty.73 This approach is 
also enshrined in Section 15AB(2)(d) of the Australian Acts Interpretation Act 1901, allowing 
courts, when interpreting a statute, to resort (only) to a treaty “that is referred to in the Act”.74 
A slightly broader application of the canon consists in the use of international sources in the 
interpretation of statutes implicitly implementing norms of international law. One may recall 
the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and 
Excise. The issue concerned the interpretation of a statute which had been adopted to 
implement the 1950 Convention on the Valuation of Goods for Customs Purposes, but which 
did not expressly mention the Convention. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that the 
statute was implicitly directed at implementing the treaty and, as a consequence, interpreted it 
in light of the treaty by relying on a presumed legislative intent.75 
Climbing up the ladder of intentionalism towards less restrictive approaches, other courts and 
commentators have deemed consistent interpretation permissible with regard to all legislation, 
by relying on the presumption that the legislature does not intend to violate international 
obligations in all cases. 
The US Charming Betsy canon, for example, has frequently been grounded on the assumption 
that the Congress generally intends statutes to honor international obligations.76 The 1884 
Chew Heong v. United States decision of the US Supreme Court provides a prominent 
example. A statute enacted in 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act, restricted the immigration of 
Chinese laborers to the United States. The statute was in seeming contradiction with an 1880 
treaty between the United States and China, which granted a right to Chinese laborers residing 
in the US to re-enter the country. The court employed the Charming Betsy canon in order to 
reconcile the meaning of the statute with the treaty provisions, and held that the new 
limitations did not apply to Chinese laborers covered by the treaty. The court based its 
decision on a presumed intent of the Congress, as showed by the following passage: “it would 
be wanting in proper respect for the intelligence and patriotism of a co-ordinate department of 
the government were it to doubt, for a moment, that these considerations were present in the 
minds of its members when the legislation in question was enacted”.77 More recently, the 
criterion of legislative intent has also been embraced by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, pursuant to which “[i]t is generally assumed that Congress 
does not intend to repudiate an international obligation of the United States […]”.78 
It is controversial whether this approach can justify limitations on the discretion of executive 
agencies. The question, more specifically, is whether national courts should presume that the 
legislature intends administrative authorities to exercise their discretionary powers in 
accordance with international obligations, even though the power-conferring statute does not 
mention any such obligations. This problem has been raised particularly in countries of 
common law in relation to the interpretive weight to be given to unincorporated international 
                                                
73 Yager v. R, [1977] HCA 10, cited in A. DE JONGE, cit., p. 48-49. 
74 Cited ibid. 
75 Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, cit.  
76 A.C. BARRETT, cit., p. 120. 
77 Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884), p. 541. 
78 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 1986, §115, comment a. 
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treaties. National courts have adopted differing approaches, as demonstrated by a comparison 
between the case law of England and New Zealand. 
On the one hand, English courts have generally refused to apply the presumption under 
analysis in the field of administrative law.79 This position is well described in the 1991 case 
R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p. Brind. The applicants challenged the 
legality of a decision of the Secretary of State directing British televisions to refrain from 
broadcasting speeches by IRA spokespersons. They asserted, among other things, that the 
Ministry had exceeded the limits of its discretionary powers because its decision violated Art. 
10 of the ECHR (right to freedom of expression). At the time, the Convention had not yet 
been implemented in English law. In dismissing the claim, Lord Donaldson of the Court of 
Appeal reasoned that “imputing an intention to Parliament that […] the authority to take 
executive action […] shall be subject to the limitation that it be consistent with the terms of 
the Convention […] involves imputing to Parliament an intention to import the Convention 
into domestic law by the back door, when it has quite clearly refrained from doing so by the 
front door”.80 An appeal was later dismissed by the House of Lords on similar grounds. Lord 
Ackner, most notably, also argued that “[i]f the Secretary of State was obliged to have proper 
regard to the Convention, i.e. to conform with article 10, this inevitably would result in 
incorporating the Convention into English domestic law by the back door”.81 
The courts of New Zealand, on the other hand, have adopted a radically different approach. In 
this regard, two leading cases should be mentioned. The first one is the 1981 judgment in the 
case of Ashby v. Minister of Immigration.82 One of the issues before the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal was whether the Minister of Immigration, before deciding to allow the rugby team 
of then-apartheid South Africa to enter New Zealand, should have taken into account the 
(unincorporated) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
and whether the failure to do so constituted a procedural violation. Justice Cooke conceded 
that “a certain factor” – not excluding an international treaty – “might be of such an 
overwhelming or manifest importance that the Courts might hold that Parliament could not 
possibly have meant to allow it to be ignored” by a Minister. 
In Ashby, this remained only a theoretical possibility, because the UN Convention was held 
not to meet such criteria in that particular case. But the dictum of Cook J finally found 
application in the abovementioned judgment Tavita v. Minister of Immigration. Here, the 
Court of Appeal reasoned that the Convention on the Rights of the Child was so fundamental 
that the Parliament could not have possibly meant to ignore it. This case initiated the judicial 
trend to make unincorporated treaties mandatory considerations in New Zealand’s 
administrative law.83 
After this brief survey of relevant case law, it is possible to draw some general conclusions on 
this judicial approach to consistent interpretation. In fact, at closer scrutiny, to base the usage 
                                                
79 S.C. NEFF, cit., p. 625-626. 
80 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p. Brind, [1991] 1 AC 696, p. 718. See also 
Fernandes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1981] Imm. A.R. 1; and Chundawadra v. 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal, [1988] Imm. A.R. 161. On this approach of English courts, see also R. HIGGINS, 
cit., p. 45; R. JENNINGS, A. WATTS, cit., p. 60, ft. 27 (with reference to further case law). 
81 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p. Brind, cit., p. 761-762. 
82 Ashby v Minister of Immigration, [1981] 1 NZLR 222. 
83 W. LACEY, “The Judicial Use”, cit., p. 100-104. 
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of international norms in domestic law interpretation on a presumed intent of the legislature is 
problematic on several fronts. 
A first problem is that, with the exception of the most restrictive formulations based on 
express legislative instructions, the intent on which the courts rely is purely fictitious. 
Generally speaking, reliance on legislative intent in statutory interpretation has been 
authoritatively criticized in legal doctrine. Indeed, it has been pointed out that this approach is 
based on unsound premises regarding how the legislative process really works.84 According to 
this view, the supposed intention of the legislative body is almost certainly imaginary or, at 
best, undiscoverable by the interpreter.85 If one accepts these premises, it should be concluded 
that a court’s reference to legislative intent is a mere rhetorical device.86 
These general remarks can apply also to the courts’ reliance on intent as a basis of consistent 
interpretation with international law. The weaknesses of this approach were well described in 
a passage of Justice McHugh’s opinion in Al-Kateb v Godwin, a case decided in 2004 by the 
High Court of Australia. In the words of McHugh, “this rule of construction is based on a 
fiction […] Given the widespread nature of the sources of international law under modern 
conditions, it is impossible to believe that, when the Parliament now legislates, it has in mind 
or is even aware of all the rules of international law. […] When one adds to the rules 
contained in […] treaties, the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations and the 
rules derived from international custom, it becomes obvious that the rationale for the rule that 
a statute contains an implication that it should be construed to conform with international law 
bears no relationship to the reality of the modern legislative process”.87 
Reliance on legislative intent raises other problems, too. In particular, it cannot be 
convincingly applied to statutes enacted before a certain treaty. As a matter of fact, it would 
be implausible to argue that, at the time a statute was enacted, the parliament intended not to 
violate a treaty which was not yet binding upon the state.88 
Finally, a reference to parliamentary intent is usually unable to explain for the use of 
international law to interpret domestic sources other than statutes, primarily national 
constitutions. Admittedly, there is evidence of one court justifying its reliance on international 
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p. 313-354. 
85 See, for example, C.A. SUNSTEIN, “Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State”, Harvard Law Review 
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overruling the canon just because he believed it was too well established in case law. See also J.F. COYLE, cit., p. 
712 (arguing that, when courts apply the presumption of conformity to domestic legislation which is not 
intended to incorporate a treaty, they are, “[a]t best, […] guessing at what the political branches would have 
intended if they had been aware of the potential conflict between the statute and international law at the time the 
statute was enacted. Given this lack of certainty, an interpretive approach whereby the courts conform their 
construction of ambiguous non-incorporative statutes to any and all relevant norms of international law assumes 
a level of confidence with respect to the intentions of the political branches that seems unwarranted”). 
88 R. JENNINGS, A. WATTS, cit., p. 61; A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 155. See e.g. Garland v. 
British Rail Engineering Ltd., [1983] 2 A.C. 751 (speech of Lord Diplock: “it is a principle of construction of 
United Kingdom statutes […] that the words of a statute passed after the Treaty has been signed and dealing 
with the subject matter of the international obligation of the United Kingdom, are to be construed, if they are 
reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning, as intended to carry out the obligation, and not to be inconsistent 
with it”; emphasis added). 
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law in constitutional interpretation with reference to a presumed intention of the constitutional 
drafters not to permit legislation in violation of international treaties. In AZAPO v. President 
of the Republic, in particular, the South African Constitutional Court held that “[t]he 
lawmakers of the Constitution should not lightly be presumed to authorise any law which 
might constitute a breach of the obligations ofthe State in terms of international law”.89 This 
line of reasoning, however, has remained very uncommon. This could be explained on at least 
two levels. On the one hand, the premises of this argument are even more fictitious than those 
underpinning judicial reliance on parliamentary intent. On the other hand, it has been 
contended that judges may avoid relying on a presumed intent of the constitution’s drafters in 
order to retain more discretion as to whether or not to resort to international law in 
constitutional interpretation.90 
 
3.2. Consistent interpretation and textual ambiguity. 
The application of international law in the interpretation of domestic law should not overstep 
what is allowed by the text of domestic legislation. This, by itself, is an uncontentious 
statement. How to best put this standard into practice, however, may be a matter of 
contention. 
In fact, it is commonly the case that the text of legislation leaves the door open for more than 
one reading. Such readings may or may not be all equally plausible. When faced with 
multiple possible interpretations of the same provision, national courts may resort to an array 
of interpretive options ranging between two extremes. On the one hand, they may stick to 
what they regard as the plain, ordinary, or most likely meaning of the legislation, regardless 
of whether or not it conforms to international law. Or, on the other hand, they may be ready to 
stretch out the meaning of the text as far as it is necessary to ensure its conformity with 
international law. 
This is essentially a problem of how much a court embraces textualism as an interpretive 
theory. Under a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, reliance on the letter of 
legislation is regarded as the only way for a court to approximate the actual intent of the 
lawmaker. 91  Starting from this assumption, a court willing to protect parliamentary 
prerogatives would be reluctant to depart from the plain meaning of the law; and even in the 
case of an ambiguous wording, it would refrain from choosing a possible but implausible 
meaning. In the field of consistent interpretation of international law, this protective attitude 
toward the legislature significantly limits the ambit of the courts’ reliance on international 
norms. 
The influence of the textualist interpretive paradigm on national case law is easily discernible. 
The most widespread approach which can be found in national case law is that consistent 
interpretation is acceptable only as long as the legislation is obscure or ambiguous.92 This is 
                                                
89 Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC) 
(opinion of Justice Mahomed). 
90 Y. SHANY, “How Supreme”, cit., p. 401. 
91 A.C. BARRETT, cit., p. 112. For a particularly extreme form of textualism, see the concurring opinion of 
Justice Scalia in Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 (1993), p. 528: if “[t]he language of the statute is entirely 
clear, and if that is not what Congress meant then Congress has made a mistake and Congress will have to 
correct”. 
92 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Effects”, cit., p. 147. 
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also the narrowest way to construe consistent interpretation. In a textualist frame of reference, 
“statutory ambiguity is essentially a delegation of policymaking authority to the governmental 
actor charged with interpreting a statute”. 93  Obscurity in the law being considered 
functionally equal to a gap in the law, this approach to consistent interpretation (merely) 
assigns a gap-filling function to international law.94 
Take, for example, the dictum of Lord Denning in R. v. Chief Immigration Officer, a case 
decided in 1976 by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. As the judge put it, “if there is 
any ambiguity in our statutes, or uncertainty in our law, then these courts can look to the 
Convention as an aid to clear up the ambiguity and uncertainty”.95 The same interpretive 
method was endorsed in the 1988 Bangalore Principles, the concluding statement of a 
colloquium of high-ranking judges from various countries of the British Commonwealth. The 
Principles lauded the tendency of national courts “to have regard to […] international norms 
for the purpose of deciding cases where the domestic law […] is uncertain or incomplete”.96 
The limits of this approach to consistent interpretation are self-evident. If a court considers 
the meaning of legislation unambiguous, the presumption of conformity will not apply, 
regardless of whether or not its supposedly plain meaning conforms to international law. This 
limit has constantly been spelt out in national case law. As argued in the 2014 in the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision Kazemi Estate v. Iran, “the presumption of conformity does not 
overthrow clear legislative intent” and “can be rebutted by the clear words of the statute under 
consideration”.97 In the aforementioned judgment in Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs 
and Excise, Lord Justice Diplock held that “[i]f the terms of the legislation are clear and 
unambiguous, they must be given effect to, whether or not they carry out Her Majesty’s treaty 
obligations”.98 
Even more bluntly, the High Court of Australia said in Western Australia v. Ward that “[t]he 
task of this Court […] is to give effect to the will of Australian Parliament as manifested in 
legislation. Court may not flout the will of Australia’s democratic representatives simply 
because they believe that, all things considered, the legislation would ‘be better’ if it were to 
cohere with the mass of (often ambiguous) international obligations and instruments. […] 
Where legislation is not genuinely ambiguous, there is no warrant for adopting an artificial 
presumption as the basis for, in effect, rewriting it”.99 
The limit of textual ambiguity operates also in the field of review of administrative powers. 
Here, the problem is whether or not a broad administrative discretion conferred by a statute 
should be considered as amounting to ambiguity. Just to name a few examples, in the 
                                                
93 A.C. BARRETT, cit., p. 123. 
94 M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 654. 
95 R. v. Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, Ex parte Salamat Bibi, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 979. 
96 The text of the 1988 Bangalore Principles is reprinted in Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence, 
Volume 1, London, 1988, p. ix. On this statement, see M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 645-646. 
97 Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 176. See also R. v. Hape, cit., paras. 53-54 
(holding that the presumption can be rebutted by clear terms of the statute) and Daniels v. White and The Queen, 
[1968] S.C.R. 517, p. 541 (Justice Pigeon holding that the canon of consistent interpretation based on legislative 
presumption “is a rule that is not often applied, because if a statute is unambiguous, its provisions must be 
followed even if they are contrary to international law”). 
98 As noted above, the judge went on to apply the presumption that Parliament does not intend to act in 
breach of international law. Similarly, see Ellerman Lines v. Murray, [1931] AC 126, p. 147 (speech of Lord 
Tomlin). 
99 Western Australia v. Ward, [2002] HCA 28. 
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aforementioned cases R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p. Brind and 
Ashby v. Minister of Immigration, the courts bluntly answered in the negative.100 However, it 
has been noted – and this position seems perfectly tenable – that the element of ambiguity or 
uncertainty is to some extent intrinsic to the conferral of discretionary powers.101 
Let us suppose now that a court finds that there is an ambiguity in the text of legislation and 
more meanings can be ascribed to it. If it subscribes to a textualist paradigm, this court would 
most likely be reluctant to choose a reading that, although theoretically admissible and in line 
with international obligations, appears to be unnatural or implausible. A court’s fidelity to the 
text, in sum, compels it to choose only between different plausible interpretations of 
legislation.102 The problem, though, is that it is hard to define the concept of plausibility in 
objective terms. The way this standard is employed in judicial practice can only be 
exemplified by looking at some relevant precedents. 
A first case which can be cited is an early US Supreme Court decision, Talbot v. Seeman.103 
One of the interesting features of this judgment is that it constituted the first application of the 
canon of consistent interpretation by Chief Justice Marshall, before Murray v. The Schooner 
Charming Betsy. The facts of the case can be summarized as follows. A statute granted a right 
to a reward for the salvage of ships owned by “citizens or subjects of any nation in amity with 
the United States, re-taken from the enemy”. An American captain, Talbot, took control of a 
ship owned by citizens of Hamburg and controlled by France. Since the US was at peace with 
Hamburg and at war with France, the captain demanded his reward under the statute. The 
issue, however, was that Hamburg and France were at peace and the ship’s owners did not 
consider Talbot’s feat to be a salvage at all. 
Marshall acknowledged that a reading of the statute favorable to Talbot was entirely plausible 
under the text of the provision, but noted that this would have been at variance with the 
principles of the law of nations regulating the rate of salvage. He then opted for a reading 
which conformed to such principles: he understood the statutory provision as if it referred to a 
ship salvaged from an enemy of both the United States and the state of the ship’s owners. 
While this was arguably not the most natural reading of the text, both interpretations could be 
regarded as plausible.104 
                                                
100 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p. Brind, cit., p. 748 (speech of Lord Bridge of 
Harwich: “where Parliament has conferred on the executive an administrative discretion without indicating the 
precise limits within which it must be exercised, to presume that it must be exercised within Convention limits 
would be to go far beyond the resolution of an ambiguity. It would be to impute to Parliament an intention not 
only that the executive should exercise the discretion in conformity with the Convention, but also that the 
domestic courts should enforce that conformity by the importation into domestic administrative law of the text of 
the Convention […]”); Ashby v Minister of Immigration, cit. (holding that “[t]o hold that, before exercising an 
apparently perfectly general statutory discretion in the field of immigration, the Minister was bound, by 
implication as a matter of domestic statute law, to consider a Convention of doubtful bearing on the subject 
would be […] to go beyond the legitimate realm of statutory interpretation”). 
101 W. LACEY, “Judicial Discretion and Human Rights: Expanding the Role of International Law in the 
Domestic Sphere”, Melbourne Journal of International Law 2004, p. 108 ff., p. 113.  
102 A.C. BARRETT, cit., p. 123 (noting that, when they are used to choose between equally plausible 
interpretations, canons of statutory construction are “used as tie breakers”); A. SCALIA, A Matter, cit., p. 23 (“A 
text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; rather, it should be construed 
reasonably, to include all that it fairly means”). 
103 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). 
104 A.C. BARRETT, cit., p. 136. 
 142 
Another relevant example, when speaking of plausibility in interpretation, is Weinberger v. 
Rossi. The case before the US Supreme Court concerned the application of a statute which 
prohibited to treat US personnel working at overseas military bases in a manner less favorable 
than local personnel, unless “a treaty between the US and the host country” permitted such 
differential treatment. An executive agreement between the United States and the Philippines 
signed a few years earlier established a discrimination in favor of local citizens working at US 
military facilities in the country. The issue revolved around the interpretation of the term 
“treaty” used in the statute. To interpret it in a strict sense, as only including the agreements 
that the Constitution terms “treaties” (i.e. agreements “concluded with the advice and consent 
of the Senate”), would have entailed a breach of the agreement with the Philippines. The court 
then interpreted the word treaty in a broad sense, as inclusive of executive agreements.105 In 
this case, too, both interpretations appeared permissible even under a strictly textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation. 
But, ironically, the concepts of ambiguity and plausibility are themselves ambiguous and 
interpretable. As is clear from the following examples, the criterion of textual ambiguity is 
essentially subjective in nature and provides much less certainty than would appear at first 
sight.106 
One could again cite a Canadian judgment, National Corn Growers Association v. Canada. 
Formally, the Supreme Court of Canada remained faithful to the rule that, where legislation is 
not ambiguous, international sources cannot be used in interpretation. In practice, however, 
the court overcame this limit by construing the concept of ambiguity in a manner different 
from textual ambiguity. In the court’s words, “it is reasonable to make reference to an 
international agreement at the very outset of the inquiry to determine if there is any 
ambiguity, even latent, in the domestic legislation. [The argument] that recourse to an 
international treaty is only available where the provision of the domestic legislation is 
ambiguous on its face is to be rejected”.107 In other words, the court predicated that a 
difference between the (apparently plain) text of the law and a relevant international 
obligation created an ambiguity in the legislation. By means to this artifice, the limit of 
textual ambiguity was effectively discarded. 
Or consider the 1988 decision United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization. At issue 
here was the compatibility between the 1947 Headquarters Agreement between the United 
Nations and the United States and a US statute, the 1987 Anti-Terrorism Act. The treaty 
obliged the US to ensure free transit toward the UN headquarters in New York to all 
representatives of member states and to all other people invited to the UN. In accordance with 
the treaty, when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was granted observer status by 
the UN in 1974, US authorities allowed it to establish an office in New York. The 1987 Act, 
however, declared the PLO a terrorist organization and forbade it, “notwithstanding any 
provision of law to the contrary, to establish or maintain an office […] within the jurisdiction 
                                                
105 Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982). 
106 V. NOURSE, “Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, 
and the Separation of Powers”, Georgetown Law Journal 2011, p. 1119 ff. (criticizing textualism and the 
concept of “plain meaning”). 
107 National Corn Growers Association v. Canada, [1990] 2 SCR 1324. On this case, see G. VAN ERT, 
“Canada”, in D. SLOSS (ed.), cit., p. 166 ff., p. 192-193. 
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of the United States”. The Department of Justice requested a New York District Court to issue 
an injunction closing the PLO office. 
Both the text and the legislative history of the Act, which the court cited in detail, made 
absolutely clear that the statute had been enacted precisely with the purpose of closing the 
PLO office. In a plot twist, however, the court held that the text was not entirely clear: the 
statute prohibited the establishment of a PLO mission notwithstanding “any provision of 
law”, not “any treaty”, to the contrary. It then relied on this made-up ambiguity and 
interpreted the statute so as not to violate the Headquarters Agreement.108 
 
3.3. Consistent interpretation and domestic hierarchy of norms. 
The use of international sources in constitutional interpretation has raised different types of 
concerns. Generally speaking, such concerns have not been based on interpretive or textualist 
premises – which, in the field of constitutional law, are collectively referred to as originalist 
interpretation109 – but on arguments based on the hierarchy of domestic norms. The courts, it 
is asserted, should not use lower-ranking or unincorporated sources to interpret the highest-
ranking legal text.110 
Contesting the interpretive use of international law on grounds of hierarchy, rather than on the 
basis of interpretivism or textualism, leads commentators and courts to more radical 
conclusions. As seen above, reliance on legislative intent and on the text of legislation is 
invoked to limit, not prohibit, the use of international norms in interpretation. On the contrary, 
a formalistic reliance on the hierarchy of norms leads to oppose any influence of international 
law in constitutional interpretation, except maybe for those rare cases in which a norm of 
international law has a constitutional rank in the domestic legal system. 
The main policy argument underpinning this view is that the interpretive technique under 
scrutiny may create unwarranted restrictions on the authority of the legislature and, in 
parallel, enhance the discretionary powers of the judiciary.111 This concern stems from the 
                                                
108 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, United States v. Palestine Liberation 
Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). On this case, see W.M. REISMAN, “An International Farce: 
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Review 1988, p. 364 ff. 
110 M. KUMM, “Democratic”, cit., p. 275 (terming this position “a Kelsenian argument”). 
111 It should be noted that the use of international law in constitutional interpretation has also been 
criticized on the grounds that it would unduly expand the powers of the political branches involved in the treaty-
making process. See R.P. ALFORD, “Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution”, American 
Journal of International Law 2004, p. 57 ff., p. 61 (asserting that this interpretive technique “improperly 
empowers the political branches to create source materials” that serve as “constitutional imputs”). This argument 
has already been criticized in Chapter 2, Section 3.3, hence it is sufficient here to refer to that discussion. For 
another critical analysis of this position, see Y. SHANY, “How Supreme”, cit., p. 381-383. Moreover, this 
interpretive technique has also been criticized on substantive grounds. See, again, R.P. ALFORD, “Misusing”, cit., 
p. 58-67 (arguing that international human rights could have the practical effect of diminishing the rights 
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observation that the use of international law in constitutional interpretation has the potential to 
(indirectly) elevate the status of international sources to a de facto constitutional rank, thus 
shaping the content of a text which regulates and constrains the authority of all state 
organs. 112  This makes the “constitutional Charming Betsy” a rather unique canon of 
interpretation: while the presumption of conformity, when applied to statutes, allows the 
legislature to disregard international law, in the case at hand the judges may be theoretically 
able to devise interpretive constraints on the authority of both the executive and the 
legislature. 
This concern has been described in clear words by Justice McHugh in the aforementioned Al-
Kateb v. Godwin case. He argued that, when the canon of consistent interpretation is applied 
to statutes, “the legislature is not bound by the implication. It may legislate in disregard of it. 
If the rule were applicable to a Constitution, it would operate as a restraint on the grants of 
power conferred. The Parliament would not be able to legislate in disregard of the 
implication”.113 Expressing a comparable view, Roger Alford has argued that courts should 
refrain from using international sources to interpret the constitution, because this would lead 
to the risk of such sources being used to overrule the democratic will of the people (a problem 
that he terms “international countermajoritarian difficulty”).114 
This criticism, however, is not persuasive. In particular, it is possible to put forward at least 
two counterarguments. 
A first counterargument is that critics largely overdramatize the impact on the balance of state 
powers of the use of international law in constitutional interpretation. It is noteworthy, indeed, 
that national courts engaged in constitutional interpretation often confine themselves to 
paying lip service to international sources, without significantly altering the substantive 
content of the constitutional provisions. Take, for example, Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Roper v. Simmons, where it was expressly stated that resort on international 
instruments was not controlling, but merely provided “respected and significant confirmation” 
for conclusions that the Court reached on grounds of domestic law.115 Mention should be 
made also of the case law of Russia’s Constitutional Court, which commonly cites 
international law as an auxiliary resource in constitutional interpretation.116 
                                                                                                                                                   
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution). For a similar position, although only referred to the use of non-binding 
international materials, see M.D. RAMSEY, “International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins 
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112 M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 648 (describing the “constitutional Charming Betsy” as the 
“most monistic” judicial technique in common law legal systems); D. SLOSS, “Domestic Application”, cit., p. 
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113 Al-Kateb v Godwin, cit., para. 66 (emphasis in the original). McHugh went on to say that “[t]he claim 
that the Constitution should be read consistently with the rules of international law has been decisively rejected 
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114 See generally R.P. ALFORD, “Misusing”, cit. 
115 Roper v. Simmons, cit., p. 578. 
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sources as supplementary authorities, see e.g. Russian Constitutional Court, Constitutional review of Article 144 
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The invocation of international law in such cases is clearly not aimed at constraining public 
power. The courts’ intention, for example, could be to foster judicial dialogue;117 to signal its 
willingness to comply with international law through the application of domestic law;118 or 
simply to stress the fact that domestic law is consistent with international obligations. Be that 
as it may, in these cases the interpretive use of international law does not impinge in the 
slightest way on the balance of state powers. For this reason, a criticism of these decisions 
based on the protection of democracy or the separation of powers appears misplaced. As a 
matter of fact, these interpretive uses of international law might rather be – and have indeed 
been – criticized for the opposite reason, i.e. for their limited usefulness and effectiveness.119 
The second counterargument relates to the cases where international sources are actually used 
as primary resources in defining the substantive content of constitutional provisions.120 As 
argued above, national constitutions commonly include broad standards and principles and 
empower (constitutional, supreme or ordinary) courts to enforce them against the acts of the 
legislature. Such standards constitutively leave broad discretion to the judges as to the 
definition of their content. Moreover, they also require that the judges resort to some 
“external interpretive tool” to understand their meaning. They cannot be interpreted in 
isolation.121 
When used in constitutional interpretation, international law is just one of these external tools. 
Consequently, one may well argue that, inasmuch as international law is relied on to give 
content to broad constitutional standards and rights, it actually limits – rather than enhances – 
the discretion of the courts. As noted by Yuval Shany, “reference to the more precise legal 
standards found in [international human rights] instruments and the case law of international 
monitoring bodies restricts the ability of judges to mold constitutional texts in accordance 
with their idiosyncratic personal or institutional preferences”.122 
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4. An assessment: consistent interpretation as a policy-based canon of construction. 
 
No doubt, the doctrinal and judicial trends analyzed in the previous section provide a rather 
confusing picture of the rationales and the limits of the use of international law in the 
interpretation of domestic law. As has been seen, domestic courts resort to inconsistent 
standards, and motivate their actions in differing – and often unconvincing – ways. A 
substantial cause of this confusion is the courts’ difficulty in grappling with the underlying 
policy issues relating to their interactions with the political branches. The core of the problem 
is in the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature. The more a court feels obliged 
to preserve the latitude and the prerogatives of the latter, the more likely it is to resort to 
arguments (based on grounds of legislative intent, textual ambiguity, or domestic hierarchy of 
norms) which restrict the role of international law in the interpretive process. 
To unravel this confusion, it is necessary to delve deeper into the logic behind the indirect 
application of international law by national courts. The main aim of this section is to propose 
an understanding of this interpretive technique alternative to those described in Section 3. 
Paragraph 4.1 will advance the argument that consistent interpretation should be understood 
as a policy-based canon of legal interpretation and will analyze the limits that it should 
encounter, if so understood. Paragraph 4.2 will then demonstrate that the use of international 
law in domestic law interpretation not only does not disrupt the domestic separation of 
powers, but can often help to protect it. 
 
4.1. Policy rationale of consistent interpretation. 
The principle that domestic law should be interpreted in accordance with a country’s 
international obligations is only one of the many canons of statutory construction which may 
guide the activities of national courts. Another example of a rule of such kind can be found in 
the principle that statutes should be interpreted in conformity with the constitution.123 
As demonstrated by authoritative legal theorists, the rationale of these rules of interpretation 
is not to approximate the intent of the legislature. Rather, their aim is the achievement of 
relevant policy objectives, in the pursuance of the protection of particular values and interests 
external to the interpreted statute.124 In fact, the canons of interpretation differ from the 
traditional methods of interpretation. Such methods generally set out interpretive procedures 
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canons “direct courts to construe any ambiguity in a particular way in order to further some policy objective”); 
C.A. BRADLEY, “The Charming Betsy”, cit., p. 507 (the Charming Betsy is normally classified with the 
normative canons). See also J.M. ROGERS, “Intentional Contexts and the Rule that Statutes Should Be 
Interpreted as Consistent with International Law”, Notre Dame Law Review 1998, p. 637 ff., p. 640 (describing 
the view according to which, “when a court is faced with two possible constructions of the law, and the court is 
not entirely sure which is correct, it in effect has a legislative choice. […] it may be argued that the court should 
make the choice that better furthers public policy from its own perspective. In this way, the court acts as a sort of 
interim legislature, deciding which way the statute should operate until the legislature says otherwise”. However, 
the author also asserts at p. 645 that “if no ambiguity exists, there is no room for interstitial policy-making”). 
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which are not intended to lead to any specific outcome. Canons of interpretation, on the other 
hand, single out a policy outcome that the interpreter should chase, not the means by which to 
obtain it.125 
In accordance with this theoretical background, it is possible to advance the argument that the 
canon of consistent interpretation should be understood as based on policy considerations, 
regardless of the argumentative expedients devised by national courts to justify their 
interpretive reliance on international law. The rationale of consistent interpretation, in other 
words, should be traced to the normative assumption that the international sources used as 
parameters should be complied with. National courts should avoid state infringements of 
international law as far as it is institutionally possible for them to do so.126 
National case law is replete with examples of courts that have done away with intentionalist 
and textualist premises and have resorted to a policy-based approach to consistent 
interpretation. An expression of this view, for example, is to be found in judicial decisions 
that motivate their interpretive reliance on international law with considerations of comity, i.e. 
with the perceived need to ensure respect and courtoisie toward those countries to which the 
international obligation is owed.127 
A more modern formulation of this approach was expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the aforementioned R. v. Hape case. The majority held that “[i]t is a well-established 
principle of statutory interpretation that legislation will be presumed to conform to 
international law. The presumption of conformity is based on a rule of judicial policy that, as 
a matter of law, courts will strive to avoid constructions of domestic law pursuant to which 
the state would be in violations of its international obligations […]”. Moreover, the court 
argued in an obiter that the presumption of compatibility could be overcome only if the 
legislature demonstrated “an unequivocal legislative intent to default on an international 
                                                
125 As noted by E. CANNIZZARO, cit., p. 11, this reminds of the difference between obligations of means 
and obligations of conduct. See also p. 6-8 (arguing that consistent interpretation cannot be traced back to 
systematic interpretation, which, by definition, requires that all the norms used by the interpreter are part of the 
same legal system). But see R. BIN, cit., p. 17 (asserting that consistent interpretation in general is a subspecies 
of systematic interpretation). 
126 A. NOLLKAEMPER, National Courts, cit., p. 139 (“Consistent interpretation is a technique to ensure 
performance of international obligations”); R.G. STEINHARDT, cit., p. 1128 (“The Charming Betsy principle 
places the courts of the United States in a position of oversight to avoid the possibility of international liability 
for the country as a whole”); M.A. WATERS, “Creeping Monism”, cit., p. 661 (noting that recent cases of 
consistent interpretation by common law courts show “considerably more interest in ensuring that the 
government lives up to its international human rights treaties obligations”). See also the 1998 Bangalore 
Principles, i.e. the concluding statement of the 1998 Bangalore Colloquium on the Domestic Implementation of 
International Human Rights Norms. The statement read, inter alia: “It is the vital duty of [the] judiciary […] to 
interpret and apply national constitutions and ordinary legislation in harmony with international human rights 
codes and customary international law”. The statement has been reprinted in Developing Human Rights 
Jurisprudence, Volume 8. Eighth Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic Application of International Human 
Rights Norms, Bangalore, India, 27-30 December 1998, London, 2001, p. 267 ff.  
127 See e.g. P.B. MAXWELL, On the Interpretation of Statutes, London, 1896, p. 173 (“every statute is to be 
so interpreted and applied, as far as its language admits, as not to be inconsistent with the comity of nations, or 
with the established rules of international law”); P.R. DUBINSKY, cit., p. 638 and 647 (tracing back Charming 
Betsy to comity).  On the concept of comity in international law, see generally L.D. PAUL, “Comity in 
International Law”, Harvard International Law Journal 1991, p. 1 ff.; P. MALANCZUK, Akehurst’s Modern 
Introduction to International Law, London-New York, 19977, p. 44; Y. SHANY, Regulating Jurisdictional 
Relations Between National and International Courts, Oxford, 2007, p. 166 ff. (analyzing the concept of judicial 
comity). 
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obligation”.128 In the Netherlands, too, courts base their interpretive recourse to international 
law “on a recognition that it is necessary or desirable to harmonize national and international 
law”.129 
A policy-based understanding helps illuminate the limits of consistent interpretation, too. If 
courts should be empowered to enrich the meaning of domestic law in order to harmonize it 
with relevant values, they should not be limited either by the presumed intent of the 
legislature or by supposedly unambiguous statutory text.130 In this perspective, the outer limit 
of consistent interpretation, which the courts cannot trespass, is the prohibition of 
interpretation contra legem.131 In line with this premise, some courts have gone so far as to 
strain the language of legislation – and choose, if necessary, possible but implausible 
meanings – in order to pursue the policy goal of securing compliance of the state of the forum 
with international law. 
In the 1976 case Ministero delle finanze v. Società compagnia di navigazione Marsud, for 
example, the Italian Court of Cassation pushed this approach to the limits. The case 
concerned the application of a statutory provision which was in clear violation of the GATT. 
From an analysis of the legislative history, it was undisputed that the parliament had intended 
the statute to be applied also to goods to which the GATT applied. However, the court refused 
to construe the statute in accordance with the intent of the legislature, asserting that the latter 
had not expressed an explicit intention to breach the treaty. The court reasoned that “[t]he fact 
that, as the preparatory work on the provision makes clear, the legislature (wrongly) 
considered the introduction of the new charge to be compatible with the agreement and on 
that account intended it to apply to GATT-originated goods as well, is in no sense a 
conclusive reason for the adoption of an interpretation consonant with that intent”.132 
Similar outcomes have been reached also in the United States. Indeed, although some have 
claimed that the Charming Betsy canon is only predicated on textual ambiguity,133 in fact it 
has often led US courts to depart from any textually plausible interpretation on the basis of 
policy considerations.134 
A revealing example is the 2013 decision of the DC Circuit Court in the case of Owner-
Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. (OOIDA) v. United States Department of 
Transportation. Here, the conflict between statute law and international law was apparent. 
Executive agreements concluded with Mexico and Canada exempted nationals of those two 
countries operating as truck drivers in the United States from certain medical certificate 
requirements prescribed under US law. A later in time statute, that made no mention of said 
                                                
128 G. VAN ERT, cit. p. 188-190.  
129 A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Netherlands”, cit., p. 350. 
130 W.N. ESKRIDGE, P.J. FRICKEY, cit., p. 322; A.C. BARRETT, cit., p. 113. 
131 See e.g. A. NOLLKAEMPER, “The Netherlands”, cit., p. 350 (for similar remarks on the practice of Dutch 
courts). 
132 Court of Cassation, Ministero delle finanze v. Società compagnia di navigazione Marsud, 20 October 
1976. The English translation of the passage quoted in text can be found in Italian Yearbook of International 
Law 1978, Vol. 3, p. 361 ff., p. 364. 
133 See generally A.H. BEAN, “Constraining Charming Betsy: Textual Ambiguity as a Predicate to 
Applying the Charming Betsy Doctrine”, Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 2015, 1801 ff. 
134 A.C. BARRETT, cit., p. 124; M. FRANCK, “The Future of Judicial Internationalism: Charming Betsy, 
Medellin v. Dretke, and the Consular Rights Dispute”, Boston University Law Review 2006, p. 515 ff., p. 528 
(asserting that the Charming Betsy canon is underpinned by the consideration that “[i]nternational obligations 
are serious matters” and that “[t]he international reputation of the United States ought not to be jeopardized”). 
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agreements, required the US Department of Transportation to issue regulations obligating all 
commercial vehicle operators to obtain such certificates. The regulation adopted by the 
Department pursuant to the statute included an exemption for Mexican and Canadian drivers, 
in compliance with the treaties. The OOIDA invoked the later-in-time rule and claimed that, 
since the statute had abrogated the earlier inconsistent treaty provisions, the regulation’s 
exemption was invalid. 
The court dismissed the claim and interpreted the statute as permitting the exemption. What is 
most interesting is that it did so by expressly discarding any intentionalist or textualist 
premise. Firstly, it held that “our decision is directed by a legal presumption, not an inquiry 
into congressional and presidential motives”. Secondly, it resorted to consistent interpretation 
despite acknowledging that the statute was “facially unambiguous”. The majority concluded: 
“absent some clear and overt indication from Congress, we will not construe a statute to 
abrogate existing international agreements even when the statute’s text is not itself 
ambiguous”.135 
A policy-based understanding of the canon of consistent interpretation is open to two 
objections. As will be seen, they both point – although from different perspectives – at the 
possible indeterminacy that may result from this approach. 
First of all, because they are instruments for the promotion of certain given values, the canons 
of construction have been criticized as empowering courts to make arbitrary choices.136 
Writing about the Charming Betsy, one commentator has provocatively wondered: “US courts 
try to construe statutes to avoid inconsistencies with international law. Where do they get the 
authority to apply such a rule? And why this rule and not others – for example, a rule that 
federal statutes should be construed so as not to be inconsistent with French law, or Talmudic 
law, or Plato’s ‘Laws’?”.137 
These criticisms should be taken seriously, insofar as they underline that the legitimacy of any 
canon of statutory construction lies in the legitimacy of the policy values that it promotes.138 
The idea that the pursuance of values would necessarily constitute a cover-up for arbitrary 
judicial choices, however, is unfounded. Such values should be traceable to the fundamental 
axioms of a legal system. A principle of interpretation pursuing respect for international 
obligations certainly meets this criterion. It should be recalled here that Chapter 2 has argued 
that the value of compliance with international law is firmly ingrained in the constitutional 
fabric of most national legal systems. The diffusion of a judicial canon of interpretation 
favoring conformity of domestic law with international law further demonstrates that a 
                                                
135 Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. (OOIDA) v. United States Department of 
Transportation, 724 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 2013). For a critical reading of this case, see A.H. BEAN, cit., p. 1810-
1812. 
136 See R.A. POSNER, cit., p. 816-817 (“the canons conceal […] the extent to which the judge is making 
new law in the guise of interpreting a stuatute or a constitutional provisions”); K. LLEWELLYN, “Remarks on the 
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed”, Vanderbilt 
Law Review 1950, p. 395 ff. 
137 C.A. BRADLEY, “The Charming Betsy”, cit., p. 484. 
138 C.R. SUNSTEIN, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State, Harvard, 1990, p. 158 
(“interpretive norms will be defensible only to the extent that good substantive and institutional arguments can 
be advanced on their behalf”). 
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principle of Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit (i.e. friendliness to international law) is to some extent 
recognized – however implicitly – in the vast majority of legal systems.139 
A second criticism could point to the fact that this understanding of the canon leaves a broad 
discretion to the judiciary as to whether or not to apply it.140 Admittedly, although the courts 
should pursue the policy objective of guaranteeing that the state lives up to its international 
obligations, the actual realization of this objective essentially depends on whether the judges 
embrace this policy goal and strive to secure it. In this regard, it is necessary to consider that a 
certain degree of uncertainty is inherent in all forms of interpretation. The uncertainty 
resulting from the canon of consistent interpretation, however, is inferior to the uncertainty 
produced by other methods of interpretation, because the canon pre-determines the goal that 
the interpreter should chase and requires to pursue it.141 
Furthermore, in a number of legal systems this indeterminacy has been remedied by 
establishing an obligation upon courts to interpret legislation in harmony with international 
law. The transition from a discretionary to a mandatory recourse to international sources in 
interpretation has been described as the passage from a weak to a strong interpretive 
engagement with international law.142 
A strong interpretive use of international law may be established by the law, as is the case 
with the aforementioned constitutional provisions requiring courts to interpret domestic 
human rights in light of international human rights law, or with Section 3(1) of the UK 
Human Rights Act. However, it is interesting to note that, in some legal systems, the 
obligation to resort to international sources in interpretation has been established through case 
law. One may again cite the German Constitutional Court decision in Görgülü, which 
established a form of mandatory recourse to international sources in constitutional 
interpretation. The court held that the European Covention on Human Rights “must be taken 
into account in making a decision; the court must at least duly consider it” and that “[a]s long 
as applicable methodological standards leave scope for interpretation and weighing of 
interests, German courts must give precedence to interpretation in accordance with the 
Convention”.143 
Another example can be found in Judgment 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court, 
which held that lower courts have an obligation to interpret legislation in conformity with 
international obligations. Should consistent interpretation not be “allowed by the wording of 
                                                
139 See Chapter 2, Section 6. 
140 See e.g. A.M. MANIRABONA, F. CRÉPEAU, “Enhancing the Implementation of Human Rights Treaties in 
Canadian Law: The Need for a National Monitoring Body”, Canadian Journal of Human Rights 2012, p. 25 ff., 
p. 25 (“Canada cannot afford to adopt such principles as the presumption of conformity and the legitimate 
expectations doctrine that are characterized by unpredictable outcomes”); Y. SHANY, Regulating, cit., p. 169 
(noting, with regard to judicial comity, that discretionary rules are always open to abuse); D. SLOSS, “United 
States”, cit., p. 527 (“U.S. courts have broad discretion to choose when to invoke the canon and when to ignore 
it”, and noting that they may strategically opt for the latter). 
141  A. BERNARDI, “Presentazione. Nei meandri dell’interpretazione conforme al diritto dell’Unione 
Europea”, in A. BERNARDI (ed.), cit., p. vii ff., p. xii-xiii (“l’interpretazione, per quanto legata al dato testuale, 
implica un ineliminabile «spazio di libertà» concesso agli operatori del diritto e in particolare ai giudici […] 
L’[interpretazione conforme] è invece l’unica forma di interpretazione che si impone vincolativamente, così da 
conculcare le scelte ermeneutiche del giudice”). 
142 M. KUMM, “Democratic”, cit., p. 278-279; Y. SHANY, “How Supreme”, cit., p. 401 (noting that 
establishing an obligation to conform constitutional law to international law might be perceived by courts as 
politically untenable). 
143 Görgülü v. Germany, cit., para. 62. 
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the provisions”, the judge must refer the issue of the incompatibility of legislation with 
international law to the Constitutional Court.144 The obligation for ordinary judges to interpret 
legislation in conformity with international law has later been confirmed by a consistent line 
of decisions.145 
It should be specified that the argument that courts should pursue – to the limits of their 
institutional capabilities – the consistency of domestic law and international law can only 
apply to a state’s international obligations. For this reason, national courts should differentiate 
between the role assigned to binding and non-binding international sources. The use of the 
latter as interpretive aids cannot per se be traced to the policy goal of securing compliance 
with international obligations, hence there can be no obligation for courts to ensure 
consistency of domestic law with this type of sources. 
It is helpful in this regard to refer to the distinction, recognized in many national legal 
systems, between binding authority and persuasive authority in interpretation. While the 
former type of authority must be followed and applied by a court, a persuasive authority is not 
binding in itself and can only be relevant in addition to a binding authority.146 Non-binding 
international sources can be used as persuasive authorities, i.e. they can illuminate the 
meaning and extent of international obligations,147 or they can be used as supplementary 
sources, not sole authorities, of interpretation of domestic law.148 
For the same reason, considering both binding and non-binding international sources merely 
as persuasive authorities is often incompatible with the policy goal of consistent 
interpretation.149 An example is the practice of Canadian courts, which commonly treat both 
types of sources as “relevant and persuasive” authority.150 The weakness of this approach was 
apparent in the Suresh case. One of the issues before the Supreme Court of Canada was 
whether the Canadian Charter allowed for a refugee, who was accused of terrorism, to be 
deported to a country where he would face a substantial risk of torture. The court 
acknowledged that the prohibition of refoulement to face torture was absolute under 
international law. However, this prohibition only had the weight of persuasive authority. As a 
consequence, the court did not interpret the Charter fully in line with international law 
(although this outcome appeared possible under its text) and held that, “in exceptional 
circumstances, deportation to face torture might be justified” under Canadian law.151 
 
                                                
144  EP v Municipality of Avellino, No 349/2007, ILDC 301 (IT 2007), para. 6.2. Note that in Judgment No. 
348, which it rendered on the same day, the Constitutional Court construed the obligation of consistent 
interpretation only in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights and not to all international 
agreements (see para. 5 of the section Considerato in diritto). 
145 See, e.g., Judgment 239 of 24 July 2009, para. 3. 
146 H.P. GLENN, “Persuasive Authority”, McGill Law Journal 1987, p. 261 ff., p. 264; C. MCCRUDDEN, “A 
Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights”, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 2000, p. 499 ff., p. 502-503. 
147 E. CANNIZZARO, cit., p. 9. 
148 See e.g. S.C. NEFF, cit., p. 626 (noting that, in the U.K., non-binding international acts “have been 
employed to supplement or reinforce other support for judgments reached. They have not, however, been applied 
entirely on their own as sole authority”). 
149 M. KUMM, “Democratic”, cit., p. 279 (U.S. courts considering all international sources as “persuasive” 
in constitutional interpretation). 
150 S. BEAULAC, J.H. CURRIE, cit., p. 124-125. 
151 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3. 
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4.2. Separation of powers function of consistent interpretation. 
While the primary goal of consistent interpretation is to ensure compliance with international 
obligations, it can also simultaneously perform another policy function. More specifically, in 
many instances the use of international law in domestic law interpretation can fulfill a role of 
protecting the domestic separation of powers. 
The idea that the canon of consistent interpretation fulfills a separation of powers function has 
first been advanced by Curtis Bradley and is now relatively widespread among United States. 
commentators.152 This view, as originally put forward, interprets the Charming Betsy canon as 
a form of protection of the authority of the political branches – and primarily the executive – 
in the realm of foreign affairs.153 It argues, in particular, that the rationale of the canon is to 
limit the interference of the Congress in the foreign relations prerogatives of the President. 
The Congress has the authority to legislate in violation of international law, but its intention 
to do so should be expressed clearly and not be presumed. In lack of a clear statement from 
Congress, courts should not create “foreign relations difficulties” to the executive.154 
This understanding of the canon of consistent interpretation has both similarities and 
differences with the approach described in the previous paragraph. On the one hand, the 
conception analyzed here is also based on policy considerations and acknowledges that the 
canon is not based on textual ambiguity or presumed legislative intent. Interestingly, it 
demonstrates that the prerogatives of the political branches can be protected by a canon of 
consistent interpretation even if it departs from interpretive or textualist premises. On the 
other hand, however, this view rejects any understanding of the Charming Betsy as directed at 
furthering compliance with international law. Compliance with international law is neither 
good nor bad per se, but should be pursued to the extent it shields the government from 
international embarrassment.155 
This latter claim advanced by the theory under scrutiny is unconvincing. Firstly, it is based on 
the fallacy that the US Constitution would be indifferent as to whether international law is 
complied with or violated. To the contrary, it has been demonstrated previously that the 
United States legal system – as much as, for that matter, most other legal systems – expresses 
a clear preference for compliance over non-compliance with international law. The principle 
that international law should be respected belongs to the domestic legal order as much as the 
principle of separation of powers.156 Secondly, this restrictive understanding of consistent 
interpretation is disproved by case law. As seen in the previous paragraphs, US courts are in 
line with the courts of other countries in justifying their interpretive use of international law 
with the need to ensure respect for international obligations. For these reasons, the idea that 
                                                
152 C.A. BRADLEY, “The Charming Betsy”, cit., particularly p. 524 ff. 
153 R.P. ALFORD, “Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and Abuse of Charming Betsy”, 
Ohio State Law Journal 2006, p. 1339 ff., p. 1342 (the canon “eliminate[s] international discord in furtherance 
of an executive prerogative to comply with international obligations”). 
154 C.A. BRADLEY, “The Charming Betsy”, cit., p. 526. This conception of the Charming Betsy canon has 
been described as “a restrictive and prophylactic doctrine protecting the separation of powers”: see R.G. 
STEINHARDT, cit., p. 1130. 
155 C.A. BRADLEY, “The Charming Betsy”, cit., p. 497-503 (describing and criticizing the “internationalist 
conception” of the canon). Some authors consider the canon as a kind of avoidance doctrine: see F. SCHAUER, 
“Ashwander Revisited”, The Supreme Court Review 1995, p. 71 ff., p. 73, ft. 9; R.P. ALFORD, “Foreign 
Relations”, cit., p. 1356 (“constitutional avoidance is the ‘essence’ of the Charming Betsy doctrine”). 
156 Chapter 2, Section 6. 
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the canon of consistent interpretation would be based exclusively on reasons of separation of 
powers – compliance with international law merely constituting an inadvertent effect – misses 
the point. 
This does not mean, however, that consistent interpretation cannot perform a function of 
ensuring compliance with international law and, at the same time, a role under the principle of 
separation of powers, the two functions acting as two sides of the same coin.157 If one takes 
this perspective, some points advanced by the theory described above can be generalized so to 
be applied to other legal systems as well. 
In order to better understand how the interpretive use of international law can perform a 
function of protecting the domestic separation of powers, let us first consider the case of a 
national legal system where certain international sources are granted hierarchical supremacy 
over legislation. As seen in Chapter 3, the effective implementation of the primacy of such 
international norms in the domestic legal order is generally entrusted to the national courts. 
Every time a lower-ranking statute appears to be inconsistent with a higher-ranking 
international source, the national court faces a decision whether to displace the statutory 
provision and let international law prevail.158 
It can be argued that, in order for this judicial process to function properly, it is necessary that 
the courts subscribe to a canon of consistent interpretation which requires them to interpret 
legislation in harmony with higher-ranking international norms. This approach limits the 
prioritization of international sources to cases where there is an actual, and not merely 
apparent, conflict with domestic legislation. Consequently, it limits the judiciary’s power to 
disapply or invalidate primary legislation by construing it in conflict with the state’s 
international obligations. From this viewpoint, the canon safeguards the prerogatives of the 
parliament vis-à-vis the judiciary. It also indirectly protects the democratic principle, by 
ensuring that the compression of the democratic will – as it is enshrined in the acts of the 
legislature – is reduced to a minimum. In sum, the canon of consistent interpretation acts as a 
counterbalance to the compression of the latitude of national legislatures caused by the 
primacy of international sources over domestic legislation. 
Section 3(1) of the UK Human Rights Act, for example, besides establishing a mechanism 
pursuing compliance with the ECHR, also fulfills the function to limit declarations of 
incompatibility of legislation to exceptional circumstances. Indeed, as noted by Lord Stein in 
Ghaidan v. Mendoza, Section 3 constitutes the “prime remedial measure” in case of conflict 
between legislation and conventional rights.159 The same can be said of the obligation of 
consistent interpretation set forth by the case law of the Italian Constitutional Court. The 
Court has the power to strike down legislation in violation of both international agreements 
and general international law, such violation amounting to constitutional illegitimacy.160 The 
rule of consistent interpretation drastically reduces the cases in which legislation should be 
                                                
157 R.G. STEINHARDT, cit., p. 1115 (terming these two functions “twin rationales”). As rightly pointed out 
by A.C. BARRETT, cit., p. 158, “a canon’s purpose lies in the eyes of the beholder”. 
158 See Chapter 3, Section 6. For the purposes of this paragraph, it is indifferent whether the control of 
conformity of legislation with international law is entrusted to a supreme court or to the ordinary courts. It is also 
indifferent whether the national court has the power to strike down the inconsistent legislation or is only required 
to disapply it on a case-by-case basis. 
159 Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] 3 WLR 113, paras. 38-49. 
160 See Chapter 2, Section 6. 
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struck down. Incidentally, Italian courts have the same obligation with regard to 
inconsistencies between primary legislation and the Constitution: they should not refer a 
seemingly unconstitutional statute to the Constitutional Court if said statute can be interpreted 
in a way consistent with the Constitution.161 
The situation is partially different when one turns to analyze the cases where international law 
is incorporated in domestic law with the same hierarchical rank as primary legislation. In this 
situation, the interaction between statutes and international law is regulated by the later in 
time rule or by the principle of speciality. As described in Chapter 2, this configuration leaves 
to the national political authorities (most commonly, the parliament) an option to choose to 
violate international law. This is to say that the constitutional setting grants an authority to the 
legislature to disregard international obligations through the adoption of inconsistent 
measures, in derogation of a background principle of domestic law favoring compliance.162 
The constitutional authority to violate international law belongs to the legislature, as the 
prime expression of the democratic will, and not to the judges. It is appropriate, for this 
reason, that the courts strive to avoid construing a statute in a manner inconsistent with 
international obligations, unless there is an explicit expression of the legislature’s intent to 
reject an international obligation.163 Put differently, the canon of consistent interpretation 
ensures that the constitutional power to disregard international law is effectively exercised (if 
ever) by the legislature, and not by the discretion of the courts.164 One commentator has 
summarized this feature of the canon of consistent interpretation by saying that it “allows the 
courts to sound out the political branches as to whether and how they wish to violate 
international law [and] reduces judicial interpretations mistakenly placing the [state] in 
conflict with […] international law”.165 In Whitney v. Robertson, the US Supreme Court 
                                                
161 See the oft-quoted dictum of the Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 356/1996, para. 4: “le leggi 
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expressly held that the choice to breach international law “belong[s] to diplomacy and 
legislation, and not to the administration of the laws”.166 
The same rationale underpinning this approach has been pursued in the UK, as well as in 
other states of the British Commonwealth, through the operation of the principle of legality. 
In principle, the parliament retains the authority to legislate in contravention with 
fundamental human rights, including international human rights. However, such derogations 
cannot be assumed by the courts unless they are stated clearly in legislation. As Lord 
Hoffman put it, “[t]he principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what 
it is doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general 
or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their 
unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of 
express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that 
even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the 
individual”.167 As is clear, this formulation of the principle of legality is indistinguishable 
from a policy-based canon of consistent interpretation.168 
 
 
5. Conclusions. 
 
To summarize, the judicial practice of interpreting domestic law in light of international law 
has the potential to allow courts to trespass the boundaries set by the formal status of 
international sources within domestic law. This has stirred a widespread perception that 
consistent interpretation, to the extent it is not contingent upon constitutional or legislative 
incorporation, might lead courts to invade the boundaries of legislative power. National 
courts, for their part, have devised a number of argumentative methods aimed at limiting the 
scope of consistent interpretation in ways which appear to better safeguard the prerogatives of 
the legislature. 
This chapter has argued that such judicial approaches generally rest on flawed assumptions 
about the limits of the judicial function. When they interpret and apply domestic law, national 
courts can legitimately act as agents for the promotion of fundamental values and interests of 
the domestic legal order, such as the interest in ensuring compliance with international 
obligations. By doing so, they do not transform themselves into agents of the international 
legal order, as both critics and apologists of this practice have argued.169 Rather, this 
understanding of the judicial function simply reflects the idea that courts are agents of the 
national legal system as a whole, and not of a particular parliamentary majority. In this 
capacity, they should promote the fundamental values of the national legal system regardless 
of whether or not they were considered in the enactment of a specific piece of legislation. 
                                                
166 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888), p. 195. 
167 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, p. 130. 
168 W. LACEY, “The Judicial Use”, cit., p. 104-105 (noting that statutory provisions requiring consistent 
interpretation “have an effect of fusing the principle of legality with the presumption of consistency”). 
169 See e.g. C.A. BRADLEY, “The Charming Betsy”, cit., p. 498 (criticizing the “internationalist conception” 
of the canon on the grounds that courts would act as “agents of the international legal order, rather than as agents 
of Congress”). 
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National courts, nonetheless, keep operating within the framework of domestic law and 
remain subject to the institutional limits of their function. If, in a given constitutional setting, 
the legislature has the power to bar the judicial application of international sources or to 
decide to disregard international obligations, the courts must necessarily pay heed to this 
prerogative. But a correct operation of this type of constitutional framework requires that the 
legislature exercises this prerogative expressly and that courts do not presume a violation 
when this outcome can be avoided. In this perspective, as has been seen above, consistent 
interpretation of domestic law with international law can be regarded as performing also a 
function of separation of powers, by preventing courts from ascribing an intention to violate 
international law to an unaware legislature. Consistent interpretation ultimately entrusts the 
power to violate international law to the parliament, while at the same time calling on it to 
sustain the political cost of this decision. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
To conclude this thesis, it is opportune to take stock of its findings and to verify whether or 
not they support the hypotheses put forward in the introductory chapter. 
Chapter 1 set the stage of the research by introducing its topic and identifying the key issues 
to be addressed. The starting points of the research can be summarized as follows. Because 
international law is increasingly aimed to be applied within domestic legal systems, 
commentators generally acknowledge that ensuring that state authorities comply with 
international obligations is crucial to the effectiveness of the international legal order. At the 
same time, however, international law leaves to the states a significant degree of freedom to 
choose how to discharge their obligations in conformity to the features of their domestic legal 
systems and their political set-ups. Generally speaking, from the viewpoint of international 
law, so far as deficiencies of domestic law do not cause non-compliance, the manner in which 
states set out their municipal legal systems is immaterial. Ensuring that national political 
authorities obey international law, therefore, is essentially entrusted to the domestic legal 
orders themselves. While domestic legal systems, for their part, commonly devise a number 
of legal techniques to ensure that their political branches conform to the authority of 
international law, their choices in this field may entail a tension with some fundamental 
principles of domestic law, primarily the principle of democratic legitimacy and the 
separation of powers. Accordingly, the chapter identified the main goals of this research, i.e. 
to assess (i) how considerations relating to the prerogatives of the national political authorities 
influence the discharge of international obligations within domestic legal systems; (ii) 
whether and under what conditions the protection of those prerogatives can produce outcomes 
in violation of international law; and (iii) whether there are ways to avoid such outcomes. It 
concluded that the answers to such questions can only be answered by looking at the solutions 
concretely adopted in domestic legal systems. 
Chapter 2 analyzed the impact of the considerations connected to the prerogatives of national 
political branches on the techniques through which international norms are formally made 
part of domestic law. By incorporating international law, a national legal system can reduce 
the power of national authorities to legislate or act in contravention of international 
obligations; therefore, the domestic status of international norms is a primary litmus test for a 
legal system’s determination to yield to the authority of international law. This chapter 
proposed a classification of domestic techniques of international law implementation in terms 
of three categories, depending on the amount of legal constraints they impose on the national 
lawmaking authorities, and demonstrated that each of them is underpinned by different policy 
rationales and raises different policy issues. The first category groups the instances whereby 
international law is granted primacy over primary legislation, thus constituting a limit on the 
prerogatives of all state authorities, including the legislature. It was shown that national courts 
commonly delimit the extent of hierarchical supremacy of international sources having regard 
to their substantive content and to their effects on the domestic separation of powers. In the 
second group of cases the prerogatives of the legislature are limited, international law being 
incorporated into domestic law without the need of an act of parliament, but not completely 
eliminated, because legislative authorities remain free to adopt acts in contravention of 
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international law. This constitutes a more moderate form of constraint on national political 
branches, which reflects a different balance of the competing policy considerations. Finally, 
the focus turned to those cases where the incorporation of international law can only be 
achieved by means of acts of the political branches. Ultimately, the chapter argued that the 
contextual weight of the relevant countervailing concerns appears to make it impossible for 
many national legal systems to establish an unconditioned primacy of international law over 
the acts of the legislature and the executive. Indeed, it is a common solution to facilitate 
compliance of the political branches to international law, while at the same time establishing a 
number of safety valves to domestic political processes. Notwithstanding the great variety of 
approaches, however, the chapter concluded that compliance with international law can be 
considered as a fundamental principle in the vast majority of national legal systems. 
Chapter 3 investigated the impact of considerations relating to the prerogatives of the political 
branches on the determination of the direct applicability of international law by national 
courts. By way of premise, the chapter argued that, by reason of the institutional 
characteristics of both international law and domestic law, national courts potentially 
constitute the principal agencies for the enforcement of international law against state 
authorities. At the same time, however, they operate within the web of limitations set forth by 
domestic law and, therefore, their role as enforcers of international law has a limit: they 
cannot ensure compliance with international obligations beyond what is allowed by the 
national legal system to which they belong. For this reason, considerations relating to the 
prerogatives of the political branches exercise an inevitable influence on how domestic courts 
apply international law. This statement found consistent confirmation in the analysis of how 
domestic courts assess the direct applicability of international norms. Having demonstrated 
that international law does not lay down any criteria as to whether its norms should be 
deemed to be directly applicable in domestic proceedings, the chapter submitted that the 
extent to which international norms are considered to be directly applicable by domestic 
courts entirely depends on considerations of domestic law. Limitations on direct applicability 
are (usually impliedly) produced by concerns of separation of powers, even where national 
courts purport to make them contingent on the substantive content of international norms. 
Building on this assumption, the chapter critiqued the tendency of national courts to resort to 
limitations on the judicial application of international norms in order to safeguard the 
prerogatives of the political branches. It contended that such application should be regarded as 
a natural consequence of international law’s incorporation in domestic law; that limitations on 
direct applicability should be construed restrictively by national courts; and that, in any event, 
they should be based on the very same criteria used by courts to assess the judicial 
applicability of domestic law norms. The chapter also analyzed how national courts enforce 
international norms which the constitution proclaims supreme over domestic legislation, and 
singled out two possible approaches: either the implementation of the primacy of international 
law is entrusted to a centralized control of constitutionality, or it is performed by ordinary 
courts in the concrete case. Finally, it briefly sketched out some extra-legal factors which 
explain for the lack of tangible effects of the formal incorporation of international law in 
many legal systems and which demonstrate that, broadly speaking, the domestic application 
of international law requires an effort of all state authorities and, to some extent, a 
cooperation between the courts and the political branches. 
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Finally, Chapter 4 focused on the techniques of consistent interpretation, i.e. the use of 
international law in the interpretation of domestic norms. By means of these techniques, 
national courts can draw domestic effects from international norms in ways that do not 
depend on their formal incorporation in domestic law or on their hierarchical status. It was 
shown, however, that for this reason the extent of consistent interpretation is generally 
influenced by a fear on the part of national courts that they may unduly compress or invade 
the prerogatives of the political branches. The chapter criticized the most common arguments 
advanced by national courts to limit the extent of consistent interpretation in ways that are 
perceived to protect such prerogatives: specifically, arguments which ground consistent 
interpretation on legislative intent, textual ambiguity, or the domestic hierarchy of norms. 
Ultimately, it was argued that consistent interpretation should be understood as a technique 
through which national courts pursue a policy goal pertaining to the national legal system as a 
whole, i.e. ensuring compliance with the state’s international obligations, and that, for this 
reason, the judicial attempts to limit its scope in order to protect the prerogatives of national 
political authorities are based on flawed assumptions on the nature of the judicial function. At 
the same time, the chapter also argued that, in many national legal environments, consistent 
interpretation can fulfill a function of protecting the domestic separation of powers, by 
entrusting any decisions to violate international law to the national authorities possessing 
political legitimacy and not to the courts. 
Against this backdrop, one may return to the hypotheses that had been advanced at the 
beginning of this thesis in order to draw more general conclusions. 
The first hypothesis, which contended that the tension between compliance with international 
law and the prerogatives of national political authorities is to a large extent inevitable, appears 
to be entirely confirmed. Throughout this thesis, such tension has emerged as a structural 
feature of the interplay of international law and domestic law. These considerations have been 
demonstrated to exercise a pervasive impact on all the aspects of the domestic implementation 
of international law, including, in particular, the choices regarding the status of international 
norms in domestic law and the manner in which national courts apply international law in 
practice. 
The second hypothesis claimed that international law is scarcely suited to addressing and 
solving such concerns. This contention is partially verified. On the one hand, international 
law is generally indifferent to safeguarding the prerogatives of national political branches. It 
does leave to the states a considerable freedom to apply international law in ways which do 
not disrupt domestic political processes, but this freedom is only intersticial, because it is a 
byproduct of international law’s compliance-centered approach to its domestic 
implementation. On the other hand, it is also true that some features of international law may 
decrease the probability of contestations or non-application by organs of the state based on a 
protective attitude in favor of the national political branches. For instance, the research proved 
that (i) the perceived need to protect the authority of national legislatures might be made – to 
a certain extent – less pressing by increasing the democratic legitimacy of international 
norms; (ii) international norms are more likely to be granted supremacy over primary 
legislation if their material content is substantially equivalent (or at least homogeneous) to the 
content of a national constitution, e.g. in the field of the protection of human rights; and (iii) 
the way in which international law provisions are formulated may have an influence over the 
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choices of national courts as regards their applicability in judicial proceedings, because, by 
reason of separation of powers, courts are more likely to apply international norms formulated 
in clear and specific terms rather than as statements of principle. Ultimatley, however, striking 
a balance between freedom and constraint of domestic political processes is left by 
international law to the national legal systems, to the extent compliance with international 
obligations is not jeopardized. 
As to the third hypothesis, it claimed that, although considerations relating to the prerogatives 
of the national political branches necessarily influence the domestic application of 
international law, they do not necessarily lead to non-compliance with international 
obligations. This hypothesis is also partially verified. Generally speaking, the tension between 
compliance with international law and protection of domestic political processes should not 
be dramatized. National legal systems try to resolve this tension by striking – in a variety of 
different ways – a fine balance between freedom and constraint of the national political 
authorities: the tension, therefore, is by and large a benign feature of the interplay of 
international law and domestic law. Admittedly, the previous pages described many 
prominent cases in which the tension led to non-compliance: suffice to remember, for 
example, the decision of the US Supreme Court in Medellín v. Texas, or the many cases in 
which national courts refused to interpret domestic law consistently with international 
obligations to protect purported legislative prerogatives. But the key submission of this thesis 
is that the vast majority of such instances of non-compliance, including Medellín, were 
ultimately the product of flawed understandings of the domestic constitutional set-up in the 
field of the application of international law and of the separation of powers. For this reason, it 
appears that in many cases the tension can be reconciled by national organs, and primarily 
courts, simply by resorting to principles, rules and judicial techniques which are ingrained 
within the fabric of domestic law. The above notwithstanding, considerations relating to the 
prerogatives of the national political branches necessarily set a ceiling to the expectations one 
may have about the application of international law in domestic legal systems. This ceiling 
can be lifted, but not broken. In particular, such considerations may entail a defective 
implementation of international law by the domestic legal system as a whole, as in the legal 
systems – analyzed in Chapter 2 – where state authorities control the domestication of all 
sources of international law and, at the same time, do not allow for the incorporation of 
international norms establishing obligations of states toward individuals. In such cases, only 
national political authorities may be institutionally suited to solving the deficiencies in the 
domestic implementation of international law. 
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